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The brief introductory chapter attempts to motivate the project by pointing to (a) the intuitive 
appeal and importance of the notion of an object (that is, a “paradigmatic” individual), and (b) 
the need – for the sake of progress in at least two important debates in ontology – to replace this 
notion with a series of related notions of individuals of different sorts.  
 
Section One of Chapter Two aims to accomplish two primary tasks. The first is to clarify the 
intensions of three often employed but ambiguous categorical terms: ‘individual’, ‘particular’ and 
‘object’, with emphasis on the third, which is often taken to be of particular philosophical 
significance. I carry out this clarificatory task by weighing various positions in the literature and 
arguing for explications of each notion that are maximally economical and neutral, that is, 
explications which (a) overlap as little as possible with other important ontological notions and 
(b) do not require us to take a stand on any apparently intractable (but not directly relevant) 
debates (e.g. on the problem of realism vs. nominalism about universals). The second task of 2.1 
is to delineate the various ontological distinctions that will be turned, in Chapter Four, into the 
“dimensions” of which the ontological framework I will be advocating there is composed. The 
delineation of these distinctions takes place naturally in the course of attempting to characterize 
the notion of an object (an intrinsically unified, independent concrete particular) and to 
distinguish it from the notions of an individual and a particular, in spite of the fact that objects 





In the second section of Chapter Two I illustrate the centrality of the notion of an object in 
Ontology by showing how that notion figures in the debate over the existence of artifacts. I 
argue that progress in this debate has been hindered by the way it has been framed, and that 
seeing the issue as concerning not whether artifacts exist but whether artifacts are objects (in the 
sense outlined in 2.1) enables us to better appreciate and accommodate the different 
perspectives of the debate’s participants. At the same time, this way of dissolving the dispute 
makes clear that existence is not limited to entities that fall under the relevant concept of an 
object, foreshadowing the pluralistic ontological framework to be developed in Chapter Four. 
 
Chapter Three pronounces on a second debate in ontology, in which three positions 
concerning the correct ontological assay of the class of intrinsically unified independent concrete 
particulars (objects) are in competition with each other. My conclusion is that none of the three 
positions succeeds, since each faces fairly serious difficulties. I suggest that the (or at least one 
major) root of our inability to locate the correct ontological assay is the inclination to treat all 
ontologically significant entities as objects in the indicated sense, and the corresponding 
inclination to attempt to give an ontological assay that covers all objects, neglecting important 
differences between distinct types of individuals. 
 
Chapter Four begins by displaying in greater detail the considerations (canvassed very briefly 
in the introductory chapter) that make the notion of an object appear to be indispensible. 




have already shown two areas in which the notion of an object tends to lead to confusion. So a 
tension emerges between the prima facie necessity of the notion and the reasons we have found 
for thinking that this notion either is itself problematic or at least tends to cause problems for 
other issues in Ontology. The remainder of Chapter Four consists in explaining my strategy for 
moving forward. Briefly, this strategy involves replacing the notion of an object with a series of 
concepts applicable to individuals of various types. Each of the components belonging to a 
given “individual-concept” is drawn from one or another side of one of the ontological 
distinctions that together form an overall ontological framework, and which components are 
involved is a matter to be determined by examining the conceptual demands imposed by the 
various practices (explanatory or otherwise) which we engage in, that require us to appeal to 
individuals of the type in question. The resulting “pluralistic” ontological framework provides a 
way of situating and relating types of individuals that both avoids the confusions that the single 
general concept of an object leads to, and is capable of indicating the varying degrees of 
“ontological robustness” or “object-like-ness” of any given type of individual. I conclude by 
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It seems undeniable that we encounter individuals in our everyday experience of the world 
around us. The world, as it comes to us in experience, is a world of individuals. Children, from a 
very early age, seem completely adept at singling out individuals and giving them names. The 
notion of an individual seems indispensable and fundamental to any attempt to understand or 
characterize our experience of the world or to explain how it is that we organize our experience 
into the overall view we have of what the world is like. 
 
The notion of an individual also plays a central role in a variety of philosophical disputes. To 
mention only a few, debates in ontology about “what there is” or about ontological commitment 
can be construed as asking “What (kinds of) individuals exist?” and “To the existence of which 
(kinds of) individuals are we committed by our adherence to a particular theory?”1 Debates 
concerning the nature of (synchronic or diachronic) identity necessarily employ the notion. 
Interesting questions in the Philosophy of Science concern the applicability of our ordinary 
notion of an individual to entities on the sub-atomic level. And the age-old question of the 
nature of substances – the contemporary discussion of which will be the subject of part two of 
this essay – can be seen as a question about individuals of a certain sort (the “paradigmatic” 
sort).  
 
                                                   
1 If we take a naturalistic perspective and hold that what exists are the entities quantified over in our best scientific 
theories, then these entities – the values of the relevant bound variables – will be the individuals we are justified in 




But in spite of the central importance of the notion of an individual from both everyday and 
philosophical perspectives, the notion is far from clear and unambiguous. We ourselves, along 
with the things we care about most - such as other people, our pets, our livestock, garden plants, 
houses, cars, TVs, computers, tables and chairs, etc. – indeed, medium-sized dry goods in 
general – are commonly taken to be the paradigmatic individuals. Yet upon reflection, it seems 
to be correct to think of a number of other kinds of thing as individuals as well. For instance, 
events, properties (at least when taken as tropes2), relations, classes, and perhaps the universe as 
a whole all seem to be properly referred to as individuals, in some sense. Such individuals, 
however, seem to be categorically distinct from the kind that includes paradigmatic individuals 
like those referred to above. Given that there seem to be individuals of fundamentally different 
kinds, the question arises how best to delimit the conceptual boundaries between these kinds; 
what feature(s) do they share in common, as individuals, and in what respects do they differ, as 
individuals of distinct kinds?  
 
One way to understand the present work is as a reconsideration of the traditional view that the 
category or class of what I have been referring to as the paradigmatic individuals – the category 
of objects or, more traditionally, of individual substances – should be seen, for both 
commonsense and philosophical reasons, as somehow ontologically privileged. In what follows, 
I will be giving the following technical sense to the concept denoting this category: the 
categorical concept “Object” is the concept of an intrinsically unified, independent concrete particular 
(an IICP for short). It will not, however, be my aim to defend the view that IICPs are 
ontologically privileged. Indeed, a conclusion I will eventually be drawing is that the univocal 
                                                   




general notion of an object deserves to be replaced by a series of related concepts applying to 
individuals of various types. Nevertheless, I will be taking the view seriously, since it continues 
to play an integral role in some major ongoing projects in Ontology. The first project, which I 
discuss in the second half of Chapter Two, attempts to determine whether certain kinds of 
objects exist or are real. The second project, which is the focus of the entirety of Chapter Three, 
attempts to give an ontological assay, an account from an ontological perspective (rather than a 
logical one) of what, generally speaking, objects consist of or amount to.  
 
Various considerations support the view that the category of objects is of special philosophical 
significance. I will briefly canvass some of these considerations here, noting that a more 
complete treatment of them is found in the first half of Chapter Four. For one thing, objects are 
very frequently appealed to when providing the explanans for phenomena we want to explain. 
The phenomena explicable by appeal to the presence and/or activity of objects belong to a very 
broad range, from explanations that appeal to physical bodies in classical mechanics to 
evolutionary and functional accounts in biology to accounts of rational deliberation and personal 
responsibility in decision-theory and ethics, to name only a few.  
 
Objects are the unified loci of capacities and dispositions which seem to be needed – at least 
in a large portion of cases – to serve as the referents of the nouns and noun-phrases which serve 
in turn as the logical and grammatical subjects of predication.3 Accounts of accidental change 
(change in properties) seem to be inexplicable without reference to some enduring object which 
                                                   





bears the properties. Moreover, our practice of singling out items in our experience and tracking 
them through time would apparently be unable even to get off the ground without some notion 
of a persisting substance or continuant. These are only some of the reasons that could be 
adduced in making the prima facie very plausible case that the category of objects is indispensible 
from practical, as well as scientific and ontological perspectives. 
 
I called the case for the indispensability of objects plausible only prima facie, because, as I will 
be attempting to show, the general term “object” turns out not to be as unequivocal as it may 
have been thought to be. The discussion of Chapter Three, together with the results of sections 
2, 3 and 4 of Chapter Four, provide the argument for this claim. Chapter Three shows that none 
of the three main competing attempts to provide a general ontological assay of objects is 
ultimately successful. Chapter Four diagnoses the result of Chapter Three as being (in part) a 
symptom of the misguided tendencies to treat the concept of an object as a univocal one, and to 
seek an ontological assay that applies to everything that falls under it. This mistaken assumption 
has led to a stalemate in the debate over the correct ontological assay for objects. Something 
similar seems to be taking place, as I argue in the second section of Chapter Two, in the debate 
over whether certain types of individuals (e.g. artifacts) exist. I suggest, in Chapter Four, that 
progress can be made in both of these debates – the benefits of the competing views on the 
ontological status of artifacts and the competing styles of ontological assay can be appreciated 
and better put to use – if what seemed to be a unitary notion of objecthood is broken down into 
a family of resembling concepts under which the various types of ontologically significant 
individuals fall, each such “individual-concept” drawing its conceptual components from a pool 




series of ontological “dimensions” in the context of which various distinct concepts, each 
applicable to a different sort of individual, can be situated.  
 
In brief, I will be contending that the dissolution of the notion of an object, necessary for 
progress in some important arenas of debate in Ontology, should not lead us to despair. To the 
contrary, the pluralistic approach suggested by the family-resemblance account of individual-
concepts being offered opens up fruitful avenues for progress in both of the specific ontological 





The Concept of an Intrinsically Unified Independent Concrete Particular 
This chapter will consist of two main sections. The first can be conceived of as a kind of 
ontological ‘map-making’ in which three technical concepts are distinguished – the most general 
concept of an individual – that is, a singular entity; the concept of a particular; and the concept of 
an object. The task of laying out the intension of each of these ontologically significant 
classificatory terms is an important one since, in the literature that employs these concepts, 
authors are not always as careful as they ought to be at indicating what is involved in each case. 
By sorting through a variety of disputes and issues I hope to be providing a small book-keeping 
service to Ontology by indicating what seem to be the optimal conceptual boundaries to draw 
around each of these notions. Optimality in this context involves, roughly, three constraints: (a) 
respect of common usage of terms, together with (b) an attempt to minimize overlap in the 
intensions of various terms, however related they may be, and (c) the attempt to maintain as 
neutral a perspective as possible on various seemingly intractable ontological issues. 
 
Although I disagree with some of the authors whose views I discuss in the first section, what 
will be of greater interest here are the two things I accomplish, in the course of carrying out the 
task of conceptual clarification, that will be particularly important for the rest of my project. 
First, a careful examination of each intension (of ‘individual’, ‘particular’, and ‘object’) leads to 
the explication of several ontological distinctions which will be instrumental in generating the 
ontological framework in which Chapter Four’s attempt to situate the various individual-
concepts will be able to operate. Secondly, observing some of the major fault-lines that result 




the ontologically central, general notion of an object that seems to be (often implicitly) lurking in 
the background of various important debates in contemporary ontology, two of which will be 
discussed in this thesis. 
 
The second section of the present chapter will examine the first of the two debates within 
contemporary Ontology to be discussed, a debate which focuses on the question of whether 
certain kinds of individuals (artifacts, ordinary physical objects, and mereological compounds), 
strictly speaking and in general, exist or are real. My primary goal will not be to adjudicate 
between the conflicting positions, though I will indicate in a preliminary way what I take to be 
problematic about each of them. The main conclusion of this section will, instead, concern the 
overall structure of the dispute. What is really at issue, I will be arguing, is not whether certain 
kinds of familiar entities do or do not exist, but whether the entities in question are in fact objects, 
in the ontologically central sense I will have distinguished in the first section of the present 
chapter. Showing how the debate can be recast in this way will illustrate the centrality, for 
Ontology, of the concept of an IICP, while at the same time suggesting a lesson about how 
progress might be made in this sort of debate that will be more fully developed at the end of 
Chapter Four.  
 
I treat the second debate, in Chapter Three, in much greater depth, as the conclusion I draw 
from it seems to be more directly in conflict with the prima facie claim that objects are 
indispensible for Ontology. This conflict will provide the primary impetus for the development 





2.1 Conceptual Cartography 
As noted in the Introduction, intrinsically unified independent concrete particulars (IICPs) – 
which can (in a very rough and ready way which I will qualify later on) be identified with 
ordinary objects such as human beings and pine trees, and perhaps chairs, statues, lakes and 
mountains – are the paradigmatic individuals we find in our everyday experience. Indeed the 
terms ‘individual’ and ‘object’ are often used interchangeably in ordinary English, at least in 
certain uses of those terms. For this reason, I approach the question of what it is to be an IICP 
via a consideration of the nature of individuals and of individuality. The term ‘individual’ is a 
fairly ambiguous one, and has radically differing uses in English. One thesis of this section will 
be that there is an extremely thin sense of ‘individual’ and there are at least a few thicker senses 
of the term, the thickest of which will be the sense captured by the phrase “intrinsically unified 
independent concrete particular object”. My approach to clarifying the relevant notion will take 
us through a consideration of several ontological distinctions that will also prove important for 
what happens in later chapters, most notably in Chapter Four, where the distinctions are woven 
together into a framework useful for situating various types of individuals.  
 
What is it, in general, to be an individual? The thinnest of the senses of ‘individual’ can be 
grasped by considering it as the most general count noun. In this sense, the word is capable of 
denoting absolutely anything at all, where ‘anything’ might be paraphrased as whatever we can 
think and/or talk about.4 Bertrand Russell attempts to make this sense intelligible as follows:  
                                                   
4 Whether we can legitimately talk about things about which we cannot think might be a further important question. 
If to talk about x only requires the use of a name of x in a sentence there would seem to be no special problem, but 
if to genuinely talk about x requires making reference to x certain difficulties can arise. For instance, can we make 
reference to fictional entities? What about incoherent or impossible entities? Note that neither the extension of 
Russell’s ‘term’ nor that of Lowe’s ‘entity’ (see discussion to follow) necessarily includes impossible entities; Russell 




Whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in any true or 
false proposition, or can be counted as one, I call a term. This, then, is 
the widest word in the philosophical vocabulary. I shall use as 
synonymous with it the words unit, individual and entity. The first two 
emphasize the fact that every term is one, while the third is derived from 
the fact that every term has being, i.e. is in some sense. A man, a 
moment, a number, a class, a relation, a chimera, or anything else that 
can be mentioned, is sure to be a term…5 
To know of something that it is an individual in the sense of being a Russellian term does not 
tell us much about what we are dealing with. For example, it does not tell us whether the 
something in question is actual or merely possible. In fact, even the round square – something 
which is not even logically possible – would count as an individual in this emaciated sense, since 
it can occur in such true statements as “The round square is not a fish.” Similarly, the collection 
of the Andromeda galaxy, my left sneaker and the round square would presumably meet the 
criterion as well. We might give this collection the name ‘Stanley’ and refer to it as one among 
(infinitely) many collections and make various comparative statements about it and the other 
collections.6   
 
Hopefully the description of the round square and Stanley as individuals raises some red 
intuition-flags. For one thing, we tend to think that if something is to count as an individual, it 
                                                                                                                                                              
(“anything whatever that does or could exist”). For a discussion of Meinong’s views on non-existent objects see van 
Inwagen (2003) “Existence, Ontological Commitment, and Fictional Entities” in The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, 
Loux & Zimmerman, eds. Oxford. 
Relatedly, it might be useful to distinguish three main types of entity: linguistic or grammatical, mental or 
conceptual, and real or ontological (on a physicalist ontology we might substitute “physical” for the heading of the 
third class). I have not seriously worked out the details of this suggestion, but for related discussions see various 
works by Zalta, including Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics, (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983) and 
his (2003) “Referring to Fictional Characters”, Dialectica, 57:2, pp. 243-254. 
5 Russell, B. (1964, p. 43). Citation taken from Henry Laycock’s (2002) Stanford Encyclopedia entry “Object.” Strawson 
expresses a similar notion in Individuals: “Anything whatever can be introduced into discussion by means of a 
singular, definitely identifying, substantival expression. Yet, among things that can be referred to, i.e. among things 




must be one thing. But the sense in which we can say that Stanley is one seems to be a lot weaker 
than the sense in which we say that some of Stanley’s parts are one. My left sneaker, for instance, 
is composed of material parts that are relatively close together in space-time and bound together 
by some kind of physical or chemical bonds. As a result, I can use it to knock a glass of water off 
the table by throwing it across the room.7 The relations between Stanley’s parts that make Stanley 
into a unit do not seem to be nearly so binding, and the only thing we seem to be able to do as a 
result of their “unity” is to mentally group them together and say fairly uninteresting things 
about them.8 Furthermore, the sense in which Stanley has being or is differs markedly from the 
sense in which, say, the Andromeda Galaxy is. For instance, the Andromeda Galaxy is part of 
the actual world. I can point toward it, and even observe it with the naked eye on sufficiently 
clear nights. It takes part in causal interactions (or at least could do so) such as merging with 
other galaxies. Stanley, on the other hand, does not exist (since one of its essential components 
does not), and, taken as a whole, does not clearly have any abilities to interact causally with 
anything else.  
                                                                                                                                                              
6 For instance, “Stanley has more members than Thomas (the collection of the Andromeda galaxy and my left 
sneaker)” or “Stanley is not identical to Linda (the collection of the Andromeda galaxy and the relation of 
motherhood).” 
7 Note that the parts of my sneaker might be its commonsense parts; they might also be its microphysical parts (e.g. 
atoms). There are interesting arguments for the view that even an apparent individual like my sneaker can be called 
an ‘individual’ only improperly. On accounts like van Inwagen’s (1990), for example, the only individuals that exist 
are living organisms and material simples. Artifacts, like my left sneaker, and non-living natural objects like rocks, 
are nothing but “arrangements of simples” (p. 108). Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons, 2000) makes a case for a 
similar conclusion, but using different arguments. He employs a thesis called “the overdetermination of causality” to 
say, for instance, that since the atoms arranged rockwise (what we would normally call a rock) are what cause a glass 
of water to topple from the tabletop, the rock could not cause the same event to take place on pain of causal 
redundancy. But since rocks have no non-redundant causal powers, they do not exist (See Olson’s Critical Notice: 
“The Ontology of Material Objects” (2002)). These issues will be discussed more fully in the second section of the 
present chapter. 
8 The sense in which Stanley is one will presumably be related to the sense in which the members of any arbitrary 
grouping of entities are one. We can draw a further distinction here between the (truly) minimal cases in which the 
members of a group or class are one simply in virtue of their belonging to the same group, and the cases in which 
members of the group are relevantly similar to one another, so that their grouping is non-arbitrary (or at least less 
arbitrary). The unity of the latter group seems to be, however ephemeral, at least more robust than the unity of a 





As we have seen, Russell holds the words ‘unit’, ‘individual’, and ‘entity’ to be synonyms for 
his ‘term’. According to Lowe (2003), however, we ought to keep these words separate. In the 
following passage he makes a few important distinctions to which I will be returning later in this 
section. 
There are three key terms whose application may easily be conflated… 
‘individual’, ‘object’, and ‘particular’. None of these terms has an 
application as general as the perfectly general term ‘entity’ (or ‘item’), 
which can be used to denote anything whatever that does or could 
exist. The term ‘particular’ is generally used in opposition to the term 
‘universal’ – particulars being entities which instantiate (are instances 
of) universals, on the assumption that universals do indeed exist. The 
term ‘object’ (or ‘thing’) is generally used in opposition to the term 
‘property’ – objects ‘possessing’, or being ‘bearers’ of, properties and 
properties being ‘borne’ by objects. Properties, however, may either be 
conceived to be particulars (when they are commonly called ‘tropes’) or 
else be conceived to be universals. Finally, the term ‘individual’ denotes 
something that has ‘individuality’ or, in other words, something that is 
‘individuated’, in the metaphysical sense explained above.”9 
 
According to Lowe, the meanings of ‘object’ and ‘particular’ should not be run together with the 
meaning of ‘individual’ since they are to be understood as correlatives to distinct contraries – 
‘property’ and ‘universal’ respectively. Furthermore, although ‘entity’ and ‘item’ are synonymous 
with the Russellian ‘term’ (modulo the caveat in footnote 4), we ought not to conflate these with 
‘individual’ either. Rather we ought to reserve the term ‘individual’ for the purpose of denoting 
something that is metaphysically (as opposed to epistemically) individuated – that is, something 
possessing a principle of individuation that makes it to be one thing, and the very thing that it is, 
as opposed to any other.10  
                                                   
9 Lowe, E.J. “Individuation,” in The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, Loux & Zimmerman eds., p 77.  
10 We might ask how much knowing that an object possesses a principle of individuation tells us about what we’re 
dealing with. We might assume that a necessary condition for something to be metaphysically individuated is that it 





As will become evident, I follow Lowe to a significant extent in his characterization of the 
intensions of ‘object’ and ‘particular’, though I attempt to elaborate on the summary 
presentation he gives in the quotation above. My main point of contention concerning Lowe’s 
demarcation of the intensions of these terms concerns the intension of ‘individual’; for there 
seem to be well-entrenched uses of ‘individual’ that do not require that the entity denoted by the 
word possess a principle of individuation.11 
 
The following table delineates the various senses of ‘individual’ that will emerge from the 
discussion that follows, going from lesser to greater degree of robustness: 
1. A Singular Entity 
An entity possessing individual or numerical unity and 
capable of being a determinate cognitive content or 
logical subject.12 
2. A Particular A non-instantiable instance of some determinate kind. 
3. A Concrete Particular 
A particular existing at some unique spatio-temporal 
location. 
4. An Object 
An intrinsically unified concrete particular which is 
ontologically independent. 
 Table 1: Senses of ‘Individual’.  
In the following three sub-sections I will seek to explain the principled differences between the 
kinds of individual denoted by each of these senses. The category of individuals that will be of 
greatest interest for the rest of my project is the sense given by the term ‘object’. There has been 
                                                                                                                                                              
about Pegasus we are thinking of something individuated or possessing individuality. Throughout this discussion, I 
will refrain from making actuality a requirement for membership in any of the sub-categories of ‘individual’. It 
seems unproblematic to say there are or could be (merely) possible individuals belonging to most, if not all, of these 
kinds. 
11 In other words, I agree with Russell that there is an important sense of ‘individual’ that is synonymous with 
‘entity’, ‘item’, and ‘term’, and see no reason to exclude this sense from the outset. 




a good deal of controversy in recent literature concerning whether certain individuals or entities 
commonly thought to exist do in fact exist. It is my view that what is really taking place is that 
the force driving the claims of authors who deny existence to certain types of individuals comes 
from their view that all and only those items that meet the criterion given in the above 
description to count as objects, combined with the assumption that anything that is not an 
object does not exist. The second section of the present chapter will bear out this claim. 
 
 
2.1.1 The General Intension of ‘Individual’ 
There are several philosophical issues concerning individuals. Arguably, before any of the others 
can properly be addressed, we must deal with the issue of the intension of the concept of 
individuality. That is, we need to have a fairly clear idea of what it is to be an individual, in the 
most broad and general sense. Gracia (1983, 1988) has produced a neat summary of much of the 
thought on this topic. He argues that among six features that have been considered by 
metaphysicians to be central to something’s being an individual, only one – non-instantiability – 
provides a necessary and sufficient condition of individuality. I will briefly consider each of the 
five characteristics that Gracia dismisses, followed by the one he accepts.  
 
(i) Indivisibility. It has been thought that to be a genuine individual, an entity must be such that 
it cannot be divided into entities of the same specific kind as itself. So, for example, a dog is 
indivisible in this sense, since the parts of a dog are not dogs. The universal ‘man’, on the other 
hand, is not indivisible, since it divides into units specifically the same as itself (namely, men). A 




to be individuals that are divisible into units of the same kind, and so they seem to provide 
counterexamples to the indivisibility criterion. But one might deny this by claiming that though 
the particular gallon of water is divisible into smaller portions, it isn’t divisible into other gallons 
of water, and similarly, a pile of ten stones is not divisible into further piles of ten stones, though it 
is divisible into (say) two piles of five stones. But Gracia argues that we can’t save the 
indivisibility criterion in this way because there could be an infinite collection of things which 
would be an individual and yet would be divisible into other infinite collections.13 The only way 
to preserve the criterion, in light of this kind of counterexample, is to modify it by adding that 
the original entity must not perish or radically change as a result of the division. But even if we 
do this, says Gracia, we still face the problem that the basis of the distinction between 
individuals and universals is flawed, since a universal is not divisible into instances that are 
members of the same specific kind as itself. When we call a particular man “a man” we are 
saying that this particular entity belongs to a certain class. The species ‘man,’ however, “cannot 
be a member of a class which is identical with itself.” Since a class cannot be included as an 
instance of itself in the way in which its particular instances are included, we have to jettison the 
idea that individuality is indivisibililty.  
 
(ii) The second proposed criterion of individuality is what Gracia calls Distinction. The idea 
here is that if something is an individual then it must be numerically distinct from all other 
entities, including those of the same kind as itself. The problems with taking this as a necessary 
and sufficient condition of individuality are (a) that there could be a universe containing only 
                                                   
13 It should be noted that we have another option here. We can say that the fact that collections and homogeneous 
parcels of matter fail to satisfy the criterion of indivisibility as stated shows that we should not consider them as 




one individual, but any individual occupying such a universe would not be distinct from 
anything,14 (b) that numerical distinction presupposes individuality rather than vice versa, and (c) 
that individuality is an intrinsic feature of whatever has it, while distinction is an extrinsic 
relation. 
 
(iii) The third option is belonging to a group (or a class or a set). Gracia calls this division. But the 
ability to belong to a set which has multiple members cannot be the measure of individuality 
because we can conceive of individuals which do not belong to any group. Angels, for instance, 
were thought by medieval theologians to be species unto themselves.15   
 
(iv) Diachronic identity – the ability to remain the same across time and through certain kinds of 
changes – has also been taken to be the decisive factor in determining whether something is an 
individual. A difficulty here is the possibility of an instantaneous individual which would, by 
hypothesis, endure neither through time nor change.  
 
(v) Finally, some have tried to express the core of individuality by appeal to the characteristic 
of impredicability, the individual being defined as that which can be a subject of predication but 
cannot be predicated of anything else. But while it is true to say this about individuals, it is only a 
                                                   
14 Though if ‘distinction’ is spelled out as “for all y, either y is distinct from x or y is x,” then this is satisfied by a 
universe with only x in it. Furthermore, it is not entirely clear why the sole occupant of a given universe could not 
be distinct from individuals in other possible universes. 
15 Traditionally, to say this would not be to say that angels can’t be taken together as a group (the group of the 
angels) but that they do not share the same essence, and so any grouping of them is only based on non-essential 
properties and so relatively arbitrary in a way that grouping dogs together in virtue of their common essence is not. 
If one does not like the angel example, the same point can be made based on a Leibnizian account of the nature of 




logical feature of them as opposed to the ontological feature we are seeking in asking about 
individuality.  
 
Gracia concludes that the only feature that gives a necessary and sufficient condition for 
something’s being an individual is its noninstantiability, that is, the impossibility that anything 
should instantiate an individual. Noninstantiability, unlike indivisibility, is what truly makes the 
difference between individuals and universals since universals are precisely those things that are 
instantiable (by individuals), while every individual is an instance of some universal.16 
Noninstantiability does not require duration through time or change, unlike identity. 
Furthermore,  
it is an ontological feature [unlike impredicability], and it is independent 
both of the specific kind of thing the individual is [unlike indivisibility, 
which is at best a necessary condition of material individuality and unlike 
division, which requires the individual to belong to a group of more than 
one] as well as of the kind of universe to which the individual belongs 
[unlike distinction, which holds only in a universe with more than one 
individual].17 
So, according to Gracia, being noninstantiable is the only truly fundamental feature of 
individuals as such. Gracia argues further that instantiability and noninstantiability (universality 
and individuality) are (a) “exhaustive and mutually exclusive notions” such that “everything is 
either one or the other, but not both” and (b) primitive and unanalyzable: “Any analysis of 
them,” he says, “will necessarily be circular; that is, it will contain a reference, explicit or implicit, 
                                                   
16 We might wonder how this use of ‘universal’ and the treatment of universals as classes in (i) is compatible with 
the possibility of individuals that do not belong to any group raised in (iii). Gracia might respond by saying that the 
former is his own view, while the latter is a view he himself does not ascribe to, but in the absence of an argument 
to the contrary, this should be admitted as a conceptual possibility and thus as a potential objection to seeing 
divisibility as necessary for individuality. 




to one or the other.” 18 This does not entail that the five features dismissed are unimportant in a 
consideration of individuals – indeed some of them seem likely to be features that belong 
necessarily to the individuals of our world – but only that they do not tell us completely and 
unequivocally what it is to be an individual, as noninstantiability does. 
 
While I agree with Gracia that features (ii)-(v) are not sufficient to give us the general 
intension of individuality, I find his identification of individuality with noninstantiability 
problematic for a few reasons, and although I would not appeal to indivisibility in (i) – at least 
not as formulated – to provide the sought-for intension, I do think it is on the right track to the 
correct general sense of ‘individual’.  
 
First, consider noninstantiability. As noted, Gracia sees individuality as the correlative concept 
of universality. Instantiability belongs to universals in virtue of the possibility of multiple 
particulars being exactly similar in certain respects. When, for instance, two electrons share 
exactly the same charge, C, a way of explaining this is by saying that the universal property of 
possessing C is instantiated in each electron.19 But conceiving of individuality as non-
instantiability, and thereby making the notion of individuality essentially dependent on the prior 
notion of instantiability – the defining feature of universals – might be viewed as seriously 
problematic by someone who doubts the existence of universals. A nominalist might have 
principled reasons for thinking the notion of instantiability, together with the accompanying 
                                                   
18 Gracia (1988), 235.  
19 The possibility of exact similarity is one of the phenomena thought to be explained by appeal to universal 
properties. There are others (see Swoyer’s (1999) “Properties”). Note that exact similarity between multiple 




notion of a universal, are incoherent. In that case, a conception of individuality given in terms of 
the negation of instantiability would be singularly unattractive. In light of this, it seems to be 
preferable, in accordance with the constraints on optimality given earlier, to develop a 
conception of individuality that is neutral in regard to the problem of universals, a conception, in 
other words, compatible with the view that everything that exists is individual. But where could we 
find a conception of individuality whose extension covers all the entities we wish for it to cover 
and yet does not proceed by opposition to universals or depend on any conception of them?  
 
I think the relevant conception is to be found in the notion of singularity or ‘individual unity’. 
Singularity is the complement of plurality, so that necessarily, if an entity is singular, it is not 
many. We might say, on a certain interpretation of what it is to be a collection (at least a 
collection containing more than one member), that a collection is essentially a plurality 
(essentially many things, rather than a single thing).20 Quantities of physical stuff like water or 
gold might be another example of something properly thought of as a plurality rather than a 
unit, in the sense that what such a quantity is is a multiplicity of things (water molecules, gold 
atoms, etc.). Possession of individual or numerical (as opposed to specific) unity entails being 
one – a single entity. Notice how this harkens back to Russell’s description of a term as 
something that can be counted as one.21  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
a single individual only (and, possibly, a universal might go completely uninstantiated, and nevertheless be 
instantiable). The notion of instantiation will be discussed in significantly greater depth in Chapter Three. 
20 Singleton sets and the empty set would require a different treatment. 
21 I take the fact that the intension of individuality, in the sense I am trying to give it here, corresponds to a large 




A sort of ambiguity appears here, since we have ways of calling something one which, from 
another point of view, we might want to call a plurality. A flock of fifty sheep can be thought of 
as one thing – a flock – yet if it is asked what the flock is (ontological is), the correct way of 
answering the question is to say that the flock is just the fifty sheep that make it up. We can 
mentally group them together and refer to them with the singular substantive noun ‘flock’, yet 
for all that the ontologist might not want to say that flocks exist (or if they do, they are 
essentially plural entities). But even though we see a group of creatures like a flock of sheep as a 
plurality, we may have reason for thinking of them as an individual, insofar as the conjoint action 
of the sheep imitates in some respect the activity of a genuine individual. The movement of 
certain schools of fish, for example, definitely could give the impression to a hungry predator of 
being a single entity. If these grounds were strong enough, we might use them to distinguish the 
kind of unity possessed by a flock of sheep from that possessed by collections like Stanley, or by 
a collection of fifty sheep, no one of which is within ten miles of any other. 
 
To be an individual, then, in the general sense I am advocating, is to possess numerical unity, 
whether the unity is actual or only an artifact of the way we think of things. In the latter case, it 
will be possible for a number of things which are in fact a plurality to have numerical unity 
bestowed on them by our conceptual capacities. In the case of such an entity, it will be a matter 
of choice whether we see it as a plurality or as an individual. When we do see it as an individual, 
it might be argued, our ability to do so is parasitic on our practice of picking out more robust 
individuals – those possessing objective or ‘intrinsic’ numerical unity. In the following sub-






Now, as Gracia himself points out, unity is a very broad notion. He argues against appealing 
to unity to characterize individuality on the grounds that to do so is uninformative, given the 
various types of unity that can be considered.22 “[T]o capture the essence of individuality,” he 
writes, “we must go beyond that very general term and say that this individual unity consists in 
non-instantiability.”23 But in addition to its lack of neutrality in regard to the question of 
Universals, conceiving of individuality as non-instantiability seems to be problematic in other 
ways as well. For one thing, saying that a given entity is non-instantiable seems to be subject to 
the same charge of uninformativeness raised by Gracia against singularity conceived as 
possession of numerical unity. We might ask what cognitive difference it would make to know 
of some entity that it is impossible for it to be instantiated. A property given in purely negative 
terms (in this case by negating instantiability) does not give us any indication of what, positively, 
possession of this property amounts to. In virtue of what fact(s) about the individual is it true to 
say that it cannot be instantiated?24  
 
Conceiving of individuality in the broadest sense as singularity still excludes some entities, 
namely whatever entities cannot properly be conceived of as individuals (entities that are 
essentially plural). Collections, for instance, and perhaps sets or even universals themselves, if 
                                                   
22 1988, 55. Among them he lists conceptual, mathematical, formal, structural, substantial, spatial, temporal, organic, 
and class unity. But there seems to be no obvious problem with having a general concept which is susceptible to 
various divisions, or even with having a family of connected concepts, so long as there is something that links them 
together, in virtue of which the various kinds count as kinds of unity. For the charge of uninformativeness to be 
effective, Gracia would have to show that no such link exists.  
23 Ibid. 
24 Gracia does take some steps to address this kind of charge by claiming that the negative characterization actually 
stands in for a more positive ontological property (ibid, 55-6). My only point here is that if one rules out singularity 




conceived as identical with their members or their instances, seem to be essentially plural. Of 
course if any of these entities is reified – conceived as a unified entity existing somehow in 
addition to its members or instances – then we would have to include it as an individual. And 
indeed it seems quite possible to conceive of such entities in this way, as determinate cognitive 
contents – the Platonic Forms or Ideas being a very clear example of such a conception. The 
only way to justify refusing individuality (in the sense of singularity) to collections, sets and 
universals, then, would be to argue that there is in fact no coherent way of conceiving of them as 
units in their own right. But given that (when so conceived) they have properties which are not 
possessed by their members or instances, it seems to follow that they cannot be identical with 
those members or instances, and so are at least conceivable as individuals.  
 
But even if we admit collections, sets, and universals as proper referents of count nouns and 
possessors of individual unity, there are other entities which we might still want to exclude. I 
have in mind here the quantities of homogeneous matter mentioned earlier – ‘parts of stuff,’ as 
this category is sometimes labeled. In this case we may have an example of a kind of entity 
which is non-individual. Parts of stuff cannot be referred to using a count noun, as we use to 
refer to a fish, a number, or a puddle, but only by using a mass noun, like ‘water’ or ‘gold’. The 
fact that there isn’t a proper way of talking about these as individuals may be indicative of their 
ontological status. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
standard to then count non-instantiability as doing so. Non-instantiability remains uninformative until the positive 




It would seem odd to give an affirmative answer to the question, “Is this water an individual?” 
Our considered view should, instead, be that this water is many individuals - that is, many water 
molecules that happen to be tied together by certain chemical bonds. ‘Waters’ cannot be 
counted. Looking at the water pooling in different places on my driveway I cannot sensibly say 
that there are five waters present there. At the same time, there may be reason to think this 
distinction somewhat artificial, since it does not seem nearly as odd to give an affirmative answer 
to the question, “Is this puddle of water an individual?” where the puddle in question might be 
identical to the water referred to in the original question. Puddles can be counted; there can be 
five puddles on my driveway after a rain shower. It might seem then that the distinction between 
a genuine individual and stuff is merely a verbal one.  
 
One way of replying to this would be to say that as a matter of fact, a puddle is not an 
individual, even if we seem to be capable of referring to it as if it were. Though we can mentally 
put boundaries around this particular portion of stuff and give it a label, and though the water 
molecules picked out are relatively close to one another in space and connected by chemical 
bonds, when properly considered, a puddle is a plurality, and not an individual (at least not a 
genuine individual). 
 
Lowe (2003) distinguishes between “entities that may properly be described as being 
‘individuals’ or as having ‘individuality’ ” and those which fall short of being proper individuals 




countable), and (b) determinate identity.25 A given quantity of water would fail to be a genuine 
individual because it is “decomposable by indefinitely many different principles of division into 
smaller quantities of the same kind and requiring no spatial connectedness among their parts.” 
So a quantity of water (or of some other type of material stuff) would fail to meet (a) even 
though there might be no question about its being determinately identical with itself and distinct 
from any other thing, thus satisfying (b). And, says Lowe, certain entities – like the two electrons 
orbiting the nucleus of a particular helium atom – might satisfy (a) in virtue of being genuinely 
countable, while failing to yield appropriate conditions for enabling us to discern the determinate 
identity of the one from the other. Taken together, then, (a) and (b) seem to give us criteria for 
being (metaphysically) individuated, and thus for being an individual.  
 
Criteria (a) and (b) do seem to capture important intuitions about what we would like to count 
as individuals. Yet, like Gracia’s noninstantiability, they do not capture the broadest sense of 
individuality. In the case of Lowe’s criteria, the problem is with making intrinsic unity a 
requirement. Intrinsic unity is unity that obtains independently of human thought or 
conceptualization. But there is also extrinsic unity, a kind of unity I have been hinting at in the 
preceding paragraphs, which is imposed on entities by a knowing subject.26 We would be unable 
                                                   
25 Lowe (2003), 78. 
26 For more on this distinction, see Newman, A. (1992), p. 166ff. I realize that my use of ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ 
may not be entirely standard. Specifically, ‘intrinsic’ is often contrasted with ‘relational’. In a sense, this contrast 
does hold true in the case of my use of the terms, though the relation involved in extrinsic unity always obtains 
between some objects and the mind that brings them together. The distinction I intend to capture is along very 
similar lines to the one drawn by Leibniz:  
That which is one per se is one from the nature of the thing. That which is one per accidens arises 
when many entities are conceived in the manner of one by a single act of mind, like a pile of logs 
(A VI, iv, 401). 
[A]n aggregate is nothing other than all those things from which it results taken at the same time, 
which really have their unity only from a mind, on account of those things which they have in 
common, like a flock of sheep (GP II, 256). 




to make sense of much of our discourse if we were unable to appeal to individuals unified 
extrinsically like armies, flocks of animals and piles of sticks. The broadest notion of 
individuality, it seems, should extend even to entities unified only extrinsically. A collection, such 
as Stanley (the collection of my left sneaker, the Andromeda galaxy and the round square), if not 
essentially plural, would be an individual in this sense. The only thing that unites Stanley’s parts 
is that we can think of them all together.  
 
There may seem to be a problem here since there could be other collections which, unlike 
Stanley, have not yet been thought of, and which would nevertheless seem to possess just as 
much unity as Stanley himself does. The fact that one such collection has been thought of by 
someone and another has not seems to play no obvious role in determining whether they exist 
or what members they have or anything else about them. My response is that if the only kind of 
‘unity’ we acknowledged was intrinsic unity – unity that comes from the thing rather than from 
us – then it would be true that unthought-of collections possess just as much unity of that kind 
as Stanley does – namely, none. In other words, a collection is simply not the kind of thing that 
has unity from itself. The real problem with Stanley – or with any (mere) collection – is that 
there is no real (extra-mental) relation holding Stanley’s parts together as a unit. We might 
attempt to say that all collections, whether thought-of or not, have in common that their parts or 
members can be thought of as one, and that it is conceivability-as-one, rather than actually being so 
conceived, that is the source of the unity of every collection. But even then, the fact that the 
source of unity involves the activity (even if only potential) of some thinking subject goes to 
show the absence of unity on the part of the collection itself. Of course, the members of some 




between them. The class of all the atoms making up my goldfish at a given instant in time 
certainly are bound together in ways that do not depend on what I think about them. But this is 
something about the atoms, and not about them as members of a class. 
 
Possession of intrinsic unity seems to belong necessarily only to those individuals which are 
“paradigmatic” and can properly be called objects in the sense to be clarified. But we can also 
make room for a class of entities whose unity is more than merely extrinsic, yet is also 
importantly distinct from that possessed by objects. My shirt, for instance, might possess 
intrinsic unity because of the chemical bonds holding its parts together, and yet, though we 
would not want to say that the unity of the blueness of my shirt is imparted only by a perceiving 
subject, we would also not want to say that the blueness is on par with the shirt itself. The 
reason is that, arguably, the unity of the blueness of the shirt depends entirely on the unity of the 
shirt itself (since if there were no shirt, there would be no blueness). In light of this, we might 
want to distinguish a type of dependent intrinsic unity possessed by such things as tropes. But 
putting possible varieties of intrinsic unity aside, it seems to be difficult to deny that there are 
some individuals (single entities) – collections counting among them – which do not possess 
intrinsic unity of any kind. At the very least, we should keep our notion of individuality open to 
this possibility. For this reason, being metaphysically individuated, in Lowe’s sense – which 
requires possession of intrinsic unity – does not give us the intension of individuality in general.   
 
Essential pluralities – entities that are not properly conceived as units or as referents of a 




sense of singularity or possession of numerical unity. As noted earlier, if collections, sets and 
universals are regarded as entirely reducible to their members or instances, then they might be 
candidates for exclusion. Likewise, if ‘parts of stuff’ are in fact pluralities that do not properly 
possess numerical unity (singularity), then we ought perhaps to place these too outside the scope 
of the extension of individuality. In this connection, some philosophers have argued that 
reference is not always singular, but that there can be irreducibly plural reference. Henry 
Laycock, in a discussion of the views of George Boolos, writes, 
…the dichotomy of singular and plural, one and many – though it is 
‘merely’ semantical, and not also ontological – is to be accepted as 
absolute or as such. Semantically, the plural is not the singular writ 
large. Boolos urges us to abandon the idea that the use of plural forms 
must be understood to commit one to the existence of sets…. Entities 
are not to be multiplied beyond necessity…. It is not as though there 
were two sorts of things in the world, individuals and collections…. 
There are, rather, two different ways of referring to the same ‘things’.27 
In order to accept this line of reasoning, we are not required to invoke any new ontological 
category (‘the many’). But since we are dealing, in respect of the most general sense of 
‘individual’, with entities that may exist only as objects of thought (and if, following Leibniz, it 
turns out that the correct way to characterize the existence of things like collections is as mental 
entities), we can say that at this level there are some entities that are not properly individual – 
they do not make up an object of thought, but rather are objects of thought. Some ‘things’ are 
(semantic are) individuals, others (the beavers in Lake Superior; the rocks raining down from the 
sky; the jewels in the queen’s crown) are, when treated as mental entities, just irreducibly plural. 
So it seems to turn out that while ‘object of thought’ is equivalent with that utterly neutral term 
                                                   
27 Laycock, H. (2002) “Object” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Laycock also briefly discusses Russell’s notion of 
“the absolute diversity of the many,” the view that “there is simply no such object as ‘the many’ – no such thing as the 




‘entity’, there may be a fundamental divide between whether some entity is a singular object of 
thought, or a plurality of objects of thought.  
 
For my immediate purposes, I don’t think a whole lot ultimately turns on whether or not we 
conceive of collections (or universals) as entirely ontologically reducible to their members (or 
instances) – that is, as essentially plural – or as additional pieces of ontological furniture over and 
above their members. The point I want to make is that conceiving of individuality in terms of 
unity allows us to deal with the case of collections or universals either way. If they are essentially 
plural, then they are entities but not individuals, and if they are, in some sufficiently mind-
independent sense, unified in their own right, then they are individual entities, and we will say in 
that case that all entities are individual. The advantage of the position I have been advocating 
over Lowe’s view is that, while Lowe is forced to reject the possibility that collections brought 
together by extrinsic unity can be seen as individuals, thus denying intuitive reasons for seeing 
them as units, my conception of individuality makes room for this possibility, without 
necessitating the adoption of a stand on the issue, and even allowing that the difference between 
seeing such entities as individuals or as pluralities may be only a matter of perspective. The 
driving force behind this approach is the idea that the more neutral an ontological perspective is 
in regard to the more intractable metaphysical issues, the better. On the perspective I am 
advocating, we can also explain the reason for the red intuition-flags raised by entities like 
Stanley – while Stanley is certainly not an object, we have now distinguished a suitably thin 
notion of an individual under which even Stanley and his companions may fall, and we can say 





To see the intension of individuality as given by singularity or numerical unity – whether it be 
extrinsic or intrinsic – is a more precise way of characterizing what it is, in general, to be an 
individual than the ways proposed by either Gracia or Lowe. Conceiving of individuality as 
singularity allows us to remain neutral on the topic of whether or not universals or collections or 
parts of stuff are individual, countable entities, whereas both of the rival conceptions force us to 
take a stand on the issue. But this seems to be something we should not want to do, especially in 
regard to the issue of universals, since we have ready to hand another concept that can take the 
role. The concept I have in mind is the concept of a particular, and if the way I am conceiving of 
the issue is correct, this will involve one step up in degree of robustness from the bare concept 
of an individual. Even if every particular is an individual, seeing individuality as singularity leaves 
it as an open question whether all individuals are particulars.  
 
Before moving forward, let me reply to one further objection. I argued that a problem with 
conceiving of individuality as non-instantiability is that it decides the issue against (some forms 
of) nominalism from the outset by pre-supposing the intelligibility of instantiability. If, however, 
I now accept the distinction between particularity and universality (as I do, at least tentatively, in 
the next section), a distinction which is more or less equivalent to the distinction between non-
instantiability and instantiability, what is to prevent the same objection to the distinction 
between particularity and universality from applying just as much as it did to the distinction 
between individuality and universality? This objection helps to bring out what I am trying to 
accomplish in this section. In case the nominalist is right, and the instantiable/non-instantiable 
distinction is incoherent (or at least of no use), my position makes available a slogan for her: 




with non-instantiability, the nominalist is forced, in denying the instantiable/non-instantiable 
distinction, to give up individuals altogether, which is something no nominalist would 
presumably want to do – indeed her very position is that everything is individual. Since the case 
against the nominalist’s claim has not yet been closed, it is better not to rule it out by the way we 
use our words.28  
 
Another advantage, then, of adopting the neutral position I am adopting is that it puts us in a 
better position to see what is at issue between the people engaging in the debate between realists 
and nominalists. Where the realist holds that there are both instantiable and non-instantiable 
entities, and that this distinction divides the class of individuals, the nominalist limits the class of 
individuals to the things the realist calls non-instantiable, denying that any instantiable 
individuals do (or more strongly, could) exist. Since the jury is still out as to which of these 
parties is correct, we do well to make use of a framework that (although it does not allow us to 
resolve the issue) allows us at least to clearly express the view of each party and to show what is 
entailed if either side turns out to be correct. 
 
2.1.2 The Intension of ‘Particular’ 
The view of individuality I have proposed would entail that universals themselves (if they exist 
and are conceived of in a certain way) can be individuals, in a sense, and would therefore require 
us to provide another term to serve as the correlative of universality. ‘Particularity’ seems well 
                                                   
28 I should add that the position that the instantiable/non-instantiable distinction is incoherent is not by any means 




suited to take the place of Gracia’s ‘Individuality’ given the frequency with which it has 
historically been employed as the opposite of universality.29  
 
Particulars can be either abstract or concrete. Roughly, the sense of ‘concrete’ I will be using 
involves being spatio-temporally located, and being capable of entering into spatial, temporal 
and causal relations. To be abstract, then, is just to be non-concrete. Though particulars, by 
definition, cannot be universals, it is possible that they be abstract. Examples of abstract 
particulars which may not turn out to be universals would be numbers and propositions.30 
 
The sense of ‘abstract’ I am appealing to here is not equivalent to the sense in which Keith 
Campbell uses the word in his (1990) Abstract Particulars. Basing his usage on that employed by 
D.C. Williams, Campbell says that tropes are abstract particulars, but that this does not imply 
that they are non-spatio-temporal. For Campbell, 
a concrete entity is the totality of the being to be found where our 
colours, or temperatures or solidities are. The pea is concrete; it 
monopolizes its location. All the qualities to be found where the pea is 
                                                                                                                                                              
nothing falls under one of its terms: everything is non-instantiable. But it does seem odd to give the intension of a 
characteristic that belongs to everything by negating another characteristic that applies to nothing. 
29 Gracia himself admits that particularity can function unproblematically as a synonym for his sense of individuality 
(1988, 54).  
30 One potential problem with conceiving of concreteness as ‘being spatio-temporally located’ is that we might be 
unable to deal with entities, like the game of chess or a natural language, or a work of art, which in spite of not 
being spatially located do seem to have come into being at some point in time, and so seem to be not wholly 
atemporal (Hale, B. (1998), section 2). Hale notes the alternative suggestion that “concrete objects are those which 
are, in principle, capable of being picked out ostensively, while abstract objects are those to which we can refer only 
by means of some functional expression.” But this seems not to get at the heart of the matter, since we can always 
ask, “In virtue of what are we able to ostensively point out some objects but not others?” and the answer would 
seem necessarily to involve some reference to spatio-temporal location, even if we need to refine the criterion 
somewhat in the face of the alleged counter-examples. 
A further interesting possibility that was pointed out to me by David DeVidi is that concreteness might come 
in grades – a particular might be fully concrete (spatio-temporal), partially concrete in either of two ways (temporal 
but not spatial, or spatial but not temporal) or abstract (neither spatial nor temporal). I think this makes sense, 




are qualities of that pea. But the pea’s quality instances are not 
themselves so exclusive.31   
To say that something is an abstract item is, on Campbell’s view, to say by contrast that it can  
(ordinarily) occur in conjunction with many other instances of qualities 
([for instance] all the other features of the pea…) and that, therefore, 
they can be brought before the mind only by a process of selection, of 
systematic setting aside, of these other qualities of which we are aware. 
Such an act of selective ignoring is an act of abstraction.32 
While there is certainly a place for the kind of distinction Campbell is drawing, I think using the 
terms ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ here is misleading. Campbell’s ‘concrete entity’ is just what we 
ordinarily mean by an object, and his abstract entities are (particularized) properties or property 
instances.  
 
And there is an important distinction between items like propositions and numbers on the one 
hand and dogs and cats on the other, which the appellations ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ are 
standardly used to mark. Importantly, in this sense tropes themselves are concrete items, since 
they are spatio-temporally located and are capable of entering into spatial and temporal relations, 
as are events and states of affairs. This nuance of meaning is blurred if we use the terms as 
Campbell does, and to do so seems unnecessary since we already have in place the distinction 
between object and (particularized) property.33 And propositions seem to be clear cases of 
                                                   
31 Campbell (1990), 3. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Specifically, Campbell’s use violates optimality criterion (a) given on p.19 above. Given that Campbell takes 
objects to be nothing but bundles of tropes, it might be objected that using the term ‘concrete’ to refer to objects 
(which, strictly speaking, do not really exist) is question begging against the tropist bundle theory of the nature of 
objects. But I do not think this is so. Even on the tropist bundle theory, there is a distinction between bundles of 
tropes and tropes, such that a bundle of tropes is not itself a trope. So there seems to be no problem with calling a 




abstract particulars which are neither properties nor objects (except when the term ‘object’ is 
used loosely, in which case it is just equivalent to ‘particular’, or perhaps even ‘individual’). 
 
But moving on from this terminological point, an issue of greater substance in determining 
the intension of particularity concerns the issue of the possession of determinate identity. In our 
discussion of Lowe above, we noted that he provides two criteria for genuine individuality – 
possession of intrinsic unity, (a), and of determinate identity, (b). It might have seemed 
conspicuous that I left out (b) altogether in the discussion of the intension of individuality. But 
discussion of this topic is perhaps more relevant here. In analyzing the concept of a particular, 
we have been saying that this concept is much more suited to function as a correlative to the 
notion of a universal. We are saying that, whatever else it is to be a particular, it is to be an 
instance of some kind. But to be a kind-instance – to belong to a kind – is to meet certain 
identity conditions, and in virtue of meeting these, to possess an identity. When it is definite that 
some individual meets these conditions, that individual will possess its identity determinately, at 
least in one sense. But some (many) kinds themselves bring with them a type of indeterminacy – 
for instance the kind, ‘head of hair’, which provides no definite standard for saying whether 
something belongs to the kind or not. So some particulars (e.g. physical bodies like rocks – as 
the discussion of the concept of a physical body in Chapter Four will show) fail to have a 
determinate identity, in this sense, even though as particulars (instances of kinds) they will 
possess an identity in the first sense. When the boundaries of a kind-concept are themselves 






Since kinds are identifiable with sortal concepts or terms, and these in turn are identifiable 
with, or at least have some important constitutive relation to, universals, sortal concepts 
themselves are entities that might be classed as individuals, even if they turn out not to be 
classifiable as particulars (the instances that fall under sortal terms). The identity of particulars, 
we might say, is conferred on them by the kinds they fall under. But do the kinds themselves 
possess determinate identity? Here again we get into fairly muddy water – it seems as though we 
could attribute determinate identity only to reified kinds or sortals (the contents signified by the 
terms), not to sortals taken as essentially plural (the totality of the items falling under the 
concept). For this reason, since we are not here pronouncing one way or the other on the issue, 
it seems wise to remain neutral as to whether or not sortals possess determinate identity, even 
though there will certainly be a way of seeing them as individuals. Any particular individual, 
however, will be a possessor of determinate identity (in virtue of being a kind-instance – so at 
least in the first sense distinguished above even if not in the second sense), and so we find here 
another reason for drawing the distinction between individuality on the one hand and 
particularity on the other, as we have done.34 Of course if one holds that there are no universals 
or sets or sortals in addition to the individual entities taken to be their instances or members but 
that all things are particular (non-instantiable) – if, in other words, one thinks that there is no 
literally common element present in each resembling particular – then one may not find the 
distinction between individuals and particulars to be very helpful. In absence of a solution to the 
problem of Universals, however, as I have noted earlier, it is preferable – in accordance with 
optimality criterion (c) – to be as neutral as possible in this area. 
 
                                                   




Finally, it should also be noted that to be a concrete particular, and thus to possess 
determinate identity, is not yet necessarily to qualify under Lowe’s criterion (a), that is, to be a 
possessor of intrinsic unity. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, Lowe (2003) argues that quantities of 
matter or parts of stuff are entities of precisely this sort. Though a given quantity of water 
possesses determinate identity in that it is of a certain kind, it does not possess intrinsic unity:  
…quantities of matter lack intrinsic unity, being decomposable by 
indefinitely many different principles of division into smaller quantities 
of the same kind and requiring no spatial connectedness among their 
parts. The very same quantity of matter may be scattered over a wide 
region of space, or gathered together into a compact mass. 
Consequently, there is no clear sense in saying that it is a ‘one’ or a 
‘many’, in advance of specifying its spatial distribution: and even then, 
what counts as ‘one’ or ‘many’ are the pieces or parcels of matter into 
which it is divided, not the quantity of matter as such…. [I]t follows 
that quantities of matter… are not properly described as ‘individuals’…. 
[W]hile something may make a quantity of matter the very quantity of 
matter that it is, nothing necessarily makes it one quantity, if quantities 
of matter lack intrinsic unity and are consequently not countable 
entities in their own right.35 
If quantities of matter have unity, then, it seems that they have it only extrinsically, because of 
our decision to divide them into portions of a certain amount and not because of anything they 
possess in themselves. 
 
Some particulars, then, may not be properly unified at all (as would be the case with any non-
instantiable pluralities resistant even to extrinsic unification, if any such entities exist). Others 
will be unified only extrinsically. Where we draw the boundaries between what entities are 
unified intrinsically and which are unified merely extrinsically will depend on a variety of factors, 
and involves considerations relevant to the disputes between realists and antirealists. The notion 
                                                                                                                                                              
according to Lowe (2003) at least, is a “quasi-object” like an electron in superposition. 




of a particular seems to be straightforward enough. Since the main focus on this chapter is to 
explicate the philosophically more important notion of an object, I turn to this task without 
further ado.  
 
2.1.3 The General Intension of ‘Object’ 
Since, arguably, the standard concept of an object is of something spatio-temporally located, 
there can be no abstract objects, though there can be abstract particulars. In light of the 
categories we have set up so far, then, the concept of an object will be the concept of a concrete, 
particular individual. But an object must also be more than this, since the category ‘concrete 
particular’ also includes (if these exist) tropes. We might say, then, that an object is a concrete 
particular non-property. But this would be rather unilluminating without an account of the 
difference between an object and a property. This I will attempt to provide, by appealing to a 
certain notion of ontological dependence below.  
 
Another line that can and perhaps should be drawn between kinds of concrete particulars is 
the line between objects and events or, more generally, states of affairs. On one view, events are 
wholly reducible to, or are nothing over and above, their constituent objects and the properties 
these objects possess. If this way of seeing events is correct, it would give us another respect in 
which objects are ontologically basic – events depend on objects for their existence in a way in 
which objects do not depend on events. Of course, since properties are also constituents of 
events, properties can also be claimed to be ontologically basic relative to events, however since 




derivative. But it is controversial whether events do in fact depend ontologically on objects (and 
their properties). The Special Theory of Relativity, for instance, is often seen as depicting 
‘events’ as ontologically basic, and then as characterizing objects as things with appropriate 
careers (e.g. being involved in continuous series of events). But since I regard the distinction 
between objects and properties as much more important (and since, if something like a 
reductionist account of events is correct it would not add much to the conception of objects as 
independent), I will leave aside further discussion of this topic here. 
 
Being a continuant (something capable of persisting through time and change) is sometimes seen 
as definitive of objects, but depending on whether or not there could be instantaneous objects 
(objects whose entire existence lasts only a single instant) this may not be a necessary feature of 
objects (just as we saw earlier that it isn’t a necessary feature of individuals). Furthermore, 
persistence might not be sufficient for objecthood either. Events, conceived of as changes in or 
sequences of changes in the properties and relations of objects, would likely turn out to be 
temporally extended entities.36 Likewise, properties (whether considered as universals or as 
tropes) seem capable of persisting at least across time if not across space as well. There does not 
seem to be any serious problem with conceiving of the brown colour of Fido’s fur in the dog-
house at noon on Wednesday as being the same brown colour of his fur on the sofa two hours 
later. 
 
                                                   
36 At least on the intuitive view that any change necessarily takes place across at least two associated moments in 
time, and usually demarcates a process in which something (the thing that changes) moves from a certain state, a, 




In what follows I will attempt to say what it is that characterizes the kind of individual 
denoted by the term ‘object’ and that distinguishes objects from other concrete particulars like 
tropes. By describing the boundaries of our notion of an object, the stage will be set for 
discussion of the two ontological debates that will concern us in the second section of the 
present chapter, and in the third chapter of this thesis. In each case, the notion of an object will 
be seen to be at the core of the debate, in spite of the fact that those engaging in such debates 
rarely make sufficient effort to clarify what, precisely, that notion involves. The present sub-
section will also suggest, in a preliminary way (to be developed further in the second half of the 
current chapter, and indeed throughout the remainder of the essay), that our ordinary notion of 
an object, though at first blush appearing to involve, unproblematically, certain conceptual 
components (independence, determinate identity, concreteness, actual rather than possible 
existence, etc.), on closer scrutiny turns out to be a less tight package than we might have 
thought. 
 
2.1.3.1 Ontological Dependence 
An assumption that has been with us so far, and that seems to be a good place to start in 
attempting to characterize the notion of an object is that ‘object’ and ‘property’ are correlative 
terms, and that the distinction between them is both meaningful and important. But does the 
distinction between an object and a property mark a real distinction? What I mean to ask by this 
question is: Are properties distinct from the objects that have them in reality, and not only in our 
minds? It is certainly the case that we can mentally consider some feature of an object in 




something more than its features) – we can think of the redness of an apple apart from its 
juiciness or its sweetness – but does this cognitive ability say anything about the ontological 
status and relatedness of objects and their properties? 
 
It is an intuitive datum that objects are distinct from properties in virtue of the fact that 
properties depend for their existence on objects in a way that objects do not depend on their 
properties – though, to avoid prejudicing the issue of Chapter Three, this must be read as being 
consistent with the interpretation of an object as a bundle of properties. Objects are entities that 
bear or possess properties, while properties are entities that characterize, or are borne by, objects, 
however the notions of bearing, possessing and characterizing end up being formulated. For this 
reason, I will attempt to argue that objects are independent concrete particulars, whereas properties 
are dependent particulars and might be either abstract or concrete depending on whether you take 
them as universals or tropes (another issue on which I am trying to remain neutral). 
 
The relation of ontological dependence usually taken to hold between an object and its 
properties is the relation of inherence. One intuitive, yet flawed, way of spelling out this form of 
dependence is to say that x depends on y if, necessarily, y exists if x does: ¬◊(Ex ∧ ¬Ey).37 
Certainly, a property (at least a particular property) cannot exist without the object to which it 
belongs (the object of which it is the property) existing. (Particular) properties (at least) depend 
for their existence on objects, and this dependence seems to be asymmetrical; for although 
                                                   
37 Fine (1995), 270. I say flawed because, for instance, it is far too generic – even the creature-Deity relation can be 
expressed by means of this formula, which no one would reasonably call a relation of inherence. Thanks to Prof. 
Joseph Novak for this point. Two other forms of dependence have been thought to hold between a universal and a 




objects need some properties to exist, they do not need any particular properties.38 We might 
say, then, that an object depends on properties in a kind of generic sense, as opposed to the rigid 
sense in which (particular) properties depend on the specific objects to which they belong. Fine 
(1995) refers to the above characterization of the rigid type of dependence as the modal/existential 
view. But this view, does not provide the asymmetry we are seeking. It should allow us to say, 
for instance, that though Socrates exists if the singleton set of Socrates exists, the singleton 
depends on Socrates and not vice versa. But, in fact, the existence of either entails the existence 
of the other, on the modal/existential view. 
 
To avoid this, Fine suggests we reformulate the view by replacing the notion of necessity with 
that of essence to yield what he calls the essentialist/existential account of dependence:  
One thing x will depend upon another y just in case it is an essential 
property of x that it exist only if y does.39  
This reformulation avoids the problem of the asymmetry of dependence, since “nothing in 
[Socrates’] nature or identity… demands that he exist only if the singleton… exist[s],” and thus 
we do not have to say that Socrates depends upon his singleton. But this view, too, faces 
problems, which I will not go into in detail here. Suffice it to say that in the end, Fine’s preferred 
formulation is something like the following: 
                                                                                                                                                              
(via abstraction), though participation is somewhat mysterious, and abstraction might be a logical, rather than an 
ontological relation. 
38 This, of course, becomes tricky once we begin to discuss the essential properties of an object, on which an object 
would seem to depend for its very existence. But the way I would try to wiggle out of this is by denying that 
essential properties are in fact properties. There is a distinction to be drawn, I think, between what an object is and 
the ways in which an object is (what the object has or possesses). This might be pretty controversial and fraught, 
however. I will go on to talk about these in greater detail later in this section, and the issue will also arise in Chapter 
Three. 




One thing x will depend upon another y just in case y is a constituent of 
an essential property of x (or just in case y is a constituent of a 
proposition that is true in virtue of the identity of x).40  
According to Fine’s account, then, when the essence of some entity x depends on some other 
entity y, the essence of x will involve y in the sense that y “will appear as a constituent of a 
component proposition or property” of the essence of x. 
 
To be sure, there is a lot more that could be said about what is going on in this formulation of 
the notion of dependence. For my purposes, the chief interest of Fine’s account is that it draws 
attention to the fact that ontological dependence relates not only to existence, but also to 
essence or identity. I do not pretend that the account discussed here is the definitive account of 
the relation of ontological dependence. But accounts like that offered by Fine seem to provide a 
way of cashing out the difference between objects and properties, since they offer a more precise 
way of expressing the idea that a property is necessarily the property of some object, while an 
object is not of anything else in this sense. A property f will be a property of an object O just in 
case the essence (what-it-is-to-be-f) of f necessarily involves (or makes reference to) O.41  
 
                                                   
40 Ibid, 275. 
41 The objection could be raised here that since this works only for particular properties and not for universals (at 
least not when conceived of Platonically as self-subsistent), I have not succeeded in indicating any fundamental way 
in which objects are distinct from properties. My response to this is that if universals are indeed self-subsistent, then 
they are independent in the same way that objects are, and thus the contrast that holds between objects and 
particular properties would also hold between universal and particular properties. Whether or not we should think 
of properties as self-subsistent in the sense is, of course, a big ‘whether’, but since my official policy is neutrality, I 




2.1.3.2 Essential Properties 
So far I have been considering the distinction between the concepts ‘object’ and ‘property’. But 
another way to approach the topic is by inquiring about the distinction between a specific object 
and the properties it possesses. Some kind of modal talk may be helpful here. Intuitively, a 
property is something about an object (some way the object is or is related to other objects) or 
something the object ‘has’ or ‘possesses’, something that ‘belongs to’ the object. We might think 
that we can distinguish a property from the object which ‘has’ it if it would have been possible 
for that object to have existed without having the property it does in fact have. Even though x is 
(in fact) f, it is possible that x might not have been F, or that x might continue to exist in the 
future without continuing to be F. We know that Aristotle is distinct from the property ‘being a 
philosopher’ because Aristotle (the particular man we refer to as Aristotle) might not have been 
a philosopher – or at least not a great or very influential one. For instance, his circumstances 
might have turned out in such a way that he wouldn’t have had access to any of the works of 
thinkers preceding himself – he might have been abandoned by his parents and raised by wolves 
in the wilderness.  
 
When we say that some object – e.g. Aristotle – could have existed without having some 
property that it (he) in fact has – e.g. being a philosopher – we could be saying that there is some 
feature of the object we are referring to which is more truly what the object is than the feature the 
object could exist without. What I mean is that it might not be correct to say of some features or 
aspects of the object that they ‘belong to’ or are ‘had’ by it; instead in these cases it might be 
more appropriate to say that the object just is this or that, where ‘is’ is not the ‘is’ of predication 




one way of looking at things. Another way of looking at the same phenomenon is to say that all 
features or aspects of an object are properties, and so are ‘had’ by the object in the property-
possession sense of ‘had’, yet some of these properties are essential (necessarily ‘had’ by the 
object) while others are accidental (contingently ‘had’). Intuitively, an object can exist without some 
of its properties, but not without all of them – for instance, Fido the dog would no longer exist 
if the property being-a-mammal was somehow (per impossibile) removed from him. If Fido stopped 
being a mammal, he wouldn’t be a dog anymore either; to be a dog is to be a (certain kind of) 
mammal. So, for any object, there seem to be features that it could not exist without (at least not 
without ceasing to be an object of the kind it was before the loss of the relevant feature). But the 
question remains whether all such features are properties, or whether sometimes what we are 
picking out with a predicate like being-a-mammal isn’t, properly speaking, a property of the thing 
after all, but is simply what the thing is.  
 
Let’s consider the idea that all features of objects are properties, but some of these are 
essential to the object and some are not. What it means, at least standardly (and perhaps naïvely), 
for a property to be essential is that the object wouldn’t exist if it didn’t possess that property (at 
least it would no longer be the kind of object it was). Mackie (2006) writes: 
To say that not all of an individual’s properties are essential to it is to 
say that it could have been different in certain respects. To say that 
some of an individual’s properties are essential to it is to say that there 
are limits to the ways in which it could have been different. That there 
are such limits, in the case of ordinary individuals such as people, cats, 
trees, and tables, may seem uncontentious. However, the attempt to 




essential and accidental properties of such individuals has proved 
remarkably difficult.42 
Is there any way to get behind the intuitive idea that a man’s height would not exist unless the 
man existed, while the man could exist without being that height? If we think that ‘being a man’ 
is a property of something, then a man couldn’t exist without at least (that) one property; and 
‘being a mammal’ and ‘being an animal’ would seem, similarly, to be properties no man could 
exist without possessing (assuming that they are indeed properties).  
 
But saying that ‘being a man’ is a property might threaten to blur or even destroy the (at least 
intuitively) important distinction between an object and a property. Intuitively, all properties are 
properties of something.43 At the very least, wherever a property is instantiated, it is a property of 
something, so this much is true even of universals. We don’t have free-floating properties that 
are not anchored to any thing. But if even ‘being a man’ is a property, then what is it a property 
of? We would have to say, in such a case, that there is some object that exists, and that this object 
has the property of being a man. To say so would imply that the object in question was 
something distinct from ‘being a man’ even if ‘being a man’ were an essential property of it. But 
what would such an object be?  
                                                   
42 Mackie (2006), v-vi. On essential properties see Kripke, Naming and Necessity, pp. 110 ff. The essential / accidental 
distinction as applied to properties is closely linked, I think, to the real / nominal distinction as applied to 
definitions. Putnam (1982) discusses this in some depth in “Why There Isn’t a Ready-Made World”. Mackie 
distinguishes between essentialism about individuals and essentialism about natural kinds. 
43 More precisely: necessarily, for any property f, if f exists, then there exists some object that has f. An objection 
to this is that the property ‘not identical to itself’ necessarily cannot belong to any entity. This raises a lot of further 
questions, such as whether so-called properties like this one are in fact properties after all, and if not, why not? One 
reason for thinking that ‘not being self-identical’ is not a genuine property is that it is a negative property, and a case 
might be made for thinking that there are no negative properties. There certainly are negative predicates, but 
presumably there is nothing about the entity that corresponds to a negative predicate (except for the fact that the 
positive properties the entity does have conceptually exclude the negative predicates from applying to it). This reply 
assumes that properties and predicates are distinct, an assumption Armstrong (1991) certainly makes, and one that I 
am inclined to make as well. Even if there are genuine negative properties, however, ‘not being self-identical’ might 





A Bundle Theorist might respond that the object, in such a case, is just the bundle of all the 
properties composing that individual, and that the property of ‘being a man’ is a property of 
(that is, ‘being a man’ is a member of) that bundle, just as much as ‘being six feet tall’ is. But the 
point I am making is that the bundle in such a case just seems to be the man – if the property of 
being a man is somehow capable of being removed from the bundle, how would anything in the 
bundle hold together any longer? How would ‘being six feet tall’, for instance, be a part of the 
bundle if there was no man or other kind of creature to be that tall? The alternative would be to 
accept the bare substratum view – the view that there are objects which have no properties at all, 
metaphysical coat-hangers on which hang all the properties by which we become aware of these 
objects, or by which these objects manifest themselves in existence. But if we are to be 
consistent with the attempt to present as neutral an ontological framework as possible (especially 
in regard to the fundamental ontological nature and structure of objects), it seems that we ought 
not to hold, at least not until we have sufficient philosophical argumentation in hand, either that 
everything about an object is a property of the object (Bundle Theory), or that there is something – 
some featureless ingredient – that exists outside of any of the properties of an object, to which 
all the features are somehow linked (Substratum Theory). 
 
C. B. Martin (1981), whose views will be considered in more detail in Chapter Three, is one 
philosopher who, adopting a kind of neo-Lockean perspective, attempts to show how the 
notions of object and property can be correlative concepts in such a way that the distinction 




Substratum Theory.44 John Heil (2003), in Chapter 15 of his From an Ontological Point of View, 
expresses a similar account of objects. The view takes properties (seen as modes or ways an 
object is) and property-bearers as correlative ideas that arise from abstraction or “selective 
attention.” Heil writes, 
Property-bearers and properties are inseparable. This is not because 
properties are bonded to property-bearers with an especially powerful 
metaphysical glue. Rather, property-bearers are objects considered as 
being particular ways, and properties are ways objects are. In 
considering an object as a property-bearer, we are considering it 
partially; in considering its properties, we are considering ways it is, 
another kind of partial consideration. Properties and property-bearers 
can be considered separately but they cannot be separated, even in 
thought. 
Let me summarize. Objects are bearers of properties. A property-bearer 
is not a ‘thin particular’ to which properties are affixed. A property-
bearer itself has all the properties it ‘supports’ and no more. Property-
bearers are not ‘bare particulars’. A property-bearer is an object 
considered as something that is various ways, something that has 
various properties; properties are ways objects are.45 
It is not my intention to pronounce, at this point, on whether this view of things is correct. 
Instead, I simply want to indicate an important conceptual component of our ordinary concept 
of objects that has great intuitive power. The component I have in mind is just the idea that Heil 
is expressing in calling objects “property-bearers” or as individuals that exist in “various ways.”  
 
But properties, in addition to objects, also seem capable, in some sense, of ‘having’ properties. 
For instance, Socrates’ height could (if taken as a trope) be said to possess the property of 
‘belonging to Socrates’, of ‘being less than the height of Frank’, of ‘being distinct from Socrates’ 
                                                   
44 As we shall see, the degree to which he succeeds is arguable. We should also note that according to Martin’s 
preferred ontological story objects do have substrata of a certain kind. But the uniqueness of his account 
distinguishes it from any simplistic bare particular theory. More on all this will follow in Chapter Three. 




weight’; the blueness of this blue jay has the property ‘being contrary to red’, and the property of 
‘being found at such and such a spatio-temporal location’, etc. Does this threaten the distinction 
between objects and properties?46 One way to deny that it does is by claiming that such 
properties are not genuine properties. But how do we draw the distinction between which 
properties are genuine and which are not? To simply state that any property had by a property is 
not a genuine one would be question-begging. How do we know when a predicate expresses a 
genuine property, and when it expresses something that makes sense to us but which we would 
not want to offer membership in existence? A more straightforward way of preserving the 
distinction in spite of the noted difficulty is by adding that objects, unlike properties – which 
might also be thought to be capable of existing in various ways – are never themselves borne by 
anything else. Objects are never ways anything else is. This, of course, is related to the sense in 
which objects are independent and properties are dependent, and is perhaps only another way of 
expressing the same idea.  
 
2.1.3.3 Further Concerns About the Notion of an Object 
If certain features of an object are either essential to, or more strongly, are in some sense 
identical to them, such features would be of the sort picked out by sortal terms, terms that pick 
out something as a member of a kind, rather than mere characterizing terms, which pick out 
something that can be said truly about the thing, but do not determine it as a member of a 
                                                   
46 Another concern which, if it does not threaten the distinction between objects and properties, at least throws a 
small fly into the ointment is that, although we claimed earlier that all objects are concrete and that only particulars 
can be abstract, mathematical individuals seem to ‘have’ properties, and so to be objects, even if the sense in which 
they have properties is different from the sense in which standard objects do. For instance, whatever properties they 
have, they seem to have essentially. It doesn’t seem to make sense, for example, to ask whether the number seven 
could persist through change from odd to even, or from prime to composite. Whenever the number seven exists, it 




kind.47 If you have an object, then you seem automatically to have something that belongs to a 
kind in virtue of its possession of a determinate identity, which only makes sense, if objects are 
particulars and particulars possess determinate identity. David Wiggins (2001) argues, in the case 
of living beings at least, that the extension of natural kind terms applicable to them are 
determined, at least in part, by the set of laws governing the coming-to-be, growth, 
development, and ceasing-to-be of individuals of these kinds. The immediate problem with this 
is that it seems to dismiss the possibility of having an object that is one-of-a-kind. On a nominalist 
ontology, each object is one-of-a-kind. But is there a way of spelling out kind-membership of 
objects in a way that would be both compatible with saying that there are real, common, law-
governed dispositions and propensities in distinct individuals which ground the (equal) 
application of kind-terms to them, and with a nominalist ontological perspective? Whether there 
is or not, it is difficult to deny that objects are determinately identifiable and, in virtue of their 
identity conditions, fall under kinds – whether kinds are construed as genuine universals or as 
resemblance classes. 
 
Related to the question of identity conditions for objects is the problem of whether there can 
be overlapping objects. The standard case in which this problem arises is the case of a statue 
(made of bronze or something else) which seems to possess different modal and historical 
properties, and hence distinct identity conditions, from the lump of bronze that composes it.  
The lump, but not the statue, would survive dramatic alterations in 
shape; the statue, but not the lump, would survive replacement of the 
matter making it up [e.g. the bronze making up the nose is replaced by 
                                                   
47 Properties corresponding to predicates like ‘being within ten metres of the North Pole’ do not determine classes 
of things that belong to one kind, since the things that meet the criteria given in that expression at any given time 
may easily be of widely divergent kinds (a polar bear, a radio, a reindeer, a sleigh, etc.). For more on natural kinds 




another nose-shaped piece of bronze]. This is sometimes put by saying 
that lumps of bronze and statues have different ‘modal properties’.48   
And this seems to hold in spite of the fact that they share all their intrinsic properties (shape, 
shininess, mass, etc.). The lump existed on Monday, but the statue did not come into existence 
until Tuesday – hence the two also differ in their historical properties. According to Leibniz’s 
principle of the ‘Indiscernibility of Identicals’, we must say that the statue and the lump are 
distinct objects which “coincide spatially for a period of time.”49 But this seems to introduce a 
flavor of strangeness into our ordinary notion of a physical object, which seems to require that 
only one object at a time can take up any particular spatio-temporal region.  
 
Finally, some objects are non-existent, whether they are fictional entities like Sherlock Holmes, 
or simply as yet undiscovered citizens of possible worlds. Is fictional possession of a property, or 
possession of a property in a non-actual possible world the same as possession of a property in 
the actual world? There seems to be no principled reason for saying it is different, qua property-
possession. And the same goes for the other distinctions as well. Whether or not an individual is 
dependent or independent, is particular or universal, is singular or irreducibly plural, is concrete 
or abstract, or has a determinate identity or not will be unaffected by whether the object exists in 
the actual world or only in some possible world. 
 
                                                   
48 Heil (2003), 181 




2.1.4 The Definition of an Independent Concrete Particular 
In spite of the initial glimpses of difficulties encountered toward the end of the previous sub-
section, I suggest that the overall discussion provided there gives good reason to adopt the 
following working formulation of the notion of an object, in the philosophically significant 
sense:  
Object =df  An intrinsically unified, ontologically independent concrete 
particular. 
This definition can be understood in the context of the various metaphysical distinctions that 
have been discussed throughout this section. As a singular entity, an object will be an individual; 
as something whose parts form a whole without the need for any cognitive activities to join 
them, it will be intrinsically unified; as a locus and bearer of properties, it will be ontologically 
independent; as spatio-temporally located and capable of entering into spatial and temporal 
relations it will be concrete; and finally as a particular it will be a non-instantiable instance of 
some definite kind.  
 
It has not been the aim of this section to show that the general conception of what it is to be 
an object formulated above is correct. Instead, I have attempted to distill from various disputes 
within ontology a formulation of the notion of objecthood that includes all the significant marks 
of the notion as it occurs, usually quite inexplicitly, in our commonsense ontological framework, 
as well as in various philosophical disputes. The importance of the conception expressed by the 
definition I have given will be illustrated in the following section via the observation that one 
important dispute in ontology can be recast as the search for the true extension of this 




a general ontological assay of objects, understood in roughly the sense given by the above formula, 
and will conclude that none of them is ultimately adequate. Chapter Four will suggest a new way 
of approaching the conception of objecthood that will offer a possible avenue for advancement 
in the ontological disputes discussed in Chapter Two, section two, and in Chapter Three. 
 
2.2 The Extension of ‘Object’ 
In this section, I examine the contemporary debate about whether artifacts, and other inanimate 
compound physical objects, exist, as this debate has taken shape between proponents of 
positions represented here by Wiggins, Hoffman & Rosenkrantz, and van Inwagen. My main 
argument will be that the topic of the debate can be more fruitfully viewed as concerning what 
kinds of entities the term ‘object’ – in the sense given to it in section one – correctly applies to. 
In a sense, then, the debate can be seen as an attempt to determine the limits of the extension of 
that notion.  
 
The debate to be canvassed here is not a new one by any means. It is traceable at least back to 
Plato and Aristotle, and throughout the history of philosophy has been a recurring theme tackled 
in a number of different ways. Historically, the problem would be more appropriately described 
– using Aristotelian terminology – as the problem of whether certain names we use denote 
entities that fall under the category of substance. More specifically it is the problem of 
determining, given that individual substances are ontologically basic, what kinds of things count 
as individual substances. The notion of an intrinsically unified, independent concrete particular 




without presuming the correctness of the entire Aristotelian categorial schema. Early modern 
philosophers were obsessed with the notion of substance. Even Kant, in his own way, saw the 
central importance of the idea – if not for ontology proper, then at least for our ability to 
conceptualize reality. The fact that we find roughly the same notion lurking in the background of 
important contemporary debates in ontology is, I think, a sufficient testimony on its own to the 
(lastingly) central importance of this notion.  
 
2.2.1 Kinds of Objects 
The category ‘Object’ is susceptible to division in various ways. One might consider that there 
could be physical and non-physical objects, for instance. I will not pursue the intelligibility or the 
basis of this division here, but will simply be dealing with physical objects.50 We might also 
divide objects into simple and compound. For the time being, I will not say much about this 
division either (though the question of simple objects will be important for an attempt to present 
a coherent Bundle Theory in the next chapter). For now, I will simply say that I do not see any 
particular problem with admitting the conceptual possibility of point particles or Democritean 
atoms (indivisible extended particles), but for my purposes here it will not be necessary to 
discuss them in any detail.51 I will be considering only compound physical objects. 
 
                                                   
50 I remind the reader that even if all objects are physical objects, it is not necessary that all objects are actual. 
Pegasus, or David DeVidi’s third arm, though merely possible objects, would nevertheless still be physical objects 
on the neutral view I am adopting, since if they existed, they would be physical. In other words, in any possible worlds 
in which these items exist, they are physical objects.  
51 We might, however, want to consider physical simples as a limiting case of the unity of a physical object. Being 




Within the sub-category of compound physical objects, we can draw further distinctions. 
Hoffman & Rosenkrantz distinguish between objects that are capable of enduring through 
mereological change (change in parts) and those that are not. The latter (namely mereological 
compounds, such as a lump of clay) necessarily include all of their material components.52 The 
parts of a mereological compound need to be bound together by forces according to the 
following principle:  
Discrete material objects P1…Pn are united into a mereological 
compound at a time t ↔ at t, P1…Pn are connected via the joining 
relation.53  
The joining relation appealed to is, roughly, a relation of dynamic equilibrium holding between 
the parts of a mereological compound x which makes it the case that any of the parts of x can be 
pulled or pushed in a given direction by means of some other part of x being pulled or pushed 
in that direction.  
 
Here I will indulge in a minor digression. I think that Hoffman & Rosenkrantz’s conception 
of a mereological compound is incoherent, and the following is my argument for why this is so: 
(i) a mereological compound can suffer no change of parts (even of a miniscule piece of matter) 
without ceasing to exist, (ii) any macroscopic composite material entity, at a sufficiently low 
(molecular, atomic or sub-atomic) level, is constantly gaining and losing parts; given only a very 
small interval of time some such change is nearly guaranteed, under normal circumstances, (iii) at 
least very many mereological compounds are macroscopic composite material entities, and (iv) 
the criterion of identity for the unity of any mereological compound is spelled out in terms of 
                                                   
52 Depending on whether or not properties are taken as proper parts of objects, mereological change can also 




ability of parts to be pushed or pulled by other parts, yet pushing or pulling (being actions of 
some kind) necessarily must occur in time. So the criterion for determining whether or not an 
entity is a mereological compound is one that cannot be put into practice – it cannot pick out 
any enduring individuals.  
 
The reason this is important, however, is that I think there is something worth preserving in 
the principle of unity Hoffman & Rosenkrantz applied to mereological compounds. If only the 
requirement that no mereological change is possible is relaxed to some degree, the same 
principle of unity will be useful as applied to a wide variety of naturally occurring inanimate 
physical objects like stones and diamonds. Our conception of physical bodies is a conception of 
a continuant – of something that endures through time, while the conception of a mereological 
compound (if the above argument is correct) is a conception of something that, strictly speaking, 
cannot endure through time. More on the notion of a modified mereological compound (a 
physical body, as I will be calling them), is presented in Chapter Four. 
 
Objects that are capable of enduring through mereological change, seem, by that fact, to be 
more robust – it takes more to disrupt their unity and existence than the loss or acquisition of a 
microscopic part. Such objects can be further sub-divided into living and non-living (though this 
distinction is not always entirely clear), and the non-living branch can be divided once more into 
artifacts (like hammers, houses, statues and thermometers) and inanimate natural formations 
(like glaciers, mountains, crystals and rivers).  
 
                                                                                                                                                              




All objects seem to possess intrinsic unity, and the distinction between the various kinds of 
physical object seems to rest (at least on one way of seeing things) on a distinction between the 
kinds of intrinsic unity they possess. Given that principles of (intrinsic) unity are usually appealed 
to as a way of giving criteria for membership in a given type of object, an attempt to disentangle 
the criteria used by different philosophers will need to distinguish different principles of unity. 
Certainly some objects appear to be more (intrinsically) unified than others. A diamond, for 
instance, seems to possess a greater degree of unity than a piece of quartz in that it is much more 
difficult to separate the diamond’s parts from one another. But there also seem to be principled 
grounds for thinking that in addition to acknowledging different degrees of unity among objects, 
we should also acknowledge different kinds of intrinsic unity. Locke famously noted that we 
cannot track living creatures through time by tracking their constituent material parts – as we do 
with masses of matter – since living creatures persist through change of material constituents. A 
move that has frequently been made by ontologists who give principles of unity for different 
kinds of objects is to claim that certain of these principles are incapable of yielding genuine 
objects. That is, things we would normally take to be objects in good standing are excluded from 
a rigorous ontology on the grounds that the way(s) in which their parts hold together are 
insufficient to produce anything truly one.  
 
The particular dispute that will be the focus of this section is usually cast in terms of whether 
to count certain kinds of objects – namely non-living compound particulars like artifacts and 
compound physical bodies – as genuine denizens of reality. Various philosophers have been 
inclined to deny this. My argument will be that what the debate is really about is (or that it is 




count as objects in the strict sense, that is, as intrinsically unified independent concrete 
particulars possessed of determinate identity.  
 
I will consider the ontological perspectives of three philosophers who take distinct positions 
on this issue. Wiggins accepts that (a) living organisms, (b) physical simples, (c) mereological 
compounds, (d) artifacts and (e) natural formations all genuinely exist; Hoffman and 
Rosenkrantz admit (a), (b) and (c) to their ontology but discount (d) and (e); and van Inwagen, 
adopting a very radical stance, accepts only (a) and (b). I attempt to diagnose what is going on in 
this debate by showing that those who dismiss certain kinds of objects tend to do so on the 
grounds that such objects fail to live up to the standards expressed by the formulation of 
objecthood provided toward the end of the last section. This observation, I think, will yield a 
way of moving forward in the debate, and of taking steps toward a dialectical reconciliation of 
certain apparently irremediably conflicting intuitions. I will be arguing that there is something 
misguided about the whole dispute as currently conducted, and, although I will not be in a 
position to resolve the whole issue (especially not in this section), there will be lessons for it 







2.2.2 David Wiggins: Even Artifacts are Real 
Wiggins’ ontology is the most permissive of the three. His discussion of individuation, as it 
applies to living organisms and artifacts, serves as the backdrop.54 According to Wiggins, 
members of both of these classes can be picked out in experience and tracked through time. 
They are continuants. Yet things belonging to one category need to be individuated in different 
ways than things belonging to the other: an organism is individuated by reference to its ‘principle 
of activity’ – which in practice amounts to a set of dispositions – that governs its behavior and 
enables us to say what the thing in question is. Without going into all the details, the following 
passage should suffice to give us the rough outline of what Wiggins has in mind by an 
organism’s principle of activity and how we come to find out what the principle of activity is for 
a given kind of organism: 
Starting off with the almost pre-theoretical idea of a sortal predicate 
whose sense is such as to depend on the sort of thing that lies in its 
extension - the kind of predicate that cries out for real definition – we 
are led to speculate what holds together the extension. So soon as we 
find that, we find lawlike norms of starting to exist, existing, and 
ceasing to exist by reference to which questions of the identity and 
persistence of individual specimens falling under a definition can be 
arbitrated. Such norms will supervene on basic laws of nature, we have 
supposed; they may be understood as certain exploitations, so to say, of 
these laws. But now we are led by simple conceptual considerations to 
precisely the kind of account of living substances that biologists can fill 
out a posteriori by treating them as systems open to their surroundings, 
not in equilibrium with those surroundings, but so constituted that a 
delicate self-regulating balance of serially linked enzymatic degradative 
and synthesizing chemical reactions enables them to renew themselves 
on the molecular level at the expense of those surroundings, such 
renewal taking place under a law-determined variety of conditions in a 
determinate pattern of growth and development towards, and/or 
persistence in, one particular form.55  
                                                   
54 Wiggins mentions, but does not discuss in any detail, the organs of living beings as well as non-living natural 
formations. Both of these types of thing, he says, fall somewhere in between the categories of organisms and 
artifacts, but since these latter categories provide the strongest and the weakest cases, respectively, for his theory of 
individuation, discussion of the other categories is inessential. 





When we have understood the relevant norms governing the processes of coming to be and 
ceasing to be, and of the maintenance, growth and development of the kind of organism under 
consideration, we have located the principle by which we can tell, for a given instance of that 
kind, when it is a member of that kind, and when it is the same instance of that kind as one 
picked out earlier. Of course, most of the population has to defer to the experts in the field on 
the specific details. Yet, that there is such a principle of activity to be found seems to be evident 
from the way we do identify members of a biological kind and track them through time.  
 
Artifacts, on the other hand, “are individuated by reference to a parcel of matter so organized 
as to subserve a certain function.”56 As a result, the identity and persistence conditions for 
artifacts seem to be much looser than those that apply to living things. Artifacts are, for instance, 
capable of enduring through “discontinuous functioning, disassembly, and part replacement” in 
ways that organisms are not.57 A clock may cease to tell time, be completely taken apart, left on a 
table for years and then reassembled, having many of its original parts replaced, and still be 
considered the same clock. To say all this, however, does not entail that artifact identity is purely 
a matter of convention or arbitrary decision, at least not according to Wiggins.58  
 
Further insight into Wiggins’ ontological views can be gathered from his treatment of the ship 
of Theseus problem. Wiggins initially lists three possible solutions: The ship identical with 
                                                   
56 Ibid, 91.  
57 Ibid, 92. 
58 “For,” says Wiggins, “human purposes and decisions might enter into the invention and modification of human 
artefact-kinds without its following that any particular questions of identity and difference (between this artefact and 




Theseus’ ship is either (i) the reconstituted ship; (ii) the repaired ship still in operation; or (iii) 
both. Strong intuitions ground both (i) and (ii), and there would seem to be a genuine 
disagreement between a person who held that (i) and a person who held that (ii) is the ship 
Theseus used. Option (iii), however, attempts to collapse the dispute by claiming that the 
identity conditions are relative to the interests of the disputants – the one seeking an 
archaeological relic, and the other a functionally persistent continuant. Rejecting each of these 
three attempts as unsatisfactory ((i) and (ii) because to choose either would be to fail to respect 
the intuition driving the other, and (iii) because it denies the legitimacy of the dispute between (i) 
and (ii)), Wiggins presents two further solutions.  
 
Option (iv) is the view referred to in the literature as the “best-candidate proposal.” It suggests 
that we should  
start with the relation in which x and y stand just in case y is a 
coincidence-candidate (of type f) for identity with x. We then say that y 
veritably coincides under f with x if and only if y is an f-coincidence candidate for 
identity with x and nothing distinct from y is as good an f-coincidence candidate for 
identity with x as y is.59 
We would then need to spell out criteria for candidature, and decide which among the 
competitors comes out first, according to the relevant criteria. Whichever this turned out to be 
would be the ship of Theseus. The problem with this view, Wiggins says, is that it violates what 
he calls the only a and b rule:  
In notionally pursuing object a in order to ascertain its coincidence or 
non-coincidence with b, or in retracing the past history of b to ascertain 
                                                   




its identity link with a, I ought not to need to concern myself with 
things that are other than a or other than b.60 
Whether or not either the working ship or the reconstituted ship is the ship of Theseus, 
however, will depend at least partially on whether the other exists. Holding this view, 
then, would require us to approve of claims like “At time t1 a was not identical with b, 
but at later time t2 (when c ceased to exist) a became identical with b” which seems to 
run contrary to the nature of the identity relation.  
 
Option (v), the view Wiggins ends up advocating, attempts to rule out the possibility of 
multiple candidates by modeling artifact identity on Helen Morris Cartwright’s identity-condition 
for quantities, which “excludes all addition or subtraction of matter whatever.”61 To make this 
condition suitable for artifacts, says Wiggins, we would have, on the one hand, to strengthen it 
“to require some however vestigial continuance of the thing’s capacity to subserve the roles or 
ends the artefact was designed (as that very artefact) to subserve.” In another way, it would have 
to be weakened to allow some of the artifact’s original matter to be exchanged,  
provided only, if the reader will forgive the comical precision of this 
first attempt, the artefact retains more than half of that original matter 
(or provided that it retains, where such is definable, the material of 
some individuatively paramount nucleus).62  
This condition should be taken together with the point that our judgments about artifact 
persistence do not always “demand to be read literally as statements of identity.” Here we see 
very clearly the kind of permissiveness Wiggins allows in matters of ontology, and it seems to be 
fairly reasonable. He continues, “[t]he truth is though that, for some practical purposes, we 
                                                   
60 Ibid, 96. 




simply do not mind very much about the difference between artefact survival and artefact 
replacement. (A negligence that in no way undermines the real distinction between these.)”63 The 
insight that our practical purposes can play a role in determining how we regard objects of 
certain kinds is one that will prove important for the approach to developing the ontological 
framework I employ in Chapter Four. For now, what should be kept in mind is the way in which 
Wiggins accommodates different kinds of objects within ontology by means of fairly diverse 
principles. For Wiggins, living organisms are real, persisting objects par excellence; artifacts make 
the cut on significantly different grounds, yet they make the cut nonetheless. Many other 
ontologists are more conservative.  
 
2.2.3 Hoffman and Rosenkrantz: Organisms and Mereological Compounds 
Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, who occupy a middle position between Wiggins and van Inwagen, 
argue that artifacts are not genuine occupants of reality, though they admit both living organisms 
and mereological compounds. In their (1997) Substance: Its Nature and Existence, they present a 
number of arguments in support of the conclusion that ordinary inanimate physical objects (a 
class including artifacts and non-living natural formations but not mereological compounds) are 
unreal. Some of these arguments are conceptual and others are “scientific” or empirical.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
62 Ibid. 
63 “When someone gives his watch to the watchmaker to clean and repair, the thing he wants back may, on a very 
sober and literal minded construal, be either that very watch (by the unproblematic criterion) or else a watch with a 
certain obvious relation to his (a watch of the same kind, in better working order, enjoying considerable community 
of parts, etc.). If he wants more than that, if he thinks of his watch as an antiquarian or historical relic from a better 





Conceptual difficulties arise for anyone wishing to defend the existence of ordinary objects. 
Firstly, it is impossible for a material object, a, to increase by addition of a part, b, since in the 
process nothing would increase – neither a nor b, which would stay the same size, nor the 
compound ab, which could not be said to increase because it only just began to exist. 
Furthermore, the belief in such things requires us to allow the possibility of multiple spatially 
coincident physical objects - a mereological compound and an artifact or natural body could 
simultaneously fully occupy the same place at the same time, which offends against parsimony. 
This belief also requires that some mysterious constituting relation – a relation of supervenience 
perhaps – hold between the mereological compound and the particular in question.64  
 
Another seeming difficulty is that we are required either to accept the possibility of 
intermittent existence (which, Hoffman and Rosenkrantz argue, is absurd) or to deny this kind 
of existence at a price. Take the case of a clock that breaks down, is completely disassembled 
and then put back together using some of its original parts as well as others that were not 
originally part of it. Wiggins claims it is the same clock at each of these stages. Hoffman and 
Rosenkrantz disagree:  
This is surely wrong, for no physical substance can consist of a 
collection of disassembled, scattered, parts which no longer stand in the 
requisite unifying causal relation. Not only do the parts of the 
disassembled clock fail to exemplify this unifying causal relation, but 
these scattered parts lack the form of a clock, and there cannot be a 
clock that lacks this form. Furthermore, Wiggins’ view implies that a 
clock exists while disassembled, if the clock happens to get reassembled 
in the future, but not otherwise. The supposition that the present 
                                                   
64 These arguments can be found at Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1997), pp. 154-55. Note that Hoffman and 
Rosenkrantz differ from a mereological essentialist like Chisholm, since, to be consistent, a mereological essentialist 
must deny that both ordinary physical objects and organisms exist. Hoffman and Rosenkrantz think these 
conceptual arguments do not apply in the case of organisms, since “no organism can be a part of any other 
organism, so that a* (the initial organism, before the addition of some material part) would not be a part of a (the 




existence of a physical object is contingent upon future happenstance is 
bizarre. For an object, o, must have an intrinsic nature, and a nature of 
this sort cannot involve a relation to a future contingent event, or, in 
general, to any entity whose existence is not entailed by o's existence.65  
These, in outline, are the main conceptual difficulties that Hoffman and Rosenkrantz think 
plague anyone who claims that ordinary inanimate physical objects exist.  
 
The “scientific” arguments Hoffman and Rosenkrantz deploy in denying the reality of artifacts 
turn on the view that no conventional things – things whose identity “logically depends upon 
the beliefs or decisions of [one or more] psychological subjects” – but only those whose identity 
depends on their own intrinsic nature, are real. The “internal nature” plays a key role in 
regulating the thing’s structure and composition. On the view of Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, 
mereological compounds and organisms count as real by this criterion, as do physical simples, 
but nothing else.66 Specifically, since neither artifacts nor typical inanimate natural formations (a 
ship or a snowball, a crystal or a lake) have the requisite sort of internal nature – nothing internal 
to them regulates the increase or replacement of their parts over time or dictates their 
compositional constitution – these cannot be considered, by this criterion, as real.67  
 
The other reasons Hoffman and Rosenkrantz give for disbelieving in ordinary inanimate 
physical objects have to do with their lack of possession of a substance- or natural kind. True 
objects or substances, “have an essence or nature whose exemplification is logically independent 
                                                   
65 Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, 159-60. 
66 Ibid, 167. In the case of the mereological compound, its nature “metaphysically determines that it persists only as 
long as it retains all of its parts… [and] strictly determin[es] the extent (if any) to which it can be stretched or 
compressed.” And each “organism, O, has an internal nature, or microstructural hereditary blueprint which 





of the existence of human beliefs or decisions.”68 They belong to natural substance-kinds which 
(i) are essential to what instantiates them, (ii) are proper objects of scientific inquiry and figure in 
natural laws,69 and which (iii) supervene on the common “structural and compositional 
properties” of the things that fall under them, which are all at least to some significant degree, 
structurally and compositionally similar. Given these criteria for being a real, as opposed to a 
merely conventional, object, Hoffman and Rosenkrantz are able to conclude that “a putative 
compound physical substance is real only if it instantiates a natural kind.” From all this, it 
follows that any compound physical thing which belongs to “an artifactual kind is not a real 
thing.”70 Since, however, the kinds denoted by ‘Mereological Compound’ and by ‘Organism’ 
both count as natural kinds by the above criteria, the things that instantiate them are real things.  
 
Based on these conceptual and empirical arguments, Hoffman and Rosenkrantz conclude that 
only “mereological compounds and organisms are genuine substances”, and that “artifacts and 
typical inanimate natural formations are unreal.” In so doing, they disagree sharply with Wiggins. 
But there is an ontological position that is starker still than that of Hoffman and Rosenkrantz. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
67 Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, 168. Note that this is not to deny, in each case, that there exist mereological 
compounds which would be spatially coincident with these items if the latter existed. 
68 Artifactual substance-kinds have, by definition, some artificial function or purpose which is given by and / or 
depends on the “belief(s) or decision(s) of some purposeful intellect(s)” (171).  
69 In the sense that “it is possible to make suitable theoretical generalizations about their behaviour.” Notice the 
parallel between this conception and Wiggins’ view that “A particular continuant x belongs to a natural kind, or is a 
natural thing, if and only if x has a principle of activity corresponding to the nomological basis of that or those 
extension-involving sortal identifications which answer truly the question ‘what is x?’ ” (Wiggins (2001), 89). 




2.2.4 van Inwagen: Just Organisms and Simples 
Peter van Inwagen (1990) offers an argument to the effect that, strictly speaking, there are no 
such things as tables, chairs, and houses (or any non-living compound objects of any sort, 
including mereological compounds). Nevertheless, he says, it can be true to say that my books 
are now on the table, without this implying that there is, in the strict sense, a table, just as we 
might say that the sun moved behind the tree in the yard without implying anything inconsistent 
with the Copernican theory of the solar system.71 van Inwagen defends the radical view that the 
only way some plurality of things, call them ‘the xs’, can compose some further thing is if the 
activity of the xs constitutes a life. Similarly, the only way for some x to be a proper part of some 
y is for y to be an organism and for x to be “caught up in the life of y.”72 Nowhere else can we 
find a case of something’s being composed of other things or possessing proper parts. This leads 
to the conclusion that the only physical things that exist are living organisms and simples.73 
 
                                                   
71 van Inwagen, 102. Similarly, someone might say truly say that there is a bliger crossing the field even though a 
bliger is in fact six creatures giving the impression of being something like a tiger, and these creatures do not 
compose anything. van Inwagen writes, “Consider six animals arranged in bliger fashion; consider the region of 
space that they collectively occupy; there is no one thing that just exactly fills this region of space” (104). To deny 
that there are bligers is not like denying that there are ghosts. In the latter denial, but not in the former, the claim is 
that when people report seeing ghosts, there is nothing there, no “real and unified set of phenomena” corresponding 
to the content of the reported experiences (107). 
72 He notes that the xs may become proper parts of y through assimilation or through generation (pp. 95-6). 
73 In a way, he says, the only things that exist are organisms: “An organism may be thought of as a thing whose 
intrinsic nature determines how it is to change its parts with the passage of time. Thus, a table could not be an 
organism since, if there were tables, they could change their parts purely as the result of the application of external 
forces…. A simple fits this abstract characterization of what it is to be an organism: its intrinsic nature determines 
that it is always to be composed of the same parts. If we adopt this way of talking, we can say that all physical 
objects are organisms, either degenerate or living” (98). Concerning the identities of organisms, van Inwagen writes, 
“If an organism exists at a certain moment, then it exists whenever and wherever – and only when and only where – 
the event that is its life at that moment is occurring; more exactly, if the activity of the xs at t1 constitutes a life, and 
the activity of the ys at t2 constitutes a life, then the organism that the xs compose at t1 is the organism that the ys 
compose at t2 if and only if the life constituted by the activity of the xs at t1 is the life constituted by the activity of 




Take the case of a chair sitting in a room. van Inwagen admits that (a) There are physical 
simples that are arranged chairwise and can be thought of as contained within the spatial 
boundaries of a chair-receptacle R (the region of space that would be occupied by a chair if 
chairs existed). In virtue of (a), when someone says “There is a valuable chair in the room,” what 
this person says is true (or at least, for all practical purposes, as good as being true), in spite of 
the facts that (b) There is no chair in the room in the sense of there being any one physical 
object located in R, and (c) There is no single thing that is composed out of the physical simples 
present in R. The claim that there is a valuable chair in the room is “sufficiently empty of 
metaphysical commitment” that we cannot say either that it does or does not entail the falsity of 
(b) or (c).74 When someone makes a chair, or any other artifact for that matter, he or she does 
not bring anything into existence, but merely rearranges already existing objects “and cause[s] 
bonding relations to begin to hold or to cease to hold… between objects.”75 
 
A further reason van Inwagen provides for thinking that, more specifically, no artifacts exist is 
that statements concerning their persistence actually import “covert reference[s] to the 
dispositions of intelligent beings to maintain certain arrangements of matter.”76 When intelligent 
beings are disposed to act according to certain ‘rules’ to preserve the arrangement of the parts of 
some inanimate object, that object is the subject of what van Inwagen calls a history of maintenance. 
For this reason, he says, we still think there is a watch on the table even though it has been 
completely disassembled, but we do not think there are any watches in the scrap pile of watch 
                                                   
74 van Inwagen, 107. Similarly, the fact that the “lunar receptacle contains untold myriads of things” does not entail 
that “these myriads compose a single thing” or that “when people say ‘Men have walked on the moon,” they say 
something” false (105). 
75 Ibid, 127. 




parts: “[T]he gears and springs spread out on the jeweler’s table are the current objects of a 
history of maintenance and none of the gears and springs in the scrap bin is.”77 
 
According to this way of seeing things, all the facts about ordinary inanimate objects turn out 
to be facts about simples arranged in certain ways. We should, then, be able to paraphrase 
sentences that contain references to artifacts using sentences that make reference only to 
simples. For instance, van Inwagen offers the following paraphrase of ‘Some chairs are heavier 
than some tables’:  
There are xs that are arranged chairwise and there are ys that are 
arranged tablewise and the xs are heavier than the ys.78 
In replacing the original statement’s ordinary predicate “x is a table” with the variably polyadic 
predicate, “the xs are arranged tablewise” the paraphrase, says van Inwagen, gives us a statement 
that demonstrates why the original claim seemed to be saying something correct. There can also 
be more complex paraphrases concerning artifacts. So, “When it was built, that house over there 
was smaller, since it wasn’t until 1952 that the garage was added” is paraphrased as “The initial 
objects of the history of maintenance of those things arranged housewise over there collectively 
occupied less space than those things over there do, since it wasn’t until 1952 that the then-
current objects of that history included things arranged garage-wise”.79 And “This house could 
have been larger” is paraphrased as “These things arranged housewise are the objects of a 
history of maintenance such that it could have had objects that collectively occupied more space 
than these things in fact do”. 
                                                   





The benefit of this view, concerning the problems that artifacts generate, is that such 
problems disappear altogether, since there cease to be any artifacts to cause the problems in the 
first place. In fact, van Inwagen seems to see the helpfulness of adopting his position in dealing 
with these apparently recalcitrant problems as its main recommending feature.80 We don’t have 
to worry about which ship is the true ship of Theseus because there are no ships. Instead, the 
situation that gives rise to the apparent problem of persistence through mereological change can 
be rephrased in terms of (honorary) simples.81 Instead of talking about ships, we can explain 
everything that happens in terms of planks: At first there were a number of planks arranged 
shipwise; then one by one the planks were removed and replaced by other planks, with each 
iteration yielding the same total number of planks arranged in the same overall pattern; later on 
the planks that had been arranged shipwise at first were again arranged shipwise. None of the 
planks ever becomes a proper part of anything, nor does it come to compose anything together 
with any of the others.82 
 
I think a serious question should be raised at this point concerning the simples arranged 
chairwise or the simples arranged shipwise or simples in any arrangement that we normally refer 
to as a compound inanimate object. The simples in question are capable of existing in other 
arrangements, or even in no arrangement at all (e.g. randomly scattered around). So the fact of 
                                                                                                                                                              
78 van Inwagen, 109. There are, according to van Inwagen, at least two other ways the paraphrase could work – one 
in terms of sets and the other in terms of regions of space.  
79 Ibid, 136. 
80 “I think that the best reasons for accepting my proposed answer to the Special Composition Question are 
available only to the philosopher who has examined the great philosophical puzzle cases about endurance in the 
light provided by this answer” (115). 
81 Of course planks aren’t physical simples, but for the sake of simplicity and since their compositional status is not 




the arrangement – the fact that the simples are arranged as they are – is a fact over and above 
the fact that these simples exist. Why is it, then, that given the arrangement of the simples – 
which van Inwagen describes (loosely) as requiring that the relative strength of bonding of the 
simples within R to one another be greater than the bonding of those simples to the (non-wood) 
particles outside of R and large compared with “the forces produced by casual human muscular 
exertions” – does not confer some unity on the simples in question? This question leads us 
naturally to some meta-reflections about the debate. 
 
2.2.5 Recasting the Debate 
A general pattern can be seen emerging from the various concerns raised over the existence of 
the offending types of objects. When what is being referred to (or mentally considered) as one 
thing turns out in fact to be many things, we say that that which was being referred to does not 
exist, or at least that it exists only in our minds but not in extra-mental reality. This is clearly 
what Hoffman & Rosenkrantz and van Inwagen are doing in regard to the kinds of inanimate 
compound physical objects whose existence they, respectively, deny.  
 
But let us reconsider (albeit briefly) the arguments of the artifact-deniers from a different 
perspective. Let us transpose the debate from the key of determining whether or not certain 
classes of objects exist, to the key of determining whether certain classes of individuals are objects, 
in the sense of that word given at the end of section 1 of the present chapter. The strength of 
the reasons for the apparent impossibility of intermittent existence which artifacts (if they 
                                                                                                                                                              




existed) would be capable of exhibiting is locatable in the fact that such existence would violate 
the requirement of intrinsic unity for objects. Independence also seems to be threatened if 
indeed human purposes or conceptual schemes play an indispensible role in determining what 
certain objects are – for then the identity of the object in question will depend on (make 
essential reference to) some human cognizer(s).83  
 
Relatedly, the fact that artifacts and other inanimate objects seem to lack internal natures on 
which their identity could depend, and that they fail to instantiate any natural kinds appears to 
contravene the requirement that any object should possess a determinate identity. Hoffman & 
Rosenkrantz found the possibility of spatially overlapping objects like statues and lumps of 
bronze unparsimonious and mysterious, and so decided to eliminate the statues and retain the 
lumps (at least when lumps are conceived of as mereological compounds, incapable of 
undergoing mereological change). The intuition at work here seems to involve certain ideas 
about what it is to be concrete (spatio-temporally located), insofar as concrete objects generally 
(at least at the macro-level) seem to be impenetrable, and to dominate their spatio-temporal 
location. van Inwagen gets rid of the lumps as well, on the grounds that all there really are, are 
simples arranged lump-wise, which do not lead us into any untoward ontological difficulties. 
                                                   
83 It may seem as though the line between ontological dependence and extrinsic unity is being blurred here. But in 
the case currently under discussion it is the identity or essence of the artifact that is seen to depend on (the intentions 
and purposes of) a cognizer, which is different from the mind-dependence involved in engendering extrinsic unity on 
an otherwise disunified entity. It is not important, in the former case, that the entity on which the identity of the 
object depends happens to be a mind (or a being having mental states) – the same generic relation of dependence is 
involved here as would be involved if the dependence were on something non-mental, as in the case of a rock’s 
property depending for its identity on the rock that possesses it; in the latter case, however, since the source of 
extrinsic unity is necessarily traced to certain mental processes, the mind-dependence involved here is one specific to 
minds or mental states, and hence is not equivalent to the ontological dependence relation. Put more briefly, it is 




Again, the possibility of there being a single object in the chair receptacle R would seem to 
violate the intrinsic unity requirement.  
 
It is significant that van Inwagen takes special pains to show that statements concerning 
objects of the sorts he deems non-existent can still turn out true (or as good as true, for all 
practical purposes). He does so out of a desire to appease commonsense, which reacts – as I 
think it ought to react – to his denials of the existence of any sort of inanimate compound object 
with indignation. But it does not seem to me that commonsense should rest satisfied with the 
paraphrases van Inwagen offers as consolation.  
 
Although I am not attempting to settle specific arguments here, for the sake of clarity in what 
follows, I need to make a few points that will reveal the perspective I am taking on the debate as 
a whole. A plausible strategy for resolving the disagreement concerning the existence of artifacts 
is to look for a middle ground between van Inwagen’s denial that there is any one thing there in 
the chair receptacle and Wiggins’ acceptance of the completely unconventional reality of artifacts 
(and perhaps of other inanimate compound objects). My attempt to recast the debate in what 
follows dissolves the dispute by locating some such “middle way” that allows us to appreciate 
the element of truth in each perspective. On the one hand, the claim that artifacts don’t exist just 
seems crazy. We deal with artifacts all the time, and we need some way of understanding them 
that does justice to this. On the other hand, paying attention to the way in which artifacts exist, 
in comparison with the way certain other things exist, allows us to understand why that claim 





While it does seem right to say that physical things whose existence is observer-dependent are 
suspicious, it does not seem right to say that the existence of many kinds of compound physical 
objects is (at least is wholly) dependent on observers and their perceptual or mental activity. The 
identity of artifacts, as opposed to mereological compounds, certainly seems to be determined at 
least in part by features of our conceptual scheme and / or our interests and purposes. A statue is 
what it is, in part, because we perceive it to be that way. The identity conditions of artifacts are 
partially conventional or “pragmatically determined,” without there being any fact of the 
matter.84 A mereological compound, on the other hand, is what it is regardless of how we see it. 
In a sense, this is what the whole question of identity through time is about. More specifically, it 
is what the relation between the objectivity of a thing and its identity conditions is about. The 
more the identity conditions of a thing (that isn’t one of us) are determined by facts about us, 
the less objectivity the thing will have. The less dependent the identity conditions of a thing are 
on features of our conceptual scheme and interests, the more objectivity we should attribute to 
it. I think that something along these lines is what has historically led many thinkers to claim that 
existence or reality comes in degrees. But whatever is right about that idea can be retained in the 
more sober claim that not all existing particulars are objects in the sense given in 1.1.4, a 
judgment which does not require us to attribute more existence to any one class of entities than 
to another.  
 
Artifacts, then, although they do not fully meet the requirements of being intrinsically unified, 




hence their existence cannot be denied. They have a unity more than a merely mentally imposed 
unity – their parts hold together regardless of what we think about them. I find the suggestion 
that artifacts are nothing at all problematic for at least two reasons. First, we attribute unity – 
and hence existence as individuals – to them in virtue of the arrangement of the material parts in 
virtue of which they can be used by us to accomplish certain purposes. We attribute to them a 
unity and reality in virtue of the fact that they subserve certain purposes of ours. Secondly, they 
are physical objects – something like versions of Hoffman and Rosenkrantz’s mereological 
compounds (but sufficiently modified to remove the problem of the notion’s incoherence). 
Their material parts are organized and connected in such a way that, given the laws of nature 
governing our universe, they are capable of being used by us to do things we want to do (to push 
or pull around other collections of matter; to produce effects on living organisms and persons, 
etc.).  
  
It seems to me that we need some kind of intermediate category to which particulars like 
artifacts and even lumps of clay would belong, in virtue of the unity they possess which is 
somewhat like that attributed to mereological compounds by Hoffman & Rosenkrantz, except 
without the restriction that this kind of thing is incapable of persisting through changes in parts. 
For one thing, even though artifacts are given their identity conditions, at least in part, by virtue 
of the (human) intentions and purposes they serve, there is nevertheless an objective fact of the 
matter about whether or not they do or can in fact serve those purposes. Because of the unity 
they have (ultimately spelled out in terms of physical forces and chemical bonds) they are 
capable of doing what we want them to do. One way of showing, then, that an artifact persists 
                                                                                                                                                              




through change, is to show that it is still capable of being used for the purposes that gave it its 
identity in the first place. A hammer is the sum of its material parts, yet these parts must be of a 
certain sort and their arrangement must be according to certain principles. So there is a kind of 
blending of intrinsic and extrinsic unity in an artifact – on the one hand it has a certain sort of 
thin but nevertheless intrinsic unity in its existence as a physical object (a modified mereological 
compound); on the other it has extrinsic (mentally-imposed) unity as it is defined in terms of the 
functions and/or purposes it was designed to meet. The two types of unity are in this case 
related. If the parts of the artifact were not connected by chemical bonds and physical forces of 
the relevant sort, it would be unable to meet the purposes for which it was made.  
 
The point of this discussion is that the debate which seemed to be about whether certain 
kinds of objects exist or not, in fact turns out to be a debate over whether certain classes of 
individuals are correctly included in the extension of the concept of an object as that concept 
was formulated in Section One. As I noted at the beginning of the present section, my aim here 
has not been to resolve the dispute or to make pronouncements regarding which kinds of 
entities really exist and which do not. Instead, I attempted to indicate a dialectical tension to 
whose resolution the ontological perspective developed in Chapter Four will contribute. 
According to that perspective, there will be a place in “ontological space” for any class of entities 
to which we are required to appeal by the conceptual demands of any sufficiently well-
entrenched practices we engage in. What place a given class of entities will occupy will be 
determined by how the entities in question measure up on the various ontological dimensions 
that are generated by the distinctions that were discussed in 1.1. This way of looking at things 




entities will be given a place in the overarching ontological framework. On the other hand, there 
will be distinctions between one class of entity and another on grounds of greater and lesser 
ontological robustness. But I leave further development of this thought until the relevant 






Three Ontological Accounts of Objects 
In this chapter, I review the three main approaches that contemporary ontologists have taken to 
the project of giving an “ontological assay” or an “account of the ontological structure” of 
objects or independent concrete particulars: Bundle Theory (BT), Substratum Theory (ST), and 
Non-Reductionist Theory (NRT).85 Giving an ontological assay of an object differs in important 
respects from giving an analysis of the concept of an object. An ontological assay attempts to lay 
out the ultimate constituents of reality and to provide a framework in which any object or 
situation may be accounted for in terms of these constituents and their relations to each other. A 
conceptual analysis of the term ‘object’, on the other hand, will potentially look quite different. It 
will provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in the class of objects 
without having to specify any ultimate ontological constituents. This was part of what Chapter 
Two accomplished. Understanding the difference between an ontological assay and a conceptual 
analysis will help to situate the debate that will be the subject of this chapter, and should help us 
to determine which tools of criticism and appraisal are appropriate for an examination of the 
theories at hand. 
 
The first two approaches to providing an ontological assay, namely Bundle Theory and 
Substratum Theory, can be considered as reductionist or constructionist in the sense that they rest on 
                                                   
85 In using these designations, I follow Loux (2001). The titles of the first two sorts of theory are fairly standard; the 
third sort is variously denominated. Macdonald (2005), for instance, refers to her non-reductionist approach as a 
“Property-Exemplification Account of Substances.” I prefer to refer to views of this kind simply as non-
reductionist theories. All of this is somewhat complicated by the fact that each of the views in question is in some 
sense a theory of substances, since “substance” can (at least in one important sense of that word) be taken as a 




the assumption that objects are completely constituted by, or are built up out of, elements that 
are more ontologically basic. To have an object, on such accounts, just is to have the relevant 
elements, suitably conjoined. BT and ST differ, of course, in their views of what count as “the 
elements,” the former taking these to be exhausted by properties and the latter insisting on 
including a non-property ingredient. The third approach is, by contrast, non-reductionist, in the 
sense that it takes “substance kinds” or fundamental sortal terms to be unanalysable, primitive 
universals, and identifies objects as instances or exemplifications of these “irreducibly basic” 
kinds. On a non-reductionist view, no ontological elements compose objects; the complete objects 
themselves – the instances of the relevant kinds – are the ontological elements. The distinction 
being marked off here is one that holds between types of ontological assays, and the use of the 
word “reductionist” here is not the same as its use in, say, theories that reduce chemistry to 
physics. In the latter case, but not in the former, the possibility of emergent properties is ruled 
out. But nothing about the weaker variety of ontological reductionism, which reduces objects to 
their properties (and substrata), requires that properties at one level could not emerge 
unpredictably from the properties and parts of the object at some lower level.86  
 
In my examination of BT and then of ST, I begin by noting some of the standard problems 
for the view, followed by a presentation of what I take to be the most compelling version(s) of 
each theory. I then show that even the best versions on offer remain seriously problematic. 
Following this, I move on to a critical examination of the non-reductionist position. It is here 
that I hope to make a more substantial contribution to the field, as this position does not seem 
                                                   
86 On BT, for instance, although objects are nothing over and above their properties, it is still possible that 




to have yet been given a serious critique in the literature – though aspects of it have been 
discussed in a few places. My conclusion will be that Non-Reductionist Theory (NRT), at least as it 
stands, also faces some fairly devastating difficulties. Taking this result together with the 
critiques of the other two positions, it will appear that we are forced to say that none of the three 
accounts of the nature of objects given so far provides an unqualifiedly satisfactory account of 
their ontological structure. But this conclusion, I argue, should lead us to wonder whether the 
real problem is the more endemic one of attempting to provide a single, general assay that 
applies to all ontologically significant individuals. If we abandon this approach, as I will argue we 
ought to do in Chapter Four, we begin to see how different ontological assays can be given for 
different types of individuals, depending on what features are included in the concepts under 
which individuals of a given type fall. 
 
3.1 Bundle Theory 
Every philosopher has heard of the theory that objects are nothing more than bundles of 
properties. The key advantage of this theory is that it offers a streamlined one-category ontology 
which does not require appeal to featureless substrata. Most will also be aware that the Bundle 
Theory has some serious problems. For instance, it seems unable to account for the numerical 
difference of qualitatively identical objects. What people might not be aware of is that there are 
some fairly sophisticated versions of BT that avoid most, if not all, of the standard objections. In 
what follows, I distinguish cruder versions of BT from some more sophisticated ones, and note 
                                                                                                                                                              
is nothing more to what an object is than the totality of the properties that compose it. Thanks to Doreen Fraser for 




remaining objections to the latter, borrowing from van Cleve’s (1985) treatment.87 I then 
explicate the most notable version of BT, which is due to Peter Simons – the Nuclear Trope Bundle 
Theory – according to which objects consist of a core of essential tropes along with a periphery of 
accidental tropes. I explain why Simon's theory is powerful and appealing – especially if we 
clarify the distinction, which he employs, between substantial and qualitative parts, and the idea 
that objects have simple parts. But in the end I argue that there are still good reasons for 
rejecting it. 
 
3.1.1 van Cleve: Crude, Sophisticated, and Super-Sophisticated Versions 
James van Cleve distinguishes three versions of the Bundle Theory, two of which – the “Crude” 
or “Naïve” view, and the “Sophisticated” view – are seriously problematic, while the third avoids 
the relevant problems, but only at the cost of certain hard-to-swallow implications. The crude 
version claims simply that “a thing (an individual, concrete particular) is nothing but a bundle of 
properties,” where the ‘bundle’ may be seen either as a set containing properties as members, or 
as a whole with properties as parts, but no requirements are placed on which properties count as 
one bundle. This version carries six objectionable entailments.88 I present them here, in slightly 
abridged form:  
 
If Bundle Theory is true, then 
(a) Any set of properties qualifies as a thing.  
(b) Things are eternal, necessary beings. 
                                                   
87 In Philosophical Studies, 47, pp. 95-107. Reprinted in Loux (2001), pp. 121-133. 




(c) Any member of a set is exemplified by that set.89 
(d) No thing can change its properties. 
(e) No thing could have had properties other than those it actually has. 
(f) No two things could have the same properties. 
 
Statement (a) follows fairly directly from the statement of (crude) Bundle Theory; (b) follows 
given the additional facts that properties, seen as universals, exist necessarily and sets exist 
necessarily if their members exist; (c) follows from the fact that exemplification would be 
equivalent to membership, on such a view. Statements (d), (e), and (f) are entailed by the fairly 
standard assumptions that sets have essentially all and only the members they have and that no 
two sets can have all the same members.90 The problem for crude BT is that there are obvious 
counterexamples to all of these entailed claims.  
 
More sophisticated versions of the Bundle Theory reflect the fact that not just any properties 
can make a bundle, but only those relevantly related. The relation responsible for binding 
properties into bundles is a contingent, homogeneous relation that has been given various 
names: ‘compresence’, ‘colocation’, ‘togetherness’, ‘consubstantiation’, ‘co-instantiation’, etc. 
Conceiving of things as bundles of this sort enables one to avoid entailments (a)-(c), but not to 
escape from (d)-(f). Bundles of co-instantiated properties are still incapable of changing, since 
elements F and G being first co-instantiated with H and later with K yields a new bundle, not an 
                                                   
89 Absurdly, since redness is a member of {redness, roundness}, that set would be red (would exemplify redness) 
(ibid, 122). 
90 van Cleve mentions that parallel arguments can be applied to bundles conceived as wholes with tropes as parts, 





alteration in an already existing one.91 Similarly, no bundle composed of F, G, and H could have 
existed with F, G, and K instead, so objection (e) still applies.  
 
Entailments (d) and (e) might be avoided, notes van Cleve, if an individual thing is identified 
with a core of essential properties but allowed to have an ‘outer fringe’ of exchangeable, 
accidental properties. But, he argues, it would be strange to consider a sub-bundle such as 
{animality, rationality} as an individual thing in its own right. And furthermore, if the individual 
is not seen as the complete bundle of properties, the same core would be capable of occurring 
together with a variety of outer fringes containing mutually incompatible accidental properties. 
This would force us to be willing to say that the same individual could be, for instance, both 
wise and foolish at the same time and in the same respect.92 And even with the addition of the 
core/fringe structure, the sophisticated version still generates the sixth entailment, since 
complexes whose constituents are exhausted by properties can only differ if their properties 
differ.  
 
The only remaining way for the Bundle Theorist to avoid the problems raised by (d), (e), and 
(f), van Cleve thinks, is to adopt a ‘new’ form of the theory. Unlike the ‘old’ bundle theory, 
which identifies every individual with some complex of properties, the new bundle theory denies 
any such identification, but is willing to paraphrase or translate statements that appear to make 
                                                   
91 Ibid, 124. Again, both this claim and the one immediately after it follow from the fact that any set necessarily has 
all and only the members it has.  
92 Note that the weight of this objection depends on taking properties as universals, not as tropes. van Cleve 
mentions, and swiftly dismisses, the attempt to identify things with bundles of world-indexed properties (WIPs) as a 
way of freeing Bundle Theory from the consequence that an object has all its properties essentially. As the idea of 
world-indexed properties seems to me to be of doubtful coherence, I leave it up to the interested reader to explore 




reference to individuals into statements that refer only to properties.93 Strictly speaking, on this 
theory there would be no individuals – only properties – so no worries could arise about 
individuals that cannot change or that could have possessed different properties than the ones 
they possess. Furthermore, the apparent problem of two indiscernible individuals dissolves into 
the (unproblematic) case of a single set of properties being instantiated twice, at different 
places.94 
 
How ought we to understand and express such a view? According to van Cleve, 
[w]hat the new bundle theory amounts to is a purely Platonic ontology 
in which properties are the only ultimate logical subjects. An 
appropriate language for this ontology would consist simply of names 
of properties plus a sign for instantiation, say an exclamation mark. 
Instead of ‘∃x(Fx)’, which suggests that there is some thing that 
instantiates F, we could have ‘!(F)’ (F is instantiated); instead of ‘∃x (Fx 
& Gx)’ we could have ‘! (FG)’ (F is co-instantiated with G), and instead 
of ‘∃x ∃y (Fx & Fy & ~ (x=y))’ we could have ‘!!(F)’ (F is instantiated at 
least twice). This notation highlights the fact that although properties 
are instantiated, they are not instantiated by anything – not even by 
bundles of properties.95 
While this view appears to be coherent, and seems to avoid the unsavoury entailments (a)-(f), it 
can be held only at the cost of a commitment to Platonism, to a mysterious, primitive notion of 
instantiation, and to the denial of the existence of ordinary individuals.96 Given the fact, then, 
                                                   
93 Ibid, 128. To illustrate his idea, van Cleve draws a parallel between these two views and the old and new versions 
of phenomenalism. Whereas the old phenomenalism identified material things with certain groups of sense data, the 
new version denied the existence of material things on the grounds that only sense data exist, and none of these 
taken singly or together are material things, so that “there is nothing to which its predicate, ‘is a material thing’, truly 
applies.” 
94 Of course, this solution – into which van Cleve thinks the new bundle theorist is forced – might not be so 
palatable, since it would require taking places as individuals (see Ibid, n. 30, p.133). 
95 Ibid, 128-29. It may be wondered whether, and if so, in what sense, the verb ‘instantiate’ is appropriate here. 
96 As if this were not enough, van Cleve points out a further deterrent to accepting the ‘new’ bundle theory. For any 
philosopher holding this theory, “since properties would be the building blocks of his universe, and since he would 




that both the old and the new bundle theories require denial of what seems to be obvious, the 
remaining alternative, says van Cleve, is to return to the idea of substance, taking an individual to 
be “something over and above its properties, something that has properties without being 
constituted by them.” I will not follow up van Cleve’s lead here, though I will consider the 
possibility in section 3.3 on Non-Reductionist Theory.97 
 
Where van Cleve drops the ball is in his treatment of another possible way out for the bundle 
theorist. A straightforward way for a bundle theorist to answer the objections arising from (d), 
(e) and (f) would be to take objects as bundles of tropes rather than universals. A trope is a 
particularized property. The solidity of this table, for instance, rather than being a participation 
in the universal Solidity, is a particular solidity, one belonging to this table and to none other. This 
solidity here and now cannot be instantiated by any other object. Some who include tropes in 
their ontologies refer to them as particular ‘ways of being’ or individual natures. Seeing objects as 
bundles of tropes is, I think, the first step toward a better bundle theory. Combined with the 
view that objects have cores of essential properties as well as outer fringes of accidental ones, 
this view would make it possible to explain how an object can change its (accidental) properties, 
how it could have had different (accidental) properties from the ones it has, and how two 
indiscernible objects could nevertheless be distinct (since, their resembling tropes being 
numerically distinct existences, the objects would only be exactly qualitatively similar and not 
numerically identical). Such a view would be able to accomplish all this without having to worry 
                                                                                                                                                              
which he is identical – or in other words, that there is no such thing as himself” (Ibid, 130). The new bundle theorist 
would be committed to his own non-existence. 
97 Note, however, that van Cleve, along with Martin (1981) and Sellars (1963) and Chisholm (1976), denies that the 
claim that an individual is something that has properties leads to postulation of bare particulars or featureless 




about the problem of multiply occurring cores possessing contrary properties, since the essential 
(trope) properties of any bundle would not be literally shared by any other bundle.  
 
van Cleve does not take this route because he thinks tropes are just particulars and so cannot 
be properties.98 But van Cleve’s distinction between properties and particulars begs the question 
in regard to the status of properties. This is evident in light of the discussion of Chapter Two 
and of the neutral ontological perspective I advocated there. There is nothing about particularity 
that entails anything about being a property if particularity is seen as conceptually correlated with 
universality, and properties are seen as conceptually correlated with objects. As long as we can 
maintain the distinction between a property and an object (and we can do so precisely by seeing 
properties as dependent and objects as independent in the sense discussed in Chapter Two) 
there is no difficulty with taking properties to be spatio-temporally located particulars. And 
furthermore, as we shall see a couple sections down the road from here, even if some tropes 
turn out to be fairly object-like, this may not be as big a problem as van Cleve thinks it is. 
 
3.1.2 More Sophisticated Still: Nuclear Trope Bundle Theory 
The Trope Bundle Theory of objects has its roots in Berkeley and Hume, and in the writings of 
more contemporary thinkers like Stout, Williams, Campbell, and others.99 But it is Peter Simons 
who presents a version of BT that both takes properties as tropes and makes the core / fringe 
distinction we’ve been discussing. On Simons’ view, an object consists of an “individual 
essence” – a core (or “nucleus”) of co-dependent tropes that is in need of completion by a 
                                                   




“peripheral halo” of accidental tropes none of which is individually necessary for the nucleus, 
though some trope from the same family as the one possessed is required. The nucleus of 
essential tropes takes over the individuating and unifying functions traditionally performed by 
the substratum, according to versions of ST. Appeal to the periphery of accidental tropes allows 
us to maintain the intuitive distinction between essential and accidental features of an object. 
 
I think Simons’ view is the best thought-out version of BT on offer so far. The following is a 
summary of some of the important and distinctive features of Simons’ view: 
(1) Tropes are bound together not by collocation, compresence, or co-
instantiation, but by various forms of ‘existential dependence’ which 
express natural but not logical necessities.100 Simons thus gives a more 
sophisticated rendering of the diverse kinds of ‘bundling’ relations there 
can be between tropes, and this enables him to avoid some of the 
problems that arise when compresence is seen as a single relation 
uniting any and all tropes. 
(2) Tropes are taken as sparse, not abundant, properties. “Not every 
linguistic predicate corresponds to a trope kind… and many 
predications will be made true… by more complex arrangements 
involving tropes in relation or a whole range of different kinds.”101 This 
avoids, among other things, population explosion objections. 
(3) Although the ultimate (or basic) parts of objects are tropes, objects can 
have smaller objects (sub-bundles of either yet smaller objects or of 
tropes) as parts.102  
(4) It is an empirical question whether or not the ways a macro-object is 
are determined by the ways their ultimate parts are – holistic quality 
tropes that depend on larger wholes and tropes that emerge 
unpredictably from lower-level properties can both be 
accommodated.103 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
99 Incidentally, it was in Williams’ “The Elements of Being” that the term ‘trope’, in the relevant usage, was coined. 
100 Simons (1999), 30-1. These relations can be mutual and rigid (as between tropes in the nucleus), one-sided and 
rigid (as between accidental tropes and the nucleus) or one-sided and generic (as between the nucleus and the 
accidental tropes). For further discussion of independence see Simons’ (1987) Parts: A Study in Ontology, chapter 8, 
and pp. 562-3 of his (1994) “Particulars in Particular Clothing.” 
101 Simons (1999), 31. 




Simons’ view captures many of the intuitions that have given impetus to theorizing about 
objects – intuitions about identity, independence, persistence, unity and integrity – without 
requiring the notion of substance to be an unanalysable primitive. A further benefit of the 
nuclear trope theory, Simons says, is that its reductionist approach is more consistent with 
established natural science than views that take substance as basic.104 And, finally, the nuclear 
theory is flexible – there may be nuclei without peripheries and even peripheries without nuclei – 
enabling the view to adapt to cover many cases of relatively deviant objects.  
 
An objection to Simons’ view raised by Hoffman and Rosenkrantz is that it seems to allow 
objects to have contradictory tropes – for instance, an atom would be both negatively and 
positively charged as a result of the presence in it of a positive charge trope (included in the 
proton bundle) and a negative charge trope (in the electron bundle).105 Simons meets this attack 
by distinguishing between the immediate trope parts and the substantial parts of an object, so 
                                                                                                                                                              
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid, 34. Views of the latter sort are incapable, for example, of covering cases of objects on the quantum level, 
where reidentifiable and countable substances seem to drop out of the picture. Simons points out some ways in 
which conceiving of what we ordinarily take to be substances is problematic. In general, there will be some 
indeterminacy as to what the parts of an inorganic object are. The sun, for instance, lacking anything like a skin, 
contains at any moment portions of matter and energy of which it will not be clear whether they should be 
considered parts of the sun. So, at any moment, it will not be entirely determinate which object (which whole) is the 
sun. I suppose that at a sufficiently low level the same thing would be true even of things like rocks – at the 
boundaries of a rock, there will presumably be some exchange of particles with the surrounding environment.  
The point about indeterminate boundaries, Simons thinks, can be extended to organisms as well, due to their 
“continual energy and matter exchange with the environment.” Furthermore, it is not always clear on which side of 
the line between individuals and collectives certain creatures, fall. About these, Simons says, “It seems somehow 
artificial to force the question ‘one individual or many?’ on them: they are organised at different levels in different 
ways (and falling under different sortal terms) and there may be no distinguished level dictating the boundaries of 
‘the’ biological individual.” In addition to this, there are problems about delimiting kinds of organisms – standard 
methods of dividing sexually reproducing organisms into biological species may not apply in the case of organisms 
that reproduce asexually, for example. But until this is settled, we cannot know how to individuate members of the 
latter kinds either. In addition to these examples, Simons views our idea of self or person as highly problematic. 
Taken together with his point about the failure of the concept of substance at the level of fundamental physical 
reality, Simons’ conclusion is that, “substance, far from being a widely applicable commonplace, is a concept rarely 
if ever fulfilled, an idealized limit of little or no use to metaphysics.” 
Simons does admit that although the trope bundle theory is better suited for describing what takes place in 




that the negative and the positive charge tropes belong not to the atom itself but to its 
substantial parts (the electron and the proton, respectively).106  
 
Simons’ response employs a distinction between trope parts (whether immediate or not) and 
substantial parts. This distinction is important as it allows us to distinguish between two kinds of 
constitution. On the one hand, a material object is constituted by its physical or substantial parts 
– as we say that a chair is made up of its back, its legs, its seat, its arms, etc. (From the 
perspective of BT, each of these will be a sub-trope-bundle.) But there is another sense in which 
an object is constituted by its properties. By specifying the properties of the chair with sufficient 
precision and thoroughness – its mass, size, shape, colour, texture, type, etc. – you will 
presumably have exhausted all that there is in the chair. So the distinction between substantial 
and trope parts has some teeth. But Simons does not take much effort to spell out precisely 
what this distinction amounts to.107 Furthermore, his account raises, but does not answer, the 
question of how substantial and qualitative parts are related. Finally, his account of trope 
bundles nested within trope bundles must either end in simple parts or admit an infinite regress 
of nested bundles. But Simons does not take an explicit stand concerning whether or not there is 
an ultimate ‘ontological ground-floor’. On these counts, then, his view remains incomplete. In a 
recent (2005) paper, “Qualitative Unity and the Bundle Theory,” David Robb deals with these 
                                                                                                                                                              
105 This charge is raised by Hoffman & Rosenkrantz (1994, pp. 77ff). 
106 Simons (1999), 32. Note that in (1994) Simons seems to reject the idea that tropes are parts (p. 563) – he also 
denies (p. 564-5) that all tropes are ways of being – they are entities but not thing-like (though at the microscopic level 
the substance / trope distinction may break down somewhat). 
107 Nor is he entirely clear about whether, and if so, in what sense, tropes are properly seen as parts of objects. In 
(1999), p. 32 he seems to affirm quite clearly that tropes are parts of a certain kind, while in (1994), he cautions 
against seeing tropes in this way, though he does note even there that “[i]t is prudent not to be too dogmatic about 




issues. I think that if we fill in the gaps left by Simons in the nuclear theory with some of the 
insights from Robb’s paper, we get a resulting view that is both complete and very compelling. 
 
3.1.3 Supplementing the Nuclear Theory 
On Robb’s version of BT, tropes are ontologically basic in the sense that while everything else 
ultimately reduces to tropes, tropes themselves do not have items from other categories as parts, 
though they can have other tropes as parts. The claim, which Robb makes more unequivocally 
than Simons does, that tropes are parts of objects, may seem to commit a category mistake. 
Clearly the redness of an apple is not a part of the apple in the same sense as its skin, or one of 
its seeds, or a portion of its flesh are parts of it. Furthermore, it seems that parts of objects are 
independent (of each other and of the whole object) while properties are not. Again, objects 
come into being by arrangement of pre-existing parts, but not of properties. And parts can be 
added to an object without having to destroy other parts, but this does not usually hold in the 
case of properties.  
 
All this shows, says Robb, is that properties are not substantial parts. In the more general 
conception of parthood that he proposes, however, properties (which he calls “qualitative 
parts”)108 are included:  
(P)  B is a part of A iff there are Cs such that (i) A is [nothing over 
and above] the Cs related in certain ways, and (ii) B is one of 
the Cs. 
                                                   
108 The following principle is given at Robb (2005), 471. Williams (1953) calls such parts "fine parts or abstract 




If tropes are parts of objects, however, there must be an explanation of how they are unified – 
that is, of what makes them parts of one and the same object. Key to Robb’s analysis is the claim 
that all the genuine properties of substantially complex objects (objects with more than one 
substantial part) are structural properties.109 Structural properties are complex properties 
composed of the properties of and relations among an object's substantial parts. In other words, 
they are ‘structured on’ the object’s substantial parts. Since the colour of a tennis ball is 
composed of the colours of its left and right halves, together with any relevant relations between 
them, we can say that the ball’s colour is ‘structured on’ the two halves.110 
 
The principle of qualitative unity for substantially complex objects, then, is as follows: 
(CU)  For any substantially complex object O and properties F and 
G, F and G are parts of O iff F and G are both structured on 
the (exhaustive) substantial parts of O at some mereological 
level.111 
Accordingly, what makes, say, the colour and the mass of my desk properties of the same desk is 
that they are both composed of the properties belonging to the same set of substantial parts – 
the ones that make up the desk – the legs, the top, and the drawers. According to Robb’s (CU), 
qualitative and substantial unity are clearly related, since the former is defined in terms of the 
latter. Furthermore, (CU) explains why qualitative parts are not independent of substantial parts 
                                                   
109 Robb denies that either higher-level properties (properties that are not structured on but merely supervene on an 
object’s parts) or modal properties are genuine properties. Belief in higher-level properties, he argues, rests on a 
confusion of resemblance with numerical identity: “It is only speaking loosely that we say that Alpha [a tennis ball] 
has literally the same color-property throughout these changes [gain or loss of particles]” (481). And modal 
properties, he says, fail all of the usual tests for being a way of being, a genuine property. The non-modal properties 
of the object are sufficient for explaining its causal powers, for providing truthmakers for modal predications, and 
for explaining resemblance of any two objects. Furthermore, “we are not acquainted with modal properties in 
conscious experience” (483-484). 
110 Robb points out that it is unproblematic “that Alpha's color is also structured on (some of) the smaller particles 
composing Alpha” which occur at a lower mereological level (Robb, 477). 




– because they are structured on them. They do not result, by being assembled, in the existence 
of an object “because their presence depends on the (logically) prior assembly of substantial 
parts,”112 and they are not additive because at a sufficiently low merelogical level we can simply 
see that the micro-properties required for being red or being round (for example) are 
incompatible with those required for being green or being square.  
 
The qualitative parts of an object are structured on the object’s substantial parts, which are 
sub-bundles of qualitative parts. But surely, we should now say, the substantial parts of objects 
cannot be reduced to bundles of properties which in turn are explained as being structured on 
lower-level substantial parts ad infinitum. Where does the analysis end? Robb thinks the fact that 
there are objects at all entails that there must be simple objects, since the ‘ontological buck’ 
cannot be passed on indefinitely to sub-bundles of properties at ever-lower mereological 
levels.113 But what can be said about these simple objects that lie at the ontological ground-floor? 
Since substantially simple objects114 have no structural properties, they need a different principle 
of unity from the one given for substantially complex objects. Robb proposes the following: 
“the principle of qualitative unity for a simple object is identity. A simple object, that is, just is a 
single, simple property.”115 Ultimately, then, Robb’s account requires that the ontological 
structure of an object bottoms out in simple tropes – simple particular natures. At the ultimate 
level of reduction, to be a substantial part just is to be a qualitative part, that is, a particular 
nature. 
                                                   
112 Ibid. 
113 He seeks, in this way, to answer Armstrong’s (1978a, p. 100) objection: “It is clear that many properties of 
particulars involve essential reference to proper parts of these particulars. If a thing is to be a chess-board, for 
instance, it must have spatial parts of a certain nature related in a certain way. These parts, however, are particulars. 
It appears, then, that many of the properties which figure in the bundle involve the notion of further particulars. 





3.1.4 Problems with the Supplemented Nuclear Theory 
On the view I am canvassing as the most complete and coherent version of the bundle theory, 
then, a complex object is a multi-leveled collection of tropes, with the highest level representing 
the tropes that characterize the object as a whole and are structured on the object’s macro-level 
substantial parts. In the usual case, some of these tropes will be essential to the object, and these 
will form the object’s nucleus; others will be only accidental, and these will form the object’s 
periphery. The substantial parts on which any of the tropes characterizing the whole object are 
structured are themselves sub-bundles of tropes which may contain their own nuclei and 
peripheries. This view enables us to avoid most, if not all, of the standard objections to BT. 
What I’ve been claiming so far is that this view needs to be taken seriously. But should we adopt 
it as our best general ontological account of objects? 
 
I think there are still some problems facing the supplemented nuclear trope bundle theory. 
Even if tropes are admitted to one’s ontology (again, for neutrality’s sake I will not rule them 
out), and even if it is agreed that (at least some) objects have essential tropes – tropes such that 
the object could not exist without them – the theory remains a troubled one.116 An initial 
objection addressed by Robb is that his view seems to commit a category mistake. If it does, says 
Robb, this is no more a problem for his account than for any other bundle theory, since every 
                                                                                                                                                              
114 An example of which will be given soon. 
115 Robb, 486. 
116 A further objection I will mention but not develop in detail is that if simple objects are, as Robb says they are, 
identical with simple properties, we might wonder how the charge that they are unextended, like mathematical 
points, will be averted. But if it isn’t, the nuclear theorist will owe us an account of how unextended things could 





bundle theory holds that tropes exhaust the contents of reality.117 Identifying simple objects as 
properties does entail that some properties (namely, the basic ones) have features of substantial 
parts – the features of being independent, arranged, and additive. But the claim that simple 
objects are in fact properties is not equivalent to the converse claim that simple properties are in 
fact objects, since the former reduces objects of a certain kind to (ontologically prior) 
particularized natures, and this does not entail that simple particularized natures have all the 
substantial features characteristic of objects. In particular, it does not entail that simple 
particularized natures are structured on anything at any lower level or have anything like a 
substratum or non-property ingredient that grounds the nature in existence. 
 
This is Robb’s explanation of the way things stand, at least. It is not entirely clear to me, 
however, that we can conceive of basic tropes as independent, arranged, and additive without 
building in something like the idea of a substratum. For instance, let’s say that what we refer to 
as the ‘spin’ of a given subatomic particle turns out to be a basic trope. Prima facie, it seems fine 
to say that there is just a simple particular nature there, call it (an instance of) spin-ness. In virtue 
of being a basic trope, it will be simple as well as being (as a matter of primitive ontological fact) 
individuated and numerically distinct. But if we say that it has the features of simplicity and 
individuatedness (not to mention independence, arrangeability and additivity) in addition to its 
‘spin’-ness, it seems as though we have to say that even the basic tropes are necessarily complex 
in nature. But if so, then we need something still more basic to ground the attribution of the 
multiplicity of attributes to a single subject, and an infinite regress seems imminent.  
 
                                                   




There are two possible ways to avoid this result. One could (a) say that what we find at the 
ontological groundfloor is in fact just the particular ‘spin’-ness, and that the other attributions 
we’ve been making do not correspond to genuine features of the entity we’re describing; or (b) 
claim that the truly basic tropes are in fact bare particulars. But if the first strategy is adopted, an 
account will be owing of what it is that makes true the statements that attribute the purportedly 
illusory features to the trope under consideration, and it is unclear what this could be. 
Presumably there must be something about the trope that grounds such veridical predications. 
If, instead, we adopt the second strategy, admitting that whenever we have some nature distinct 
from simplicity or brute individuatedness we are in need of some truly bare, non-qualitative 
individuator to go with it, then we no longer have a version of BT but a version of Substratum 
Theory instead (a view that is not unproblematic itself – see the following section). So Nuclear 
Trope Theory seems to collapse into mystery or into the Substratum Theory when pressed hard 
enough. 
 
An additional objection is one I will call the objection from the indefiniteness of substantial parts. 
In short, there seems to be no precise and non-arbitrary way of deciding which parts of an 
object count as its substantial parts and which do not. This, I think, should lead us to doubt 
whether there is a fact of the matter about what the substantial parts of an object are. There are 
a couple of ways of dividing objects into substantial parts. First, objects can be divided based on 
the geometrical properties of the space they occupy. On this basis, we can talk about the right 
and left halves of an object, say a bronze sphere or a tennis ball. In addition to the fact that 
where the lines are drawn is entirely arbitrary, the effect of this mode of division is that there are 
                                                                                                                                                              




literally an infinity of distinct potential substantial parts within the object, each of which is an 
object in its own right. And these objects are capable of overlapping each other in an infinite 
number of ways, so that if some sub-region of the space occupied by the object is specified, an 
infinite number of parts of objects can occupy precisely the same region of space, which is a 
fairly counterintuitive result.  
 
The second way of dividing an object into its substantial parts is to specify its physical parts. 
This can be done at various levels. A living human body for instance, may be said to have 
various organs as parts. But of course there will be parts which are not organs, such as individual 
red blood cells. At a lower level we might attempt to say that the parts of the body are its cells. 
However, there are at any time a number of dead cells which are not clearly part of the body. A 
similar thing happens at the atomic level, since at the organism’s surface there is a constant 
exchange of atoms with the external environment. In general, any entity that is specified as a 
physical part will be such that its boundaries are not well-defined or precise. It seems, then, that 
we cannot specify the physical parts of the body with exact precision.118  
 
But this causes problems for Robb’s principle of qualitative unity for substantially complex 
objects (CU) since the effectiveness of that principle depends on our being able to specify 
substantial parts. Recall the principle: 
(CU)  For any substantially complex object O and properties F and 
G, F and G are parts of O iff F and G are both structured on 
the (exhaustive) substantial parts of O at some mereological 
level. 
                                                   




If the boundaries of substantial parts are vague, it will be unclear what, precisely, the qualitative 
parts of an object are structured on.119 Take the surface area of the bronze sphere, for example. 
If the substantial parts of the sphere are infinitely many, clearly there will be no straightforward 
function from the surface area of the parts of the sphere to the area of the whole sphere. Or take 
the mass of a living human body – if it is unclear whether some items should be counted as parts 
of the body (dead cells, the bacteria living in the intestines, or the water molecules in a blister on 
the foot) it will be unclear how to build the mass of the whole body out of the masses of its 
substantial parts. But if we don’t know what the qualitative parts are structured on (and if, more 
strongly, there is no principled way of determining this) then we cannot use (CU) to tell us when 
two given properties are parts of one and the same object. And unless we can find some other 
principle of unity for qualitative parts, we will not be able to say, in general, when a given 
property is part of an object. But if sense cannot be given to the notion that tropes are parts of 
objects, then the very essence of the Bundle Theory seems to be in question. 
 
Someone wanting to retain the nuclear trope theory might protest that the problems I have 
raised apply only to the additions I have made to Simons’ view, and so only to what I am calling 
the Supplemented Nuclear Trope Theory, and not to the original view. But until we have an 
account from Simons of what happens at the ontological ground floor, one must suspect that 
the only reason Simons’ view does not fall prey to the objection concerning the incoherence of 
simple tropes is that he does not explicitly work this out. And as for the objection from 
indefiniteness of substantial parts, the original view could only escape if it could be shown that it 
is not committed to (CU). But even though he is not entirely explicit about it, Simons is in fact 
                                                   
119 Furthermore, are the qualitative parts structured on the nuclei of the sub-trope bundles that are the object’s 




so committed. In the response he gave to Hoffman and Rosenkrantz’s objection about 
contradictory tropes, discussed earlier, he makes it clear that he is committed to an object’s 
possessing smaller objects (sub-trope bundles) as parts. But if so, then he is also committed to 
the view that macro-level properties are structured on the properties of and relations among an 
object's substantial parts. But that is all it takes to be committed to (CU). 
 
3.1.5 Conclusion 
Although BT can be a lot more subtle and interesting than it may have seemed, even its best 
formulation is still subject to difficulties. But why does this matter? The importance of the 
critique of BT can best be appreciated when seen as part of a bigger story, according to which 
we have no coherent ontological assay of what an object is. The two other contenders for the 
correct ontological assay of objecthood – Substratum Theory and Non-Reductionist Substance Theory – 
are at least equally problematic. But this is worrisome given the pervasive conceptual demand for 
objects imposed by many of our explanatory practices, both in science and in everyday life. The 
problem may arise from our mistaken assumption that we have a single, univocal concept of 
objecthood which needs a unique corresponding ontological assay. If, instead, we think in terms 
of a plurality of concepts of individuals, each determined by the requirements of specific 
scientific or other explanatory practices, we can be more flexible in offering assays suited to the 
distinct types of individuals picked out. So, for instance, although BT may be inappropriate for 
physical objects (in view of the objections raised earlier), it may provide a completely adequate 
assay of mathematical objects. But further development of this larger story must be saved until 





3.2 Substratum Theory 
In light of the difficulties faced by BT, the substratum or bare particular theorist argues that there 
has to be more to an object than mere properties – there is also something that has (is the 
subject of) the properties but is not itself “had” by anything else – the substratum or ‘bare 
particular’.120 A first stab at establishing Substratum Theory would be by demonstrating the 
inadequacies of Bundle Theory, in all its variants. Since the only alternative to BT is irreparably 
flawed, this approach goes, we get ST by default. So, for instance, it has been argued that since 
Trope Bundle Theory cannot account for the sameness of qualitatively identical items, while 
Bundle Theory with Universals cannot account for their numerical difference, there must be, in 
objects, some non-property constituent (the substratum) that grounds their difference, which is 
combined with the universal properties that ground their sameness. But the disjunctive syllogism 
(BT ∨ ST; ¬BT; ∴ST) will be insufficient on its own if BT and ST are not the only conceivable 
ways of giving an ontological assay of objects. And since the section following the present one 
will discuss a third competitor in the running, it should go without saying that I find this 
approach problematic.121 
 
                                                   
120 Although some attempt has been made to give a deflationary account of substrata, I will focus on what Robinson 
calls the substantive account of substrata and their role in characterizing the nature of an IICP. There are also 
notably distinct variations of the substantive view. Armstrong, for instance, distinguishes between the substratum 
taken in abstraction from its properties – what he calls the ‘thin particular’ – and the substratum taken together with 
its properties – the ‘thick particular’. Either of these two conceptions can be seen as distinct from both the Lockean 
substratum and also from Aristotelian prime matter, which is also sometimes seen as a kind of substratum. 
121 This will work, however, if one is limited only to what are called ‘constituent ontologies’ that is, ontologies that 
allow properties as literal constituents of objects and permit a “categorial analysis that delineates their constituents” 
(See Moreland (1998), p. 253). However, I see no reason to adhere to such restrictions, and the view to be discussed 




Traditional empiricists have generally had a distaste for the notion of a bare particular since 
such things seem incapable of being objects of acquaintance. A charge that is less dependent on 
antecedent philosophical commitments is that the very notion is incoherent or self-contradictory 
– those who propose it end up having to say, for example, that the things that (by definition) 
possess properties do not possess any properties, since they are bare. And since there are ways 
of explaining the three main roles for which they were introduced (uniting the properties; 
individualizing them; and making the bundle something substantial) without appealing to 
substrata, they seem to be unnecessary postulates.  
 
Proponents of ST have, however, claimed for their view a number of advantages over any 
version of BT. Substrata traditionally have been seen as the key to philosophical explanations of 
individuation, identity, differentiation, persistence through change, etc. The usual reply from the 
bundle theorist is that these are not explanations but assumptions of a solution – advantages of 
theft over honest toil. In this section, I will discuss the major objections to ST by way of an 
examination of two of the best thought-out versions of the theory – J.P. Moreland’s and C.B. 
Martin’s – which approach substrata from somewhat different angles. For Moreland, bare 
particulars are first and foremost individuators – they are introduced as a way of solving the 
problem of individuation. Martin is concerned with whatever it is that grounds properties in 
existence, seeing that properties are ontologically dependent entities, in such a way as to require 
no further grounding itself. Finally, as I have done in the case of BT, I note some problems that 
confront even the best versions of ST.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              




3.2.1 Moreland’s Bare Particularism 
One objection that seems to rule out the possibility of substrata or bare particulars from the start 
is the objection from the Principle of Acquaintance (PA). It is claimed that the postulation of such 
entities is inconsistent with empiricism since we could not be acquainted with them. Any 
simplistic Lockean account of substratum as an inferred “I know not what” support of 
properties seems vulnerable to this type of attack. Edwin B. Allaire122 responds to objections of 
this sort, following Bergmann, by claiming that when we are acquainted with, say, a round red 
spot, we are in fact directly acquainted not only with the characters (or universals) round and 
red, but also with an individual or bare particular.123 Allaire argues that phenomenologically 
speaking, when  
two things which are the same in all (nonrelational) respects [for 
instance, two qualitatively identical discs, are] presented together, they 
are presented as numerically different. That difference is presented as is 
their sameness with respect to shape, (shade of) color, and so on. What 
accounts for the difference is the numerically different individuals…. 
[T]he two collections of characters – if one persists in speaking that 
way – are, as presented, numerically different. Clearly, therefore, 
something other than a character must also be presented. That 
something is what proponents of the realistic analysis call a bare 
particular.124 
This analysis is forced on us, Allaire thinks, since the trope bundle theorist cannot explain what 
grounds the non-linguistic fact of the sameness of two qualitatively identical objects, while the 
bundle-of-universals theory cannot account for the numerical difference between them. An 
                                                                                                                                                              
Clothing” (1991). 
122 Originally published in 1963 in Philosophical Studies, 14, pp. 1-8. Reprinted in Loux (2001) Metaphysics: Contemporary 
Readings. 
123 Contra Russell, the fact that bare particulars cannot be recognized or reidentified (since they are merely 
numerically and not intrinsically different), does not prevent us from being able to be acquainted with them (118). 





analysis that appeals to substrata along with universals succeeds, where bundle theory fails, in 
grounding these features in distinct entities. 
 
Moreland (1998), in his own defense of a bare particularist solution to the problem of 
individuation, points out that Allaire’s response is inconclusive since the particularity presented 
to us in experience may accrue to the two particular states of affairs (the qualitatively identical 
objects) themselves, and does not guarantee that we are directly acquainted with “the constituent 
that accounts for the thisness and thatness of each,” that is, with the bare particular in each of 
the objects. This possibility arises from Moreland’s view, which seems reasonable, that the 
individuation (and thus the particularity) of macro-level particulars (tables, chairs, etc.) may 
derive from the individuation (and particularity) of their lower-level substantial constituents (the 
wood, the atoms…) and that it may only be at the very lowest level that we reach substrata or 
bare particulars as the ultimate individuators. Nevertheless, argues Moreland, leaving the PA 
challenge unanswered ought not to trouble us, since most philosophers today do not adhere to 
the positivist empiricist constraints for analytic ontology from which the objection springs.125  
 
Moreland goes on to consider three other objections that he thinks require a more subtle 
response.126 Bare particulars are, for Moreland as for Allaire and Bergmann, the element in 
objects which bestows on them their particularity. The need for such entities is felt because of 
the realist view of properties that is adopted. Since nothing that is universal (shared by or 
common to many), nor any collection of universals, can individuate entities, some non-property 
                                                   
125 Moreland (1998), 256. He notes that even D.M. Armstrong, who is perhaps the contemporary ontologist most 
guided by empiricism, admits bare particulars as individuators. The greater concern, for analytic ontology, is 




ingredient is necessary to explain how it is that we could have qualitatively identical yet 
numerically distinct individuals. The first objection Moreland addresses is that the notion of a 
bare particular said to be required by the problem of individuation is incoherent and self-
contradictory. On the one hand, bare particulars by definition possess or exemplify no properties 
(in themselves), yet on the other hand, it seems that they must possess or exemplify at least some 
properties if they are entities at all. Properties that are especially difficult to deny of bare 
particulars are the properties of being concrete, being particular, and being capable of bearing 
properties. Although Moreland also mentions such properties as being self-identical, being 
coloured if green, etc., I will not discuss these here on the grounds that they can be dealt with 
more easily by appeal to a sparse view of properties.127 
 
Moreland thinks that the objection under discussion rests on a confusion about bare 
particulars. It is wrong to think of bare particulars as being completely without properties – 
indeed, according to Moreland, they must have properties in order to exist. But bare particulars, 
unlike the higher-level particulars (the objects or ‘substances’) to which they belong, are simple 
entities, and consequently, rather than possessing properties in the way higher-level particulars 
do (properties are ‘rooted-in’ the nature of substances), bare particulars have properties ‘tied-to’ 
them. The tied-to relation is distinct from the ‘rooted-in’ relation in that when a property is tied-
to a bare particular, this is not reflected in any difference in the nature of the bare particular 
itself. Moreland expresses this view as follows:  
                                                                                                                                                              
126 As Moreland points out, these objections have been summarized in Loux (1978) and in Hoffman and 
Rosenkrantz (1994). 
127 For a good discussion on this, see Jonathan Schaffer’s (2004) paper, “Two Conceptions of Sparse Properties,” 




A bare particular is called ‘bare’, not because it comes without 
properties, but in order to distinguish it from other particulars like 
substances and to distinguish the way it has a property (F is tied to x) 
from the way, say, a substance has a property (F is rooted within x). 
Since bare particulars are simples, there is no internal differentiation 
within them. When a property is exemplified by a bare particular, it is 
modified by being tied to that particular. Thus, bare particulars have a 
number of properties, e.g., being red, and they have some properties 
necessarily, e.g., particularity, in the sense that a bare particular can exist 
only if it has certain properties tied to it.128 
Since the having of a property by a bare particular does not result in any internal difference in 
the bare particular (but only in the property tied to it) the bare particularist can draw out the 
poison of the claim that bare particulars are self-contradictory by showing that although they 
always have properties (in the sense that properties are tied-to them), bare particulars remain 
propertyless (in the sense that no properties are rooted-in them). So at least on these grounds 
the notion cannot be accused of self-contradictoriness. This move, it should be noted, only 
works if both the simple bare particulars and the fact that properties are tied-to them are taken 
as primitives within the theory. 
 
Another objection to substrata or bare particulars is that bare particulars either need to be 
individuated by some further element, or else are themselves not needed to individuate ordinary 
objects, since whatever it is that could individuate substrata could have been postulated instead 
from the beginning. If we admit that bare particulars possess various essential properties, then it 
is possible that, given any two bare particulars, a and b, they have all the same essential 
properties (e.g. particularity, concreteness, etc.). But then, the objection goes, “we would need to 
postulate further bare particulars to individuate a and b, and so on to infinity.”129 It seems 
                                                   
128 Moreland (1998), 257-258. 
129 This objection, as Moreland notes, is raised explicitly by Loux (Substance and Attribute, pp. 149-52) and is implicit 




obvious enough, however, that this objection treats bare particulars as though they were bundles 
of properties. But Moreland’s account cannot be criticized in this way since it depicts bare 
particulars as simples which just are (as a matter of brute fact) individuated and to which 
properties are tied (even if they could not exist without the properties that are so tied). So there 
is no need to look for further individuators for them.130 Furthermore, there is no getting below 
the primitive fact about our universe that bare particulars are individuated and thus numerically 
distinct – so the claim that we ought to substitute whatever would have individuated bare 
particulars for the bare particulars themselves is also ruled out. Once the simplicity and primitive 
individuatedness of bare particulars is seen, the objection ceases to be well-motivated. 
 
The final objection argues that if bare particulars are taken to be  
primitive individuative simples with properties tied to them in a 
primitive way ungrounded in capacities or properties within those bare 
particulars, it seems that it is inexplicable as to why bare particulars 
always come tied to certain properties (e.g., particularity). What is to 
keep them from simply splintering off on their own, as it were?131 
And if this is a genuine possibility, then we seem to have been led to incoherence after all, in 
spite of what was claimed above, since that which ex hypothesi individuates properties might exist 
without any properties to individuate. Moreland’s response is to insist that no bare particular 
could exist without at least some, perhaps very general or even transcendental, properties 
(particularity, simplicity, unity, reality, etc.) tied-to it. Or, Moreland claims, it may in fact be the 
case that existence itself must always consist either in property-possession (the object-mode of 
                                                   
130 Moreland (1998), 260. 




existence) or being-possessed (the property mode). In either case, the possibility of free-floating 
substrata would be ruled out.132 
 
3.2.2 Criticizing Moreland 
In Moreland’s bare particulars we have a fairly sophisticated version of substratum theory.133 To 
recap, on Moreland’s view, an ordinary object (a clothed or ‘thick’ particular) “assays out” (can 
be ontologically decomposed) into a simple, bare particular along with some universal properties 
and a tie of predication (the tied-to relation) that binds them together. This sub-section will 
focus on objections to Moreland’s view raised by D.W. Mertz (2001), and will also examine 
Moreland’s – and Timothy Pickavance’s (2003) – response and Mertz’s (2003) rejoinder. 
 
Mertz’s initial criticism of Moreland consists of three points. First, the positing of a “tied to” 
form of predication, distinct from the standard “rooted-in” form, seems to be ad hoc and 
motivated only by the desire to save bare particulars. But it is not entirely clear how serious a 
charge of ad hocery would be at this level. Moreland grants the ad hoc feel of the tied-to relation 
but argues that the dialectical pressures of the problem of individuation warrant appeal to it as 
part of the overall most reasonable explanation of the phenomenon of individuation in the 
context of realism about properties. The issue here turns on whether following the dialectic 
leads, as Moreland and Pickavance claim, to the “discovery” of the tied-to relation that holds 
bare particulars and properties together, or whether, as Mertz urges, this relation only serves as a 
                                                   
132 Ibid, 260-61. 
133 A similar version is advocated by D.M. Armstrong. Armstrong is in fact one of the biggest proponents of a bare 
particular theory in contemporary metaphysics. Although his view is not similar in every respect with that of 




patchwork solution, in no way independently motivated, to cover a gaping hole in the fabric of a 
theory which ought, all other things considered, to be discarded anyway. Since a decision on this 
issue depends so heavily on the relative weights of the other virtues and deficiencies of the 
theory, I will be focusing (as in fact Mertz himself does) on these further issues and will not 
examine the effect of this particular charge further.134  
 
The second criticism leveled by Mertz is that since, on Moreland’s account, the descriptively 
empty nature of a simple bare particular is (and must be) utterly unaffected by what properties 
are tied to it, a bare particular can (in spite of Moreland’s protesting to the contrary) exist 
independently of any such properties, which makes the fact that any property ends up being tied 
to it a contingent fact. Yet it seems as though some properties, like simplicity, must necessarily 
be tied to any bare particular, yielding a contradiction. Furthermore, since there is nothing in the 
nature of a bare particular to control for what properties can be tied to it, nothing could prevent 
contrary properties, like ‘round’ and ‘square’ from being tied to it simultaneously.135  
 
Moreland and Pickavance (henceforth M/P) seek to fend off this objection by claiming that, 
in the first place, bare particulars do not have any necessary properties, though it is necessary 
                                                                                                                                                              
parallel to the ones Moreland gives would be available to Armstrong. The remaining differences being relatively 
negligible, a separate treatment of Armstrong’s position seems unnecessary. 
134 To use a phrase suggested to me in conversation by David Devidi, “charges of ad hocery stand or fall depending 
on what's going on around them.” For the interested reader, I point out that the initial objection is found at Mertz 
(2001), 50. For Moreland’s reply and Mertz’s rejoinder see Moreland and Pickavance (2003), 7-8, and Mertz (2003) 
19-20.  
135 Mertz (2001), 51. I will not be discussing Mertz’s alternative proposal for individuation here, but will mention 
briefly that Mertz appeals to relation instances as the ontologically fundamental entities. The key advantage, 
according to Mertz, of relation instances over bare particulars is that there is no ‘ontic separation’ of intenstions 





that, in order to exist, they have some property (or other) tied-to them. In short, the (clarified) 
view of M/P is that “all properties of bare particulars are contingent in the sense that a bare 
particular need not have had those specific properties to exist; this does not, however, deny the 
fact that a bare particular must have some property or other in order to exist.”136 The denial, on 
behalf of M/P, that even properties like unrepeatability and simplicity are necessary properties, is 
effected by denying that these are genuine properties at all in the sense of there being ontological 
correlates to the relevant linguistic predicates. Unrepeatability, simplicity and particularity, then, 
either are disguised negative properties (lack of repeatability, of complexity, etc.) or are 
predicable in virtue of “brute fact[s] incapable of further analysis.” To substantiate the latter 
possibility, M/P appeal to Husserl’s view that “the categories of formal ontology, e.g., being an 
essence, being a property, being a particular, are not in the objects to which these categories truly 
apply as properties are.”137  
 
Mertz’s rejoinder is that even if each of the predicates likeliest to qualify as a necessary 
property of bare particulars turns out to be a negative one, in order to avoid making negative 
predication into uninformative and arbitrary denials there must be some reason for excluding the 
negated features, and this reason can only be the existence of some positive characteristic that 
contributes to the bare particular’s makeup. And furthermore, if, as seems to be the case, there 
are multiple negative predicates applicable to bare particulars, then multiple positive 
characteristics are needed, in which case bare particulars would be complex and not simple.138 
                                                   
136 Moreland and Pickavance (2003), 9. 
137 M/P (2003), 10; citing Husserl (1982), pp. 18-32. This certainly begins to feel a bit mystical. 




But both of these points run contrary to Moreland’s depiction of bare particulars and threaten to 
revive the charge of incoherence.  
 
The charge that negative predicates, when truly applied to some subject, require positive ontic 
correlates seems difficult to avoid, but may not cause much damage if M/P are granted their 
second strategy for dealing with the (apparent) necessary properties of bare particulars. Mertz 
does not discuss the possibility that these predicates could be truthfully applied in virtue of the 
unanalysable fact that bare particulars belong to certain formal ontological categories – a 
belonging that does not entail that anything corresponding to those categories are ‘in’ bare 
particulars. But in the absence of any clear explanation of how this could be so, at the very least, 
M/P would seem to owe us some reason why we ought to believe it to be possible.  
 
To the other part of Mertz’s second objection, the claim that contrary properties can be 
exemplified by the same bare particular, M/P reply that the alleged exemplification cannot 
occur, not because of anything in the nature of the bare particular itself, but simply as “a 
function of the nature of the properties themselves.”139 To give a simplistic example, the 
presence of ‘green’ in (some portions of) a leaf itself, rather than anything about the leaf’s 
individuating bare particular, excludes ‘orange’ from being present in (those portions of) the leaf 
at the same time. Mertz counters this suggestion by reminding us that the nature of the tied-to 
relation necessarily leaves open the possibility of simultaneous possession of contraries. In 




the predicate intension (F [for monadic predicates] or R [for relational 
predicates]) has a role in revealing something about the nature(s) of the 
subject(s). This is so because in a fact the union of an ontic predicate and its 
subject(s) require and presuppose of both a reciprocal compatibility of specific 
qualitative contents.140  
But since the tied-to relation cannot be exemplified in this way – because of the bareness of its 
bare particular relatum – we must conclude that it cannot be a standard relation. The unity it 
provides must instead be equivalent to the non-exemplifying “unity of arbitrary concatenation or 
blank association found in a list or class, e.g., {F,a} or {R,b,c}.”141 But if the tied-to relation is 
indeed completely subject-indifferent in such a way that the bare particular relatum neither limits 
nor conditions the relation in any way, then, argues Mertz, of necessity there will be “a 
compatibility between the relation, any intension, and any bare particular.”142 But this means 
nothing could prevent the bare particular from having both round and square tied to it at the 
same time. 
 
Although M/P never take up this line of defense, as far as I know – there may be a way of 
dealing with Mertz’s objection based on the idea, expressed in Moreland (1998), that bare 
particulars may only be the ultimate individuators and thus not be responsible for every case of 
individuation. According to this idea, macro-level particulars are individuated by lower-level 
particulars in a hierarchy of individuation, so that even though a number of properties are 
rooted-in the thick particular this would not necessarily require them to be tied-to the relevant 
                                                                                                                                                              
139 M/P (2003), 11. They note that Mertz’s view that the content of a subject controls what is predicable of it actually 
accords with their view, since it entails that the subject as possessing some property and not as particular is what 
determines what else can be predicated of it (ibid, 12). 
140 Mertz (2003), 15. Italics Mertz’s. 
141 Mertz (2003), 16. If the tied-to relation were a fully fledged relation, it would succumb to Bradley’s Regress 
(Mertz (2001), 47).  
142 Mertz (2003), 17. This also explains what Mertz says elsewhere: “when construed as a contentless tie it becomes 




bare particular. So, for instance, properties like round and square could be dealt with at the level 
of ordinary predication – the kind of predication that takes place at the level of thick particulars. 
And at that level there is no difficulty in saying that something in the nature of the particular 
exemplifying one property (round) excludes the possibility of its exemplifying other properties 
(square) simultaneously. If this maneuver can be made, then Mertz is incorrect when he 
attributes to Moreland the view that every atomic thick particular a “has a unique bare particular 
pa such that, for every property F, F is rooted-in a if and only if F is Tied-to pa.”
143 And if that is 
the case, then the only way to make the objection that bare particulars may possess contrary 
properties stick is to find contrary properties that would apply to them at this ultimate level – 
contrary properties at the macro-level would pose no problem for them. 
 
Finally, and according to Mertz more seriously still, by the Principle of Constituent Identity  
(PCI) (x)(y)[(z)(z is a constituent of x ↔ z is a constituent of 
y)(x=y)] 
which Moreland himself explicitly accepts, since bare particulars can have no constituents, they 
therefore have “exactly the same constituents and so are identical.” But this implies that there 
exists only one individuator and hence only one thick particular.144 In reply, M/P point out that 
(PCI) applies only to entities composed of proper constituents (constituents not identical to the 
composed entity), and so does not rule out the possibility of numerically distinct simple entities, 
that is, entities lacking any proper constituents, as bare particulars are taken to be.145 To this 
Mertz levels another charge of ad hocery:  
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144 Mertz (2001), 52. 




Why, other than to save bare particulars, must the principle be so 
restricted? Under the theory of bare particulars it is simply a ‘brute fact’ 
that two internally simple bare particulars are numerically distinct, and 
so accepting the theory one would have to restrict the constituent 
principle. But whether to accept the theory is precisely the issue.146 
It seems correct to say, with Mertz, that if the very possibility of simple bare particulars is – as he 
claims to have shown it is – in serious question, our motivation for restricting (PCI) will be 
reduced.  
 
At the same time, however, it does seem to be a rather dodgy move to infer from the claim 
that any two entities with the same constituents are identical that any two items with no 
constituents are identical. Since, according to (PCI) it is sameness of constituents that serves as 
the criterion for identity, in the case of two entities not possessing constituents at all, we might 
seem to naturally want some other criterion by which to judge questions of identity or diversity. 
Mertz’s inference seems unproblematic in the case of set theory, according to which there can 
only be one null set. But it is not entirely clear that bare particulars are sufficiently like sets to 
warrant the application of the same move to them.  
 
One might argue that (PCI) fails to give identity conditions that cover both complex and 
simple particulars by appeal to a similar case of a failed attempt to give identity conditions for 
propositions. Consider the following Principle of World Identity for propositions: 
(PWI) (x)(y)[(w)(w is a world in which x is true ↔ w is a world in 
which y is true)  (x=y)]. 
                                                   




This principle of identity fares well enough for contingent propositions. But in two limiting cases 
it is inadequate. First, although the propositions expressed by the claims  
(a) All animals are either mammals or non-mammals 
and  
(b) Every snail is a snail 
are true in all and only the same worlds (since, like any tautology, they are true in all possible 
worlds) we certainly would not want to say that they are for that reason identical. Second, the 
propositions expressed by the claims  
(c) There are mammals that are non-mammals  
and 
(d) There are dead snails that are alive  
are true in all and only the same worlds (since, like any contradiction, they are true in no possible 
worlds), we would not for that reason want to say they are identical. In the case of (a) and (b), as 
well as the case of (c) and (d), we resist identification because the contents of the propositions 
expressed by them are clearly not the same, and the identity conditions for propositions should 
take content into consideration. Arguably, it is because propositions (contingent or otherwise) 
have the same content that they are true in the same worlds – content is, after all, at least part of 
what determines truth value. So, when faced with counter-examples to (PWI) the correct move 
is to replace it with some other more generally applicable principle of identity for propositions 





What Moreland needs to say, it seems, is that the case of bare particulars is more like the case 
of propositions than it is like the case of sets. And there certainly is some similarity between the 
two cases – bare particulars can be seen as a ‘limiting case’ of particulars in that they are 
particulars without constituents, much as contradictory propositions are a limiting case of 
propositions in that they are true in no possible worlds. But to justify this claim, something 
would presumably need to be said about the reason why simple particulars present a legitimate 
counter-example to (PCI), something along the same lines as what was said about content in the 
case of (PWI). What feature common to both bare (constitutively simple or empty) and thick 
(constitutively complex) particulars does (PCI) fail to capture? One attempt to give such a 
feature would be the following Principle of Individuative Identity: 
(PII) (x)(y)[(i)(i is a principle of individuation for x ↔ i is a principle 
of individuation for y)  (x=y)]. 
The parallel might not be complete; it is not clear, for instance, that it is because x and y are 
individuated by the same principle that they possess the same constituents. (PII) also has a 
feeling of circularity about it when considered as applied to bare particulars themselves, since the 
principle of individuation for a bare particular is just itself. But when dealing with simple entities 
like bare particulars, this might be the best we can expect. Whether or not (PCI) leads to the 
collapse of all supposedly distinct bare particulars into a single individuator remains inconclusive, 
at least until these issues are better sorted out. 
 
After the dust of the M/P-Mertz debate has fallen, the most serious difficulty that remains 
standing against M/P’s bare particularism is the extreme counterintuitiveness of the attempt to 




the properties of simplicity, unity, particularity, etc. are properties necessarily attributable to 
them. None of the ways of accounting for this on offer by M/P are convincing, at least not 
without a significant amount of further explanation. I have suggested a way of avoiding the 
problem of bare particulars possessing contrary properties by appealing to levels of individuation 
and claiming that properties that are predicable at one level may not be applicable at other levels. 
But seeing bare particulars as ultimate individuators and thus not the proper subjects of at least 
some of the properties that apply to thick particulars offers no escape from the implausibility of 
the claim that bare particulars have no positive characteristics necessarily. 
 
3.2.3 Martin’s Neo-Lockean View 
Moreland’s version of ST arose in the context of realism about universals. The need for bare 
particulars was felt because the phenomenon of individuation could not be accounted for if all 
the constituents of an object are universal properties. But substrata have been put to use for 
other purposes as well. In particular, in the context of a trope theory of properties, substrata are 
not needed to serve as individuators, since tropes come pre-individuated. But substrata are still 
appealed to in order to serve as unifiers of the various diverse properties that come together to 
make up an object. If no version of bundling or compresence is fit to the task, perhaps 
postulating a non-property ingredient to which all the properties are tied will be. And in any case 
the need is present for something to serve as the ontological ground for tropes, which are seen 
to be dependent entities. This seems to have been the primary motivation for John Locke’s 





Martin (1980) presents a refurbished, Lockean view of substrata. Since it is possible to 
attribute properties to other properties, we must say not only that the substratum is the support 
or bearer of properties, but also that it is not itself supported or borne by anything.147 But, as 
Locke noted, such an item seems to be unknowable, since we only know things by their 
qualities. This, of course, is a version of the objection from the PA discussed above. The 
Lockean answer to this criticism, according to Martin, begins with the view of complex general 
ideas as partial in the sense that they include only the ‘leading or characteristical’ feature of 
whatever kind is picked out, abstracting from other features which an object belonging to that 
kind would also need to possess in order to exist. In the case of the general idea of a substratum, 
the leading feature is its being the bearer of properties. The leading feature of the correlative general 
notion of ‘property’ is then just being borne. Neither the properties borne nor the bearer are 
objects in their own right, nor are they parts of objects.148 Instead, they are each something about 
the object. When it is understood that “the object qua object is both the bearer of properties and 
the properties borne,” the objection that substrata are necessarily unknowable ceases to pose a 
problem, since we clearly know objects.149 
 
This is supposed to help give a coherent idea of a substratum because nothing is claimed to 
exist possessing only the feature of being a property-bearer. Every existing substratum will bear 
                                                   
147 Martin, 4. See Locke’s Letters to Stillingfleet (p. 245, 2). 
148 The fact that neither substrata nor properties are objects explains, in Martin’s opinion, why the relation that 
holds between them is unlike other relations. 
149 Martin, 7. A further argument against substrata mentioned by Martin goes as follows: “we come to believe in the 
need for substrata simply because it is suggested by the subject-predicate form of our language (and also, 
presumably, by the (∃x) of quantification in logic). Then it is argued that some languages (and also, presumably, 
some logics) don't have this subject-predicate form. So, the conclusion seems to be that the notion of, and 
supposed need for, substrata is due only to, and suggested by, a local, parochial linguistic form” (Ibid, 8-9). Martin’s 
primary reply is that “if some languages suggest a substratum and some do not, the question should still arise 'Which 




properties (and usually many properties). Specifically, it will bear whatever properties belong to 
the object in question. It is clear that Martin thinks this analysis of objects as requiring both 
properties and a bearer of properties applies to any and all objects:  
And even the finest parts right down to those objects that are the 
‘insensible corpuscles’ of physics are such that, like the larger, 
observable wholes they might make up, there is that about them that is 
the bearer of properties, and that about them that is the properties 
borne.150 
Wherever a property is, a substratum comes along with it. So on Martin’s view, at the 
ontological ground-floor (assuming there is one) there will necessarily be complex items 
– substrata each of which possess at least one property. But what needs to be kept in 
mind when considering Martin’s view is that substrata are not taken to be independent 
objects in their own right. They are not objects, but something about objects. So it will 
never be the case that property-less substrata are found.  
 
The following is a distillation of the argument Martin gives for the need for substrata: 
1. Properties are not independent or arranged (or, we might add, 
additive).151 
2. Properties are not parts of objects. (from 1) 
3. Objects are not collections of properties, contra BT. (converse of 
2) 
4. Properties need to be borne by something. (from 1,3) 
5. There must be something about a given object that is the bearer of 
properties (a substratum, in other words). (from 4)152 
                                                   
150 Martin, 8. 
151 Martin puts this point insightfully: “…the top half is a part of an object and not a property of it. That is, what is 
referred to as 'the top half' can be thought of under some other description as an object that could have existed 
without need of being the top half of anything, but as an object existing in its own right,” which is not true of a 





We need properties in order to distinguish what it is about an object that makes true diverse 
predications about it. When it is true to say of, for instance, a passionfruit, that it is round and 
purple, it will not be the whole object that makes true both predications, but in each case 
something distinct and particular about it. We also need properties to explain the phenomenon 
of real (intrinsic, as opposed to extrinsic) change. Martin writes, “Real change to an object is 
more than the change of predicates coming to be true or false of an object. The what about the 
object that is different (namely its properties) is needed as well.”153 Properties, however, cannot 
support themselves in existence – any property is a property of something. So in addition to 
properties, we need that which bears the properties without being borne by anything else. So, 
says Martin, “The passionfruit under this partial consideration, and incomplete description, is 
indeed the substance or substratum.” Again, the object is the substratum and the object is the 
properties – each of these aspects of an object can be properly separated out only mentally and 
not in reality. 
 
3.2.4 Problems with Martin’s view 
Lowe (2000) agrees with Martin in seeing Locke as taking properties to be particularized ways 
objects are, and as dependent entities which are only improperly viewed as parts of a whole.154 
                                                                                                                                                              
152 The passage where the complete argument is closest to being presented is on Martin, 7-8: “If properties are not 
to be thought of as parts of an object, and the object is not then to be thought of as a collection of properties, as its 
parts may be, then there must be something about the object that is the bearer of the properties that under any 
description need to be borne. And that about the object is the substratum.” 
153 Martin, 9. 
154 “Locke thinks that, precisely in as much as we conceive of the qualities of a thing as having the status of modes, 
or dependent beings, we cannot help but suppose that, whenever we observe certain qualities to be co-instantiated 
in nature, there is something upon which they depend for their existence and union, something in which they 




Lowe also notes that Martin’s account, insofar as it distinguishes substrata from crudely 
conceived bare particulars, avoids some common objections. To the claim that substrata are self-
contradictory (since they must both possess and lack properties) Martin can answer (even if he 
in fact does not) that the view of substrata as necessarily possessing at least some properties “is 
founded upon an illicit tendency to think of substrata as objects of a queer sort, when in reality 
they are something ‘about’ objects, their property-bearing aspect.”155 Furthermore, as noted 
above, seeing substrata as incapable of existence independent of objects, Martin also side-steps 
the argument that there could be free-floating naked substrata. And, on Martin’s account, 
substrata are knowable, since we can partially consider “what it is ‘about’ the object that is a 
bearer of its various properties – what it is ‘about’ the object that is needed for us to have before 
us an object, rather than merely various compresent properties.”156 We thus know substrata not 
only via their properties but even to some degree ‘in themselves’.  
 
But according to Lowe, Martin’s account does not line up with that offered by Locke on two 
counts. First, Locke’s empiricism prevents the possibility of forming an idea of a substratum by 
abstraction or ‘partial consideration’ of the contents of experience, since no non-quality would 
ever be a part of the contents of experience in the first place. And secondly, Martin’s account 
presents substrata not as objects (that is, not self-subsistent entities), but as aspects of objects; 
Locke, on the other hand, claims fairly clearly that substrata are self-subsistent.157  
 
                                                   
155 Lowe, 511. Note that Lowe thinks appealing to sparseness may be an appropriate move here as well. 
156 Lowe, 510. 
157 Lowe, 512-13. Locke says explicitly that the best notion of substratum available is “that it is ‘Ens’ or ‘res per se 




More important for our purposes are the philosophical inadequacies of Martin’s view. Firstly, 
by taking the substratum to be a distinct aspect or ingredient of an object, Martin’s account 
becomes subject to Bradley’s regress. For even if the relation that binds substrata and properties 
is non-standard – it holds not between objects but between aspects of objects – it is nevertheless a 
relation. But then we are led to ask what it is that unites the substrata, the properties and the 
relation together into a coherent unity, and we find the need for a further principle of unity, and 
the regress goes on.158  
 
Secondly, there seems to be no reason to postulate a substratum, as a distinct constituent of an 
object, to serve as the bearer of the object’s properties when the object itself is already available 
to fulfill this role. On Lowe’s positive view, “the substratum of an object’s properties is to be 
identified with that very object.”159 Objects, Lowe argues, meet the traditional desiderata of 
substratum theory – they support properties in the sense that without them properties (as modes 
of the object) could not exist, without being properties themselves. But unlike Lockean 
substrata, Lowe’s are knowable via their properties, and unlike Martin’s, they are self-subsistent. 
They ‘possess’ properties but not in any sense that leads to a regress since there is no genuine 
relation of support between them:  
a quality is a quality ‘of’ its substratum, which is the qualitied object 
itself, not some peculiar constitutent, aspect or ingredient of the object. 
                                                   
158 A hylomorphic approach might be capable of handling this kind of regress. Thanks to Joseph Novak for 
pointing this out to me. 
159 In stating that, for instance, a passion-fruit, when partially considered, is the substratum, Martin is close to 
adopting the same view as Lowe, however, he distances himself from this possibility by claiming explicitly that the 




But ‘ofness’ in this sense does not express a genuine relation in which 
two items stand to one another, a kind of metaphysical bond or glue.160 
So Martin’s view seems to be inadequate in at least these two ways. Whether Lowe’s positive 
view is a genuine improvement over Martin’s, and whether it is still a version of ST or is rather a 
brand of the theory to be considered in the next section are questions that remain to be 
answered.161 
 
There are further objections to the notion of substrata that come from considerations of 
artifacts. Take a rubber ball, for instance. It seems as though a rubber ball consists of two 
roughly semi-spherical halves, which are themselves capable of independent existence and 
therefore seem to be objects within the original object. Do each of these halves then possess a 
substratum? If not, why not?  
 
Further, if every object possesses a unique substratum, what happens (to the substratum) 
when an object is destroyed? Let’s say, for instance, that we have a living human being, which 
dies. We might want to say the corpse is no longer the same object as the living being, and we 
might even have reasons for saying it isn’t an object any longer at all (a corpse is only a 
collection of parts whose relations are in the process of dissolving). But then does the 
substratum of the original living body somehow dissociate itself from the body on death, and 
continue to exist indefinitely, or is it annihilated? If the latter, the question arises as to how 
                                                   
160 Ibid, 513-14. 
161 On Lowe’s view, the substratum of an object is the object itself. The next question to ask is, what then is the 
object? He says it is emphatically not a collection of properties (which, being ontologically dependent, could not 
result in an independent thing). For the answer to this, we have to look to Lowe’s writings elsewhere. In his (1998) 




something with no properties of its own (e.g. perishability) could be annihilated. Since the 
corpse continues to exist, is the substratum of the original living body replaced by a corpse-
substratum instead? Unless something like Moreland’s point about the ultimate individuators 
belonging only to the lowest-level objects is taken into account, it is not clear how the advocate 
of ST will avert the force motivating this kind of objection. 
 
Simons (1994), while admitting that Martin’s view is a genuine improvement on more naïve 
versions of ST, points out a different problem:  
That about a bearer of properties (i.e. here, tropes), that it is a bearer of 
tropes, is either not itself a trope, or, more plausibly, it is a second-
order trope, supervening upon there being first-order tropes the 
substance has. In either case, it does not explain how it comes about 
that there is something other than the bundle of tropes that bears the 
tropes, nor does it help to explain what this relation of bearing is.162 
Obviously if the substratum is a trope, the whole purpose of introducing it in the first place will 
have been thwarted. Of course, Martin would likely not be happy with saying that a substratum 
is just a kind of property, but it’s not clear what else a non-self-subsistent aspect of an object can 
be. Furthermore, to describe substrata as partially considered objects (bearers), whose other 
aspect is being borne is merely to redescribe the original problem of the nature of objects, rather 
than to give an account of it. So we are no further along than when we started. “If no further 
explanation is forthcoming,” Simons writies, “we have not a substratum theory but a 
particularist equivalent of what Loux calls a substance theory of substance [and of what I call a Non-
Reductionist assay of objects]. That is to say, the notion of substance remains basic.”163 But this, 
                                                                                                                                                              
seems to make his version of ST barely distinguishable from some of the non-reductionist positions to be discussed 
below. 
162 Simons (1994), 567. 




Simons thinks, is a last resort that does not need to be taken since his own nuclear trope version 
of BT offers an account of objects that gets a fair distance beyond this starting point. 
 
3.2.5 Conclusion 
We have considered a version of ST that takes properties as universals and substrata as simple 
contentless individuators, and a second version of ST that views properties as tropes and 
substrata as aspects of objects that cannot exist independently of them any more than their 
correlative properties can. Both of these views are more subtle, in significant respects, than their 
historical predecessors. Nevertheless, there are also problems with them both that have not been 
answered satisfactorily as of yet, and that are likely unanswerable. The most serious problem for 
the first version is its failure to present a plausible story of how bare particulars can be literally 
contentless while apparently having to possess certain features. And the substrata postulated by 
the second version seem unnecessary from one perspective, and from another to be just another 
kind of trope. 
 
There are also criticisms that can be leveled at BT and ST simultaneously. The idea here is that 
the whole ontological reductionist approach is misguided. For one thing, a non-reductionist 
might say, the concept of a concrete particular cannot be adequately analysed in terms of more 
basic constituents, so that “the ontologist cannot get below the concept of a concrete 
particular.”164 In fact, it is alleged, each of these constituents is only intelligible in the first place 
from within an antecedently given conceptual framework of concrete particulars. Furthermore, 




properties plus a bare particular) to be constituent parts of a concrete particular, remains a kind 
of category mistake, ultimately modeled inappropriately on empirical science’s notion of 
molecules composed of atoms. It is also argued that reductionist views do not adequately take 
account of two important distinctions: the first is the distinction between kind or constitutive 
attributes (‘human being’, ‘dog’, ‘oak’, etc.) and characterizing or non-constitutive attributes (like 
‘red’, ‘round’, ‘juicy’, etc.), the former of which are not analyzable in terms of the latter; the 
second is the distinction between essential and accidental attributes. Non-reductionist attempts 
to give an ontological assay of objects will be considered next.  
 
3.3 Non-Reductionist Theory 
Both the Bundle Theory and the Substratum Theory can be seen as reductionist perspectives in 
the sense that they take substances to be reducible to their ontologically more fundamental 
constituents (their properties, on BT, or their properties together with their substrata, on ST). 
Objects are reducible to their ontological elements in the sense that if it is asked what an object 
is, the reply will be that an object is (identical to) a bundle of properties or a substratum and its 
associated properties. Since, as we have seen in the previous two sections, there are strong 
reasons to doubt that either reductionist ontological assay succeeds, we seem to be in need of 
some kind of non-reductionist theory of objects. A non-reductionist account would argue that 
objects are ontologically atomic or basic ontological units in their own right, rather than 
composites of more basic items.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              




A natural way to proceed, attempting to walk the non-reductionist road, would be to deny, 
with the “austere nominalist,” that concrete particulars have any ontological structure for the 
metaphysician to characterize. According to austere nominalism, there are objects but no 
properties. The facts that we attribute redness to a given apple and say that a given fire engine 
agrees with the apple in its color attribute do not imply the existence of properties (whether 
these are seen as universals or as tropes). Rather they are “fundamental and unanalyzable 
feature[s] of the world…. There are no prior facts that serve to explain these facts; they 
constitute the primitive materials out of which we construct our story of the world.”165 The costs 
of denying that there are properties seem to be fairly high, but I will not at this point look any 
more deeply into the coherence of this analysis of attributes. I mention the view primarily by 
way of contrast to the non-reductionist view that will take up the bulk of this section.  
 
Versions of the Non-Reductionist Theory I have in mind (I will henceforth refer to it as NRT) 
have been presented by Michael Loux (1978, 1998, 2006) and by Cynthia Macdonald (2005), 
among others. According to NRT, the category of properties is genuinely distinct from the 
category of objects. However, the properties an object exemplifies are not in any sense parts or 
constituents of it. After a mildly critical exposition of each of these related accounts, I will 
present what I take to be some fatal objections to the non-reductionist project.   
 
                                                   
165 Loux (2006), 53. Loux discusses this view in pp. 52-62. More about it will appear in my critique of Loux’s view 




3.3.1 Loux and Wiggins 
Loux has proposed an account of objects (concrete particulars, in his terms) which he calls a 
‘Substance Theory of Substance’. It is a view, inspired by Aristotle and advocated by David 
Wiggins among others, according to which objects are seen as fundamental, irreducibly unified 
entities, which nevertheless retain a complex ontological structure insofar as in each object a 
“core of being” or essence can be distinguished from its contingent or accidental attributes.166 
An object is given its essence by virtue of its instantiating a kind-universal (e.g., sheep, maple) 
and has its essence necessarily. Loux writes, “to be an instance of a kind is simply to exhibit the 
form of being that is the kind.”167 So the irreducible unity of objects derives, on this view, from 
the irreducible unity of the kinds – the fundamental “forms of being” – they exhibit. But the 
object will also be characterized contingently or accidentally by a number of properties extrinsic 
to its core or essence, and these do not play any role in determining what the object in question 
is. Instead, this is done antecedently, by the kind instantiated. It is the essence that makes the 
object what it is – an object of a certain kind. So there is, in the analysis of objects, ontological 
complexity to be discerned.168  
 
The discernible ontological complexity, however, is not like the complexity attributed to 
objects by either BT or ST, which see objects as built up from ontologically more basic items. 
On NRT, objects (at least the genuine ones)169 are what we find at the ontological ground floor, 
                                                   
166 For Aristotle’s presentation see Categories 5; Physics II.1 and 8; Metaphysics Zeta and Theta. 
167 Loux (2006), 110.  
168 Loux thinks the ability of this position to account for the distinction between essential and accidental attributes 
differentiates it from bundle theories. Although Loux does mention Peter Simons’ view in a footnote (ibid, note 27, 
p. 119), he does not seem to be aware of this as a version of BT that incorporates the essential / accidental 
distinction quite effectively, perhaps because he concerns himself mainly with versions of BT that are realist about 
universals.  
169 Proponents of NTR often hold that only certain concrete particulars count as genuinely unified basic entities or 




and there is no getting beneath them. Contra BT, NRT asserts that no amount of properties can 
provide sufficient resources to recover the concept of an object, which must instead be given at 
the start of the ontological project. This is evident from the fact that properties are not even 
“intelligible independently of the framework of material particulars.”170 According to NRT, both 
BT and ST are guilty of making attributes parts of objects, in a confused and “bizarre mimicry of 
physical scientists” as though attributes alone, or in addition to substrata, could come together to 
yield objects, as atoms come together to make up molecules.171 The kind to which an object 
belongs is not a part of that object, to be joined with various properties to compose a whole; 
instead, the instantiated kind is “what that object is.”172 NRT also has to be distinguished from 
ST, even though the two approaches are in agreement that the properties attributed to objects 
need a subject to exemplify them. On NRT, the subjects are not (as bare particulars are) 
constituents of objects; rather, they are the objects themselves, whose identities are not distinct 
from at least some of the attributes they exemplify – namely, the kind-universals they 
instantiate.173  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
basic natural kinds, that is, the biological kinds and the “kinds posited by our best theory of the material 
constitution of the universe.” (114). But what ought we to say, then, about the non-substance concrete particulars? 
One line of approach – made familiar by van Inwagen – is to deny that they exist, when speaking about existence 
strictly. I have considered this question in the first part of this dissertation, so I will not go into it again in detail 
here. 
170 Loux (2006), 108. “Our concept of a color,” Loux continues, “is, in the first instance, the concept of a visible 
feature of the surface of a material object; our notion of a shape is the notion of an attribute concrete particulars 
exhibit in virtue of the relations that obtain among their physical parts; and the concepts of a weight or a size are 
ideas that can be understood only by reference to complex systems of measurement that already presuppose an 
antecedently given framework of concrete particulars.” 
171 Loux (2006), 108.  
172 Loux (2006), 110-11. 
173 Loux writes, “Take the man away from Socrates and there is nothing left that could be a subject for anything” 
(2006, 111). It should be noted, however, that the identity of the subject will not necessarily involve its accidental 




The key virtue of NRT, relative to reductionist ontological assays, is that it holds that among 
attributes, in addition to the property-universals possessed by concrete particulars, there are also 
the kind-universals to which concrete particulars belong. Kinds represent forms of being not 
reducible to any collection of properties. Objects exemplify kind-universals by instantiating 
them, in virtue of which they can be said to belong to their respective kinds.174 Intuitively, the 
question “What is x?” is properly answered by citing the kind to which x belongs, not by listing 
x’s properties. It does seem to be an advantage of NRT over BT/ST that it meshes with this 
intuitive account of what a thing essentially is, in a way that the other views seem unable to do.  
 
To see this more clearly, compare two ways of answering the question, "What is that x over 
there?" 
(1)  That x is (a) a bird, (b) a table, (c) an electron, (d) Peter… 
(2)  That x is (a) seated, (b) yellow, (c) angry, (d) banana-shaped… 
The answer form displayed by (1)’s examples – that is, the answer given by appeal to kind or 
sortal terms (or, perhaps, to rigid designators, as in (1d)) that, seemingly, stand for essences – 
strikes us as appropriate, but that displayed by (2)’s examples does not. It might be asked why 
BT (or ST) could not use the same sortal terms to answer the ‘What is x?’ question, without 
having to say that the terms so used stand for essences. Could not sortal terms merely be cooked 
up for convenience’s sake, as a shorthand way of referring to various relevantly similar bundles, 
which we group into classes not on account of shared, irreducibly unified essences, but only 
                                                   
174 Loux (2006), 109. The talk of belonging and membership employed by NRT should not, however, mislead us 
into thinking that they are the same as sets. Most importantly, where sets are determined by their members, kinds 




because we notice that certain properties happen to hang together in the world? While it may be 
true that the correct (ontologically accurate) way of answering the 'What is x?' question in the 
case of objects is to say that x is a bundle of such and such compresent properties (BT) or that x 
is a substratum to which such and such properties are tied (ST), neither of these views captures 
our ordinary practices of singling out objects in experience and tracking them through time. 
 
David Wiggins (2001) has argued that our abilities to deal with questions of the identity of 
objects depend on our being able to grasp, to some degree, the senses of sortal terms (terms 
which stand for kinds). Identity, Wiggins says, is sortal-dependent and is determinate and all-or-
nothing (that is, not relative to any descriptive context). We single objects out and track them 
across time by appeal to (often irreducibly practical) principles, derived from our understanding 
of the kinds picked out by the relevant sortal terms, which provide us with the identity 
conditions of those objects. And it is by virtue of the fact that it provides an answer to the ‘What 
is it?’ question that the kind makes possible the practice of singling out or individuating objects 
in experience. This practice, then, is something we should want our theories of objects to be able 
to explain since, as we have seen in the analysis of the intention of particularity in Chapter Two, 
all objects will possess a determinate identity in virtue of their particularity, and since, further, 
diachronic identity (possession of determinate identity over time) depends on synchronic 
identity (possession of determinate identity at a given moment). Even if there could be 
instantaneous objects (a possibility I earlier tried to remain open to), they would possess 
determinate synchronic identity, and it will (at least in many putative cases of instantaneous 
objects) only be a contingent matter that they cannot possess a diachronic identity – there seems 




they are annihilated a single instance after beginning to exist did not take place. So the fact that 
NRT, in virtue of its more adequate account of identity, does, in general, a better job accounting 
for diachronic identity as well, and hence of the practice of tracking objects through time, seems 
to be a point in its favour.  
  
BT and ST also reverse the intuitive order of priority apparent in explanations of the following 
kind:  
O:  x weighs approx. 425 lbs because x is a mature male black bear.  
In this statement, the explanation for the possession by the object of a given property (the 425 
lb weight) is given in terms of the kind to which the thing we're dealing with belongs (a bear). 
Because x is a thing of this kind (which naturally parses out as “Because of what x is”) x has such 
and such a property. As Loux writes, “it is because it belongs to the kind that it possesses these 
properties and not vice versa.”175 BT (and ST) seems to have to say instead,  
E: Because such and such properties are compresent here (are tied 
to this bare particular), we have (what we call, for pragmatic 
reasons) an individual of this kind (e.g., a bear). 
 
I have labeled the claims on display here (O) and (E) to indicate that the former, (O), offers 
what we might call an ontological explanation (which must be a sort of causal explanation) while 
the latter, (E), provides, if anything, an epistemological explanation or, better yet, an epistemological 
criterion for deciding whether or not a thing of a certain kind is present. Ontological / causal 
explanations like (O) naturally attribute explanatory priority to the kind or nature of an object, 
                                                   
175 Loux (2006), 110. Loux provides the following example: “Thus, the things that belong to the kind geranium will 
have a characteristic shape; their height and weight will each fall within a certain range; their leaves will be of a 




seeing the properties as somehow ‘following’ or ‘flowing’ from it, even if our understanding of 
the nature in question is incomplete, and is derived from our experience of the qualities of the 
thing (or of the qualities of other instances of the same kind). All this seems consistent with 
postulating that, as Wiggins says, the kinds designated by genuine sortal terms will bring with 
them certain a posteriori laws of coming to be, of continuity, growth and development, and of 
ceasing to be that will govern the things that instantiate those kinds.  
 
Wiggins is concerned to show how Putnam’s account of natural kind words, combined with 
an understanding of the significance of the ‘What is x?’ question, inform our practices of 
individuating and tracking objects. Although the use of a natural kind word will not depend on a 
full understanding of the theory of that kind, such a theory or “nomological grounding” must, in 
principle, be available, if indeed the sortal term denotes a natural kind. If so, “then” according to 
Wiggins, “the holding of the relevant principles is constitutive of its exemplification by its 
instances. To be something of that kind is to exemplify the distinctive mode of activity that they 
determine.”176 And these lawlike principles in nature are what “determine directly or indirectly 
the characteristic development, the typical history, the limits of any possible development or 
history, and the characteristic mode of activity of anything that instantiates the kind.”177  
 
To remind the reader of Wiggins’ position, I will cite again one of the passages discussed in 
2.2, which contains a succinct summary of his view: 
Starting off with the almost pre-theoretical idea of a sortal predicate 
whose sense is such as to depend on the sort of thing that lies in its 
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extension – the kind of predicate that cries out for real definition – we 
are led to speculate what holds together the extension. So soon as we 
find that, we find lawlike norms of starting to exist, existing, and 
ceasing to exist by reference to which questions of the identity and 
persistence of individual specimens falling under a definition can be 
arbitrated. Such norms will supervene on basic laws of nature…; they 
may be understood as certain exploitations, so to say, of these laws. But 
now we are led by simple conceptual considerations to precisely the 
account of living substances that biologists can fill out a posteriori by 
treating them as systems open to their surroundings, not in equilibrium 
with those surroundings, but so constituted that a delicate self-
regulating balance of serially linked enzymatic degradative and 
synthesizing chemical reactions enables them to renew themselves on 
the molecular level at the expense of those surroundings, such renewal 
taking place under a law-determined variety of conditions in a 
determinate pattern of growth and development towards, and/or 
persistence in, some particular form.178 
My purpose in mentioning Wiggins’ ideas is to show the intuitive power behind the idea of kind-
universals, and also to give some indication of how an account of such kinds might be spelled 
out in greater detail than Loux develops it. I have so far been recounting what I take to be the 
broad outlines of NRT and of its intuitively appealing features. Next I will treat NRT’s more 
problematic aspects in some detail. But before I get to what I see as the really fundamental 
issues, I will mention, for the sake of approximating completeness, three of the potential 
difficulties Loux himself addresses toward the end of his presentation of NRT.179 
 
The first problem Loux addresses is that, since many different kind-universals are exemplified 
by living beings, it would seem that any substance would possess multiple distinct essences. But 
this result can be avoided, Loux thinks, if the various kinds are seen as composing “a nested 
hierarchy… [in which] the more general kinds are included in or implied by the less general,” so 
                                                   
178 Ibid, 86. 
179 Since the fourth problem he discusses is one I have already addressed elsewhere – namely the problem of what 
items to include in the (metaphysically strict) extension of ‘object’, and what to say of the items that we ordinarily 




that “the lowest-level kind, the infima species… gives us its complete essence.”180 The idea here is 
that, for instance, ‘primate’, ‘mammal’, ‘vertebrate’, and ‘animal’ are all somehow included in 
‘human being’ and so only the latter, most specific kind-universal is the one that truly provides 
the essence of human beings. Secondly, some essentialist theories (Loux calls them Leibnizian) 
claim that substances must have individual essences, as opposed to the shared, general essences 
advocated by NRT, in order to resolve certain philosophical difficulties. So defenders of NRT 
need to provide an account of the identity properties (e.g. being identical with Socrates) which 
Leibnizians see as individual essences, as well as an account of how NRT can resolve the 
relevant philosophical problems. Loux gestures at some possible approaches (deny that any such 
properties exist; argue that they are reducible to the accidental and essential attributes associated 
with an object) but does not take a clear stand on which of these he favors. 
 
A third difficulty arises from physical reductionism, which might be seen as threatening to 
make living beings into “mere collections of their physical parts.” But in the case of 
commonsense parts (“things like arms, legs, eyes, kidneys, heart, and stomach”) rather than 
posing a problem, Loux follows Aristotle in arguing, such parts actually lend support to the view 
that substances are irreducible unities since they are what they are only in the context of the role 
they play within the larger system; their essences make reference to the (prior) wholes of which 
they are parts.181 Parts in the physicist’s sense (ultimate or elementary physical entities), on the 
other hand, although not dependent for their identity or existence on the wholes of which they 
are parts, can yet, when involved in the living system, be considered as “virtual or potential 
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substances.”182 By this, we must presumably take Loux to be saying that the identity conditions 
for, say, a carbon atom, while joined to other atoms to form a molecule that plays some role 
within the workings of the cell of an organism, are distinct from the identity conditions it 
possesses when it is, say, floating about in the air. In the latter case but not the former, it will be 
an identifiably independent object in its own right.183 An additional response to the objection, 
says Loux, is that the necessarily teleological nature of living beings does not seem capable of 
being accounted for in terms of non-teleological items. 
 
I think Loux deals with these points in a more or less satisfactory way. But there seem to be 
more pressing issues facing NRT. According to Loux, NRT deals with the problem of explaining 
both the particularity and the numerical difference of objects simultaneously. Whenever a kind-
universal is instantiated, an individual or particular of that kind exists which will be numerically 
different from any other instantiation of that kind. All that is needed to be a metaphysically 
individuated object, on NRT, is to instantiate some kind. So, on NRT, the possibility of 
numerically distinct yet qualitatively identical particulars is unproblematic. Loux explains,  
in virtue of instantiating the proper kind to which both belong, each of 
the qualitatively indiscernible objects is marked out as a particular 
numerically different from the other. Their shared kind, then, 
diversifies the two objects, so even though they share all their 
additional attributes, all their properties, they remain numerically 
distinct. Their numerical diversity is given us in the ontologically 
fundamental fact about them, that they instantiate their proper kind.184 
                                                   
182 Loux (2006), 117. See also Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z.16 and H.5,6. 
183 I will not investigate the plausibility of this sort of belief here, mainly because, as I have said, none of the 
difficulties Loux raises seem as serious as those I will mention in the next two sub-sections. 
184 Loux (2006), 112. As Loux points out, “[a] property, by contrast, is numerically identical in its different 
instantiations. If two objects exemplify the property of redness, there is something, redness, that is literally the same 




Loux refers to kind-universals as “individuative universals” and seeks to explain how this works 
by means of a metaphor according to which kinds are “ontological cookie cutters” which “go 
around the universe, so to speak, partitioning it into the discrete particulars that are their 
instances.”185 This metaphor, and the process of individuation performed by kind-universals it 
purports to elucidate, require some serious unpacking in order to be made intelligible and 
unmysterious. Prima facie it seems highly unlikely that a universal, which is by definition 
something that can be common to or shared by many individuals, could be the individuating 
principle that causes items to be numerically distinct. Before moving on to the critique of NRT 
proper, I will first consider a recent variant of the view, developed by Cynthia Macdonald, the 
most noteworthy feature of which is that it seeks to answer the objection we have just raised to 
NRT as developed by Loux. 
 
3.3.2 Macdonald’s Property-Exemplification Account 
Cynthia Macdonald’s version of NRT, presented in her (2005) Varieties of Things, differs in a 
couple of ways from Loux’s version. First of all (and this may ultimately be no more than a 
matter of terminology), Macdonald refers to what we have so far been calling kinds or kind-
universals as “substance-kind” or “constitutive” properties, and contrasts them with characterizing 
properties.186 She thus refers to her own account as the “Property-Exemplification account of 
                                                   
185 Ibid, 116. 
186 At some points, Macdonald’s way of drawing this distinction is unclear and misleading. She says, for instance, 
that “the exemplification of a property is (i.e., is identical with) the thing that has it…. So, an exemplification of the 
property, black, is the substance that has it, a substance that is in fact black (e.g., a black cat)” (117). But surely the 
exemplification of a property (especially an accidental property like black), if it is anything, is something about a 
substance, or something a substance does, rather than being identical to the substance itself. Granted, she claims that 
her way of speaking is equivalent to the ordinary accidental / essential locution concerning properties, though it is 




Substances” (PES). Her description of the nature and function of substance-kind properties 
carries distinct echoes of the description of kinds given by Loux:  
(a) Individual substances are identical with exemplifications of their 
kinds.  
(b) These exemplifications (instances) are themselves capable of 
exemplifying (in the sense of possessing) characterizing features.  
(c) Substance-kind properties “by their very nature, ensure that when 
they are exemplified they are exemplified by a single thing.”187 
(d) The lowest-level kind attributable to a substance (e.g. cat) gives its 
full essence, in the sense that the more general kinds (e.g. mammal, 
vertebrate, animal…) are implicitly contained in them.188  
(e) Substances change by being the same instantiation of a kind 
through time while gaining or losing one or more characterizing 
property.  
Yet Macdonald’s claim that the kinds in question are properties seems to differentiate her view 
from that of Loux. Loux certainly thinks kinds are universals, but he thinks they belong to a type 
of universal fundamentally different from the type to which properties belong. Unlike property-
universals, kind-universals provide for what the object is and are instantiated by the object, and are 
not entities had or possessed by objects. Loux’s distinction clarifies an ambiguity in the notion of 
exemplification; kind-universals are exemplified by being instantiated, while property-universals 
are exemplified by being possessed. This distinction is somewhat blurred by Macdonald’s 
terminology, though she does seem to want her account to retain the spirit of it.189 
 
A perhaps more significant way in which Macdonald’s PES differs from Loux’s version of 
NRT is that it gives to substances what she calls an ‘internal structure’ in the sense that they are 
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not only exemplifications of substance-kind properties, but are exemplifications of such 
properties at times and in places. These places and times, together with the relevant substance-kind 
properties are, on Macdonald’s view, constitutive of substances and essential to them. She writes, “it 
is in the nature of any substance to be an exemplification of a substance-kind property in a place 
at a time.”190 This distinguishing feature of her view results in the following existence and 
identity conditions for substances:  
Existence Condition: Substance [x,P,t] exists if and only if the atomic 
substance-kind property P is exemplified in place x at time t. 
Identity Condition: Necessarily, substance [x,P,t] is identical with 
substance [y,Q,t’] if and only if place x is identical with place y, the 
atomic substance-kind property P is identical with the atomic 
substance-kind property Q, and the time t is identical with the time t.’191 
In keeping with the spirit of NRT, however, Macdonald assures us that to say that places, times, 
and substance-kind properties are constituents of substances should not be construed as saying 
they are parts that go together to compose substances.192 And this ensures that her account is 
non-reductionist in a way that neither BT nor ST is.  
 
The addition of places and times is necessary, Macdonald thinks, in order to account for the 
individuation of individual substances. Loux claimed that individuation and numerical diversity 
are simply brute facts that accompany or (better) result from the instantiation of a kind. Noting, 
                                                                                                                                                              
189 Whether or not she is successful in this may be debated – see footnote 181 where Macdonald quite clearly says 
that substance-kind properties are entities had by things. 
190 Macdonald, 117. Because, as Macdonald believes, substances are continuants, strictly speaking we should say that 
it is in the nature of a substance that, at any time at which it exists, it exemplifies a substance-kind property in a 
place. And it must not be merely a substance-kind property, but one and the same substance-kind property that is 
exemplified throughout its entire spatio-temporal career. Macdonald does not discuss these complexities. In my 
discussion, I assume that they are built in to the account. 
191 Macdonald, 118.  
192 Rather, the relationships these constituents enter into are “simply very different from the relations that the parts 




however, that substance-kind-properties are universals and hence are shared by each of their 
instances, Macdonald appeals to particular places and times, in addition to the kinds, to complete 
the individuative feat.193 Without this addition, NRT would be unable to give any obvious reason 
why two instantiations of a kind are in fact two, rather than one. Oaklander & Rothstein (2000) 
raise a similar objection: “How,” they ask, “can a universal, which is common in every object 
that exemplifies it, also provide for the numerical diversity among these same objects?”194 
Furthermore, they note, if kinds are to be capable of individuating objects (on their own), they 
cannot be basic, irreducibly unified entities (as Loux says they are), since they would need some 
non-universal element – something like our old friend the bare particular – to do the work the 
(common) universal element is incapable of doing. Giving each of the instantiations of a kind a 
unique time and place allows us to overcome this obstacle.195  
 
It is not entirely clear whether or not Loux would be willing to agree with the claim that it is 
necessary that any exemplification of a substance-kind occur at some place and time. In another 
context he points out that nominalists sometimes argue that the idea of spatio-temporally 
located universals leads to absurdity since it allows for entities that are wholly and simultaneously 
present at different, non-overlapping places. This in turn would legitimize assertions like  
(1) The color red is 15 miles away from itself  
and 
                                                                                                                                                              
constituent expressions, this “in no way shows that substances themselves ‘contain’ or are constituted by the entities 
referred to by the constituent expressions of such descriptions” (117-118). 
193 She writes, “The places in which and the times at which those properties are exemplified or instantiated uniquely 
individuate substances from one another” (116).  
194 Oaklander and Rothstein (2000), 101. 




(2) The shape of triangularity is both receding from and drawing 
closer to itself 
both of which seem to be self-contradictory. Loux thinks the realist about universals can deal 
with this objection by simply denying that universals are spatio-temporally located, and here he 
cites Russell’s point that relation-universals like being north of are not located in any of the 
particulars related by them. On the other hand, he thinks that even if universals are spatio-
temporally located, this does not present a problem:  
[T]he apparent oddity of claims like (1) and (2) derives not from any 
metaphysical impossibility, but merely from the fact that since our 
discourse about spatial location is typically restricted to the case of 
particulars, we mistakenly suppose that the principles governing their 
occupation of space apply across the board.196 
So it appears that Loux thinks the options to take universals as spatio-temporally located or to 
refrain from doing so are both open to the realist, and he himself does not – as far as I can see – 
explicitly pronounce on the issue.197 There seems to be room, then, for him to agree with 
Macdonald that exemplifications of substance-kinds necessarily take place at some spatio-
temporal location, but there are also reasons why he might not want to say this (and in his 
explicit account he does say that exemplification of a substance-kind is in itself sufficient for 
individuation). 
 
But whether or not Loux would agree with Macdonald in seeing the exemplifications of 
substance-kinds as individuated by the places and times they occupy, this strategy will not work 
as a way of escaping the objection Macdonald is trying to disarm. Consider what Macdonald 
might mean by saying that necessarily, any substance [x,P,t] is an exemplification of atomic 
                                                   




substance-kind property P in place x at time t. It seems that, where s is a substance, t and t’ are 
place-times (for simplicity’s sake I combine places and times into one variable-type), and E 
stands for “exemplifies a substance-kind at”, there are two options for interpreting Macdonald’s 
claim, the first being notably stronger than the second: 
(a) (∀s) □ ((∃t)(sEt) ∧ ((∀t′)((t′ ≠ t)  ¬ sEt′)))   
[Any substance must exemplify its kind at (and only at) the place-time it 
actually exemplifies it at.] 
(b) □ (∀s)((∃t)(sEt) ∧ ((∀t′)((t′ ≠ t)  ¬ sEt′))) 
[Any substance must exemplify its kind at some unique place-time or 
other.] 
If we interpret Macdonald’s claim as equivalent to (b), we find that the view is no help to NRT. 
It has already been established that kinds cannot individuate. So if kinds together with place-
times are capable of individuating, it would have to be in virtue of the place-times. But treating 
places and times as individuators has been criticized extensively in the literature. Perhaps the 
strongest and most oft-repeated objection is that places or “parts of space” themselves can only 
be individuated by reference to the object(s) that occupy them. Lowe (1998) writes:  
the problem with this suggestion is that parts of space themselves… 
very arguably lack a principle of individuation. It won’t do, here, to 
claim that parts of space can be identified with sets or aggregates of 
points and be individuated as such: for either points are just parts of 
space themselves – in which case the claim in question carries us no 
further forward – or else (as I prefer to think) points are limits of parts 
of space, in which case parts of space cannot be aggregates of them. It 
seems that parts of space, like parts of stuff, can only be individuated 
derivatively (thus, one could individuate a certain part of space as the 
part of space which is currently wholly occupied by a certain gold 
ring).198  
                                                                                                                                                              
197 Still, it would be hard to see how he could claim that objects like Socrates and Fido, which just are 
exemplifications of the kind-universals to which they belong, are spatio-temporally located. 




In order for places and times to be capable of individuating objects, they would themselves first 
have to be individuated and hence independent. Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, to whom Lowe 
refers in his own discussion of the problem, argue along similar lines that places and times are 
not independent entities. I won’t go into the details here, but the general idea is that an 
independent being would have to be capable of existence on its own. But the nature of place and 
of time is such that there could not exist a single place or time (since the structure of place must 
allow for motion and the structure of time must allow for change, but these entail at least two 
places and at least two times). So places and times are not independent.199 Needless to say, if 
places and times can’t individuate, then appealing to them to explain how instances of shared 
substance kinds can be numerically diverse is not a very hopeful strategy.  
 
But the other interpretation of Macdonald’s claim, (a), not only faces the problem just raised 
against (b), but is also highly counter-intuitive, since (a) implies that, for any substance s, there is 
one and only one series of place-times at which s could possibly exist; in other words, 
throughout the course of s’s existence, s could not have existed at any other place-times than the 
place-times at which s in fact existed. The interpretation given by (a) would rule out counter-
factual claims like, “The anvil might not have landed on the coyote if the coyote had stayed at 
home instead of chasing the road-runner.” Neither the coyote nor the anvil could have been 
anywhere but where they in fact ended up. Generally, then, (a) would entail that determinism (or 
at least something practically equivalent to it) is true. And while determinism might be true, it 
seems best to avoid building it in to one’s existence criterion for objects. So either Macdonald’s 
view is the relatively harmless one (which Loux may be open to accepting) that exemplifications 
                                                   




of substance-kinds are always exemplified at a unique time and place, in which case building this 
in to NRT moves it no closer to being able to account for the individuation and numerical 
diversity of objects, or it is a view that adds to this deficiency the highly controversial entailment 
that it is necessary, for every substance, that it exist at precisely the series of place-times at which 
it exists. Either way, it does not seem that Macdonald’s version of NRT improves on Loux’s.  
 
3.3.3 Further Objections to NRT 
It is tempting to conclude that some version of NRT must be correct, since, as we have seen, 
even the best reductionist theories of objects are seriously problematic. I argued that the 
disjunctive syllogism BT ∨ ST; ¬ BT; ∴ ST fails because the reductionist options do not 
exhaust the options for an ontological account of objects. Now, however, we might attempt a 
similar argument in favour of NRT: BT ∨ ST ∨ NRT; ¬ (BT ∨ ST); ∴ NRT. Indeed, 
proponents of NRT do argue this way; this is certainly true in the case of Loux and Macdonald, 
each of whom presents the non-reductionist account as the remaining alternative after the 
reductionist options have been systematically disposed of.  
 
But we need to ask whether the trichotomy of positions outlined is in fact exhaustive. And 
without having to look too far, we find that it might well not be. Loux himself notes that one 
might follow Aristotle in adopting a form of essentialism without also accepting his views on the 
nature and role of natural kinds. Though some have placed Leibniz in the Bundle Theory with 
Tropes category, he could arguably equally well be seen as a Non-Reductionist, yet since he gives 




van Inwagen (1990) has outlined a theory of concrete particulars which seems to be consistent 
with Aristotelian essentialism but which does not take objects to be unanalysable. Finally, 
Wiggins’ account, though related to that given by Loux, is not clearly non-reductionist in the 
same way. He explains the fact that an object is an instantiation of a kind by appeal to 
nomological foundations in nature, and so he seems to be giving a kind of reductive account 
insofar as the essences of objects supervene on the law-like principles that govern their existence 
and development, and these in turn on the more general laws of nature.200 Given some measure 
of imagination, then, the fact that BT and ST are seriously problematic cannot be a decisive 
reason to adopt any particular version of NRT. Of course, it is far from clear that any of the 
alternatives I have mentioned are any less problematic than their main competitors.201 
 
Furthermore, a proponent of one of the reductionist options might protest that in spite of the 
fact that the versions of that approach examined here have been shown to be flawed, a more 
satisfactory version might be forthcoming. And, certainly, he might add, one does not want to 
return to the outdated mode of theorizing about substances as ontological primitives. As Simons 
has written,  
The concept substance served well enough as long as our knowledge was 
confined to what we could perceive through the unaided senses and 
infer from those data. It retains a role as a high-level concept in 
                                                   
200 It is not entirely clear whether such an explanation is reductive. It would still be open to Wiggins (or to Loux, if 
he were to agree with it) to say that the kind is what somehow generates the regularities, and that this takes place via 
the (ontologically primitive fact of the) instantiation of the kind to which the object belongs. The fact that Wiggins 
is primarily concerned with individuation in the epistemic sense, rather than in the metaphysical sense, hides to 
some extent the precise ontological import of his doctrine.  
201 This is a point that plays an important role in setting up the tension whose resolution will be the subject of the 
next chapter, namely, the tension between the apparent problematic nature of all proposed ontological assays of 
objects and the prima facie conceptual necessity of objects. Strictly speaking, I must admit that I do not give a 
completely exhaustive treatment of every style of assay. Nevertheless, the others I have mentioned have flaws that 
have been noted in the literature, and I am content to take the project of chapter four as founded only on the 




commonsense knowledge and such disciplines as cognitive science and 
natural language analysis and processing which remain at this level. As a 
fundamental metaphysical primitive, it belongs, like the horse and cart, 
to a bygone age.202  
And even if all the alternatives had been examined and discarded, it would still remain that NRT 
faces significant problems of its own. I now turn to two further objections to NRT which I take 
to be fairly decisive against it. 
 
3.3.3.1 Uninformativeness 
In seeking an ontological assay or account of the ontological structure of objects, we are looking 
for answers to certain questions. We are asking the general question, “What is it, ontologically 
speaking, to be an object?” And we are asking several specific questions guided by the intuitive 
desiderata we feel any theory of objects should meet. For instance,  
i. Individuation: What it is that makes a given object to be 
individual (metaphysically individuated) and numerically 
distinct from others of its kind? 
ii. Unity: What causes an object to possess intrinsic unity, to have 
its various parts and / or features combined into a single thing? 
iii. Identity: What bestows on an object the determinate identity it 
possesses; what makes it to be the very object it is (and no 
other)?  
iv. Change: What is it that enables an object to persist through 
change? 
v. Modality: What accounts for the fact that some features of 
objects seem to be essential, while others seem to be 
accidental? 
                                                   




But instead of giving satisfactory answers to these questions, NRT bypasses them. NRT’s reply 
to the general, definitional question is that to be an object is to be an instance or exemplification 
of a(n atomic) substance-kind (or kind-property) – something that exhibits the form of being 
that is the kind in question. But the question we then want to have answered, in order to get 
some intellectual purchase on the topic, is one that could be formulated in the following ways: 
“What is it to be an instance of a given substance-kind?”; “What is it to exemplify an atomic 
substance-kind property?”; “What is it that makes kinds prior to their members (unlike the 
members of sets) and capable of bestowing on them all the rich ontological features being 
attributed here?” But in effect all NRT’s answer tells us is that an object just is a non-universal 
version of certain privileged universals, period. There are two particular cats because the 
universal ‘Cat’ is instantiated twice, and that’s all there is to say about it. But we should feel that 
the universals postulated to explain the particulars are now themselves in need of some 
ontological assay, an assay which typically is never given.203 This kind of answer is a singularly 
uninformative one. 
 
NRT says that the way to answer the specific questions (i)-(v) above is by appealing to the fact 
that objects are instances of their kinds in the way described in the reply to the general 
question.204 Consider the individuation criterion (i). It is supposedly in virtue of the fact that they 
are instances of irreducibly basic kinds that objects are numerically distinct individuals. Recall 
Loux’s claim that, 
                                                   
203 Could not Wiggins reply that the story about laws of nature is what provides the desired further account of what 
universals are? It seems possible – though by no means certain – that he could. But if so, it appears that he would 
no longer be giving a non-reductive account. 
204 To account for the cases of change (iv) and modality (v), NRT needs to add that there are also accidental 




the multiple instantiation of a kind is, by itself, sufficient to secure the 
existence of numerically distinct particulars. Each of its instantiations is 
a particular that is numerically different from each of the others…. 
[K]inds, unlike properties [construed as characterizing universals], are 
such that their multiple instantiation results in numerically different 
particulars…. Their shared kind… diversifies the two objects, so even 
though they share all their additional attributes [in the case of 
qualitatively identical particulars], all their properties, they remain 
numerically distinct.205 
Stating that a kind has been instantiated, according to NRT, is supposed to be explanatorily 
sufficient to answer the individuation question. But we ought to ask, “How does the mechanism 
of instantiation work?” In the case of individuation, “How does instantiation generate 
individuality and numerical diversity?” But the only answer that seems to be on offer at this 
point is the metaphorical description of the relevant substance-kinds as “ontological cookie 
cutters”. Because of the “activity” of kinds in “cutting up the world” we are given various 
“principles for identifying, distinguishing, and counting objects.”206  
 
The metaphor is fine and good, but one wonders how far we are to take it, and indeed what 
content we are to draw from it at all. Surely the force of the metaphor is the idea that a pattern 
can be impressed by one kind of thing (the kind-universals) onto things of a distinct kind 
(particulars) in some way analogous to the way a shape is impressed into cookie dough by a 
cookie cutter. But various significant disanalogies appear as soon as we begin to probe. If there 
really are mind-independent kinds distinct from their instances, they would have to inhabit some 
extra layer of reality since they are abstract. Does the non-reductionist theorist really want to say 
                                                                                                                                                              
the unity (ii) question; kind-instantiation explains the unity of the essential features, but what joins the accidental 
features to the essential core given by such instantiation? More on this in the next objection. 





this? If so, we will want to know how a kind-universal, being ontologically a fundamentally 
different entity from the particulars that are its members, interact causally with them.  
 
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the non-reductionist would admit that there is in reality 
anything corresponding to the ‘dough’ that exists before being ‘cut up’ by the kinds and is 
somehow caused or made by them to take on various features. The best candidate for 
ontological dough would be some kind of matter, but unless we are dealing with something like 
Aristotelian prime matter we are not likely to find anything that comes completely 
uncharacterized and ready to be informed by whatever kinds come to inform it. And Aristotelian 
prime matter has problems of its own, such that few ontologists would be likely to choose it. 
Moreover, only on a very extraordinary (or naïve) view of physical reality could we agree that any 
causal process analogous to cookie-cutting actually takes place between kinds and their instances. 
I do not need to rehearse the standard objections to Platonic participation here. Suffice it to say 
that unless the causative machinery at work in making instances from kinds is displayed in such a 
way as to provide answers to such legitimate ontological questions as those raised above, we 
should feel deeply unsatisfied by such accounts and their associated metaphors. For these seem 
to be just the questions motivating the whole project of giving an account of the nature of 
objects in the first place. But on NRT, these questions are insulated from serious enquiry by the 





L.A. Paul (2006) raises a related objection in the context of an argument against the view she 
calls substance essentialism.207 Specifically, she is concerned with the non-reductive substance 
essentialist’s claim that “the world is such that objects have primitive essential and accidental 
properties (or simply fall under sorts, or have certain forms).” This view, she says, is inferior 
when compared with various available reductive theories of de re modal properties – those, for 
instance, that see such properties as determined by the relations of the object to its counterparts 
in various possible worlds. And, she argues, the substance essentialist who appeals to some 
further primitive entity, such as the form of the object, to account for its sort will still be guilty 
of unacceptable primitivism unless he can give “a reductive account of how an object’s form 
determines its sort and a reductive account of how an object’s de re modal properties are 
determined.”208  
 
To the kind of objections I have been raising, the defender of NRT might respond along the 
following lines. Granted, the explanations of the phenomena we are concerned with as resulting 
immediately from the unanalyzably primitive fact of kind-exemplification may feel unsatisfying. 
But two things can be said about this. First, the explanations given take the ontological account 
at least one step deeper than those offered by a position such as austere nominalism, so that 
NRT is less quick to appeal to primitives than some alternative theories. And second, since the 
dialectical pressures lead us to postulate kind-universals and exemplification as ontological 
primitives, and since doing so leads to the overall most coherent view, why shouldn’t we help 
ourselves to them? After all, every ontology must postulate primitives at some level. And as we 
                                                   
207 Specifically, substance essentialism is, according to Paul, “the view that (a) objects are substances that fall under 
sortals and (b) we need no further ontological explanation of how objects have their de re modal properties” (335). 




saw in the case of substratum theory, the seriousness of the charge that certain aspects of a 
theory are somewhat ad hoc depends on the relative overall cost-benefit analysis of that theory. 
The elegance and explanatory simplicity afforded by accepting kind- and property-universals 
outweighs, the defender of NRT might argue, any sense of obscurity or dissatisfaction we might 
feel about the way the theory treats certain questions we desire answers to.  
 
The non-reductionist theorist might urge, further, that it is quite possible that the felt need for 
deeper answers is misguided in the first place. What grounds do we have for our expectation, for 
instance, that the story of how an object is individuated – how it becomes a numerically distinct 
instance – must be given at some deeper ontological level? After all, it is not clear that any other 
theory on offer fairs any better on this count. Trope Bundle Theory solves the problem by 
simply positing that basic tropes, as a matter of primitive fact, come individuated – and the fact 
that it is tropes rather than objects that are the primitively individuated units does not obviously 
take us significantly further than NRT. The Bare Particularist version of ST offers the addition, 
to a realist view of properties, of a non-property individuator. But as soon as it is asked what 
makes the bare particular itself to be individuated or to be the source of individuation for the 
properties tied to it, the answer will be that these are unanalyzable metaphysical facts.  
 
The problem with this kind of response, it seems to me, is that at the level of macro-level 
objects like fish and perhaps benches, the appeal to primitivism feels a lot more like sleight of 
hand than it does in the case of, for instance, basic tropes. Just as we are more inclined to accept 
that quantum-level entities have bizarre properties (e.g. capable of being in more than one place 




inclined to countenance the possibility that entities as remote from experience as basic tropes or 
bare particulars could be primitive, though such a claim about macro-level objects seems harder 
to swallow.209  
 
Maybe this feeling is nothing more than an effect of our tendency to want to give an account 
of all physical objects in terms of their constituent parts and the laws that govern them. Robb’s 
idea of structural properties – properties that are structured on the properties of lower-level 
substantial parts – gives us a very natural way of understanding the properties of macro-level 
objects. The rationality of a particular man (a good candidate for an essential macro-level 
property), we tend to think, arises at least in part from the way the man’s nervous system and 
various cognitive capacities are set up, which in turn are the result of the properties of lower-
level organic structures such as brain cells and neurotransmitters. The further down we go, the 
more unusual the entities we are dealing with become, and the more believable it becomes that 
we are dealing with ontologically primitive entities. To say that the trope-bundle that is a quark is 
composed of unanalyzable, irreducibly numerically distinct individuals, from which individuality 
and numerical distinctness is then transmitted to the bundles and eventually to the bundle of 
bundles of bundles (etc.) that is our familiar macroscopic object, seems to be better suited to a 
scientific perspective than the idea that the whole package is just stamped into existence as a 
numerically distinct individual.210 If this kind of explanation can be given, however, then only if 
NRT outweighs the reductionist options in very significant ways should we prefer it over them.  
                                                   
209 Of course the Non-Reductionist might argue that the analogy between what happens with the atomic theory of 
matter and what we ought to think is taking place  
210 Note that a similar ‘deeper’ explanation of the individuality and numerical identity of macro-level objects is 





Does NRT outweigh the other options? Besides the outstanding objections to the reductionist 
theories, the only clear advantage NRT has over trope BT or ST-with-tropes is that its realism 
about universals gives a slightly more elegant account of attribute-agreement and abstract 
reference, and related phenomena (on this count substratum theory with universals would score 
the same as NRT). If, however, as Armstrong has admitted, trope theories of properties, using 
equivalence classes, do almost as well as realist theories at accounting for these phenomena, then 
the primary remaining issue seems to be whether it is a category mistake to see tropes, and bare 
particulars, as parts of objects. And while this seems to hold against naïve views of BT or ST, it is 
not entirely clear that it holds in the case of the more sophisticated views.  
 
3.3.3.2 Threat of Incoherence / Hypocrisy 
I now return to the issue, canvassed earlier (footnote 204), that NRT, in order to provide a 
complete answer to change and modality questions (and quite likely to the unity question as 
well), must say that there are accidental properties associated with the essences that are the 
instances of kind-universals. One of the main motivations behind NRT seems to be the desire to 
do justice to the idea that properties require a subject or possessor without having to resort to 
the incoherent notion of a propertyless substratum. On NRT, it is the concrete particular itself 
which is the subject of all the properties we attribute to it, but we don’t want to say that these 
properties are components or parts of it in any sense, since this would lead us back into 
reductionism. At the same time, advocates of NRT want a theory which does at least as well as 
                                                                                                                                                              
individuators (e.g., the individuators of, say, quarks), so that higher-level particulars are individuated not by bare 




the best versions of BT or ST at dealing with the distinction between essential and accidental 
properties. An object, the non-reductionist tells us, consists of “a core being or essence 
furnished by a kind and a host of properties that lie at the periphery of that core and, hence, are 
accidental to concrete particulars.”211 Thus, objects have a certain ontological structure in spite 
of their irreducibility, and are capable of accounting for persistence through change and modal 
facts about them, since change is simply the exchange of one accidental property for another, 
and since objects have essential cores as well as properties they can exist without. 
 
Difficulties arise, however, when we reflect on the fact that all the members of a given 
substance-kind will share the same essence – essences are general, we are told. If so, then what is 
it that distinguishes them? As we saw earlier, Macdonald’s attempt to solve this problem by 
appeal to essential place-times cannot help. One of the problems with the substratum was its 
inability to act as an individuator for the object of which it is a constituent in virtue of the fact 
that any truly bare particular would be indiscernible from any other truly bare particular. But, the 
same problem now seems to arise for the substance theorist.  
 
A further, related issue is that, given that the core being or essence given by the kind is really 
distinct from the accidental properties associated with it, we now have to ask how the two are 
related. And we must have it that they are related in such a way that neither the accidental 
properties nor the essence of the total object are components of it (on pain of committing the same 
category mistake the reductionist views were accused of making). But how do we spell this out? 
And if we find a way of describing the tie that brings together the essence with its characterizing 
                                                   




properties in a way that does not commit the part-whole category mistake leveled against 
reductionism, why can’t we make that description available to the reductionist as well? 
 
The root problem in both of these cases is that NRT charges reductionist views with the 
inability to resolve certain problems, while at the same time neglecting to answer the same 
charge as applied to itself. The problems of the individuation of the essences qua instances of 
kind-universals and of the relation between these and their characterizing properties remain as 
outstanding debts to be paid by any advocate of NRT. The Non-Reductionist account of 
objects, which seemed (to some) to be the last standing outpost for the ontologist seeking to 
describe the nature of objects, must be placed on the shelf beside the two forms of reductionist 
accounts. 
 
3.3.4 Conclusion of Chapter Three 
Both bundle theories and substratum theories of objects are seriously flawed. This conclusion is 
not particularly surprising. What is more surprising are the facts that there are subtle and 
powerful versions of both views on the contemporary scene in Ontology, and that even the 
most subtle versions remain seriously flawed in spite of the improvements they make over their 
more naïve predecessors. Non-Reductionist Theory is also seriously flawed. Again, this fact may 
not come as much of a surprise to many philosophers. Whether any version of either 
reductionist or non-reductionist ontological theories of objects will be rehabilitated to the point 




chapter rests on the assumption that such accounts are not likely to be forthcoming, and asks 
the question of what the ontologist is to do if this assumption is true. 
 
In the absence of any satisfactory ontological assay of objects, I think we should ask two 
questions. Firstly, we should ask whether there is a more endemic or systematic problem 
involved here than the particular problems with the distinct styles of assay. Perhaps the difficulty 
of providing an adequate ontological assay of objects is due to the fact that the notion of an 
object is too general; perhaps some kinds of object can be captured by a given assay even if 
others cannot. Certain of the objections I have raised against particular assays seem to bear this 
out. For instance, I argued that the Supplemented Nuclear Trope Bundle theory collapses into a 
version of ST when simple entities are being considered. It might be the case that ST gives the 
correct account of simple entities, while some suitably sophisticated version of BT can account 
for all the complex ones. Secondly, we should ask (especially if the answer to the previous 
question is affirmative) whether some other, perhaps ontologically thinner notion(s) is (are) 
capable of meeting the conceptual demands imposed by the various explanatory and other 
practices we engage in which seem to make the notion of an object indispensible to us. This will, 
I think, require some reconsideration of the role of the ontological distinctions that were drawn 
in Chapter Two.  
 
In the following chapter, I will bring the arguments of Chapters Two and Three together with 
the goal of offering a resolution to a conflict that has been shaping up. The conflict I have in 
mind is between the prima facie case for the indispensability of objects (in the philosophically 




section of Chapter Four than I have done so far – and the problems that we are led into by too 
strict an adherence to that notion – problems which are demonstrated by the misguided 
approaches to the two debates in Ontology we have now discussed (the debate over the 
existence of ordinary objects in 2.2, and the debate over the correct ontological assay of objects 
in Chapter Three). I will argue that the ontological distinctions employed in characterizing the 
notions of an individual, a particular, and an object in Chapter Two can be woven together to 
form a kind of ontological framework in which a plurality concepts of ontologically significant 
individuals can be situated. By replacing the notion of an IICP with this plurality of individual-
concepts, I will also argue, we can make progress in both of the debates where, as we have seen, 
seemingly unresolvable problems have arisen. It will turn out, then, that a place can be secured 
for the general ontological theory of individuals, even if there is no place for such a theory of 
objects, at least not in the sense of that notion we have so far been working with. 
 
 
3.4 Appendix to Chapter Three: Reflections on Individuation 
This section is not a direct part of the main argument, and the reader wanting to keep the flow 
of the whole thesis in mind is advised to skip over it and then return at the end if he or she so 
desires. I include it mainly for the sake of developing a bit further some of the thoughts raised in 
the last section of the previous chapter.  
 
It would be interesting to know whether there is any common or systematic reason at the root 




think it is unlikely that such a project will ever succeed? We would have a stronger case if we did 
not have to base such a claim merely on the fact that no theory has been successful yet, or by 
pointing out isolated and particular flaws in the individual theories. One issue that does seem to 
be fairly central to the problems of all the competing theories is the issue of explaining 
individuation. How is it, the question goes, that individuals come to be numerically distinct or 
individuated? The rationale behind the question seems to spring largely from considerations 
having to do with realism about universals – we notice the phenomenon of attribute agreement 
(the shareability of properties) which seems to hold for nearly any characterizing or kind 
property we can imagine.212 We notice, for instance, that both Socrates and Plato are (essentially) 
human beings. So we ask what makes the two occurrences of the kind ‘human being’ 
numerically distinct? Furthermore, for any feature that seems to set Socrates apart from Plato, 
there is no difficulty in imagining that some other individual shares F with Socrates. In fact, it 
seems imaginable that there could be an individual qualitatively indiscernible from Socrates. But 
in such a case, what could make it true that we nevertheless have two distinct individuals and not 
one?  
 
Clearly, as we have seen earlier, Bundle Theory with universals cannot say anything about this. 
Substratum Theory’s postulation of bare particulars seems, at first, to provide the answer, since 
it offers a non-property, non-universal item whose fundamental role is to individuate. But this 
approach fares no better in the end because of the incoherence of the concept being employed – 
the concept of an entity with no internal nature whatsoever that is nevertheless capable of doing 
the metaphysical work of individuating collections of universals. BT with tropes takes 
                                                   




individuation of tropes as a primitive ontological fact, and derives the individuation of objects, 
seen as trope-bundles, from that of their constituents. The problem here is that when the 
question is pressed as to what individuates trope BT’s preferred ontologically fundamental 
entities, the game is given up. They just are numerically distinct, and that’s all there is to say about 
it. Furthermore, at the ontological ground floor – the level of the basic tropes – the properties or 
natures become very object-like, and the threat arises of the need to build in a substratum for 
them. This, of course, the trope theorist must deny, yet the only way of doing so is by stipulating 
that, contrary to our intuitive understanding of properties, basic tropes just are individuated and 
numerically distinct from one another. 
 
Non-Reductionist Theory, as expressed in Lowe’s version, seems to offer a nice compromise, 
stating that the substrata of objects are just the objects themselves, so that what makes an 
individual to be individuated is not some component of it, but just the individual itself.213 This 
kind of account seems to avoid the appeal to incoherent property-less bare particulars while not 
having to claim that properties are capable of doing the work of objects (as in trope BT). Yet the 
only way to effect the claim that fully-fledged (thick) particulars or individual objects themselves 
are the true individuators is to postulate primitive individuation on behalf of those objects – or 
at least individuation at most a small step from primitivity. Individuation is accounted for (when 
explanations are given for it by NRT advocates) by appeal to the mysterious process of 
instantiation, in which numerically distinct instances of substance-kinds are stamped into 
existence. But as the instantiation mechanism usually goes unexplained, NRT also seems to give 
up the game in regard to the question of individuation, albeit in a slightly less immediate (more 
                                                                                                                                                              




disguised) fashion than the way Trope Bundle Theory gives it up. So none of the theories of 
objects we have considered succeeds in telling us why individuals are individuated and thus 
numerically distinct units.  
 
But is this really a problem? After all, the three theories actually agree, when it comes down to 
it, that individuation is an ontologically primitive fact (even if NRT is in denial about this). They 
differ only in respect of where that primitive fact shows up within the context provided by the 
other aspects of their theories. Might it not be, then, that the question, “What makes individuals 
to be individuated?” is just misconceived in the first place, and that we should take it as 
unsurprising and unproblematic that the true individuals (whether they turn out to be bare or 
thick particulars, or tropes) are just brutely individuated? Given constraints of space, I must 
leave this as an open question, at least for now.  
 
The main point of this chapter has been that each of the three main attempts to provide 
ontological accounts of objects is flawed. The implications of this, and what response we might 
take in light of them, will be considered in greater detail in the following chapter. 
                                                                                                                                                              





A Family-Resemblance Account of Individuals 
This chapter has two primary objectives. The first section (4.1) picks up on a claim the 
justification of which I briefly outlined in the introductory chapter – namely that, at least prima 
facie, the concept of an object – of an intrinsically unified, independent concrete particular – is 
indispensible to us. I lay out some motivating reasons supporting this claim in greater detail by 
showing how various theoretical and practical concerns of ours seem to demand the availability 
of something answering to the category of objects. However, the results of the second section of 
Chapter Two and of the entirety of Chapter Three have already shown two areas in which the 
notion of an object tends to lead to confusion. So a tension emerges between the prima facie 
necessity of the notion and the reasons we have found for thinking that this notion either is 
itself problematic or at least tends to cause problems for other issues in Ontology.  
 
Section 4.2, then, will present my general strategy for resolving the apparent conflict. The 
strategy I propose begins by noting that there is greater flexibility than at first appeared in the 
schema of ontological distinctions canvassed in Chapter Two. Once this flexibility becomes 
apparent, the possibility arises of identifying distinct but related concepts, one for each of the 
main sub-categories of individual to which our purposes require us to appeal. The “pluralistic” 
ontological framework that results when the relationship between the ontological distinctions is 
clarified provides a way of situating and relating the distinct types of individuals that both avoids 




the varying degrees of “ontological robustness” or “object-like-ness” of any given type of 
individual. 
 
Given the restrictions I must place on this project to render it manageable, I limit myself to 
explicating (in section 4.3), at least in broad strokes, three such “individual-concepts” – one that 
applies to inanimate physical bodies, another to living organisms, and a third to persons. At the 
same time, I take myself to be illustrating a general approach that will also be capable of situating 
and relating concepts denoting other kinds of entities that belong to the individual-family, such 
as artifacts, certain kinds of groups (e.g. flocks of birds, schools of fish, etc.), and perhaps a 
variety of other kinds as well.  
 
4.1 The Prima Facie Necessity of the Concept of an Object 
Why ought we to think it unlikely that we will be able to do ontology without the concept of an 
object? We seem to be driven to appeal to objects by various practical and theoretical concerns. 
In the present section I will discuss the prima facie indispensability of the concept of an object in 
sustaining three distinct practices: (i) the practice of generating causal explanations involving 
physical bodies; (ii) the practice of generating biological explanations involving organisms; and 
(iii) the practices of rational deliberation and of attributing moral responsibility, which involve 
persons. The list of objects mentioned in (i)-(iii) could certainly be added to; there are also many 
more practices requiring us to appeal to objects besides the ones I will be considering. But the 
sample I provide here should suffice to make the case. The task of section 4.3 will be to provide 




these practices. It will turn out that objects are not, strictly speaking, indispensible, but that there 
is a way of preserving the intuitions that lead us to think they are, within the ontological 
framework I develop. 
 
4.1.1 Physical Explanations 
What we ordinarily consider to be objects are unified centres or loci of capacities and dispositions 
of various sorts. In everyday life and in science, we employ a vast number of causal explanations 
that follow the pattern of citing the presence and/or activity of some object(s) as the cause of 
some observed effect or behaviour. Consider the following questions and explanations:  
Q:  Why is the window broken?  
E:  Because a baseball was thrown through the glass some 
time ago.  
Q:  Why is this man choking?  
E:  Because there is a baby octopus stuck in his esophagus.  
Q:  Why is this person displaying various symptoms of 
illness?  
E:  Because of the presence of bacteria of a certain kind in 
her lungs (and because of what these bacteria are 
doing to her lungs – their activities in which they are 
exercising their capacities).  
Q:  Why has the population of rabbits decreased in this 
region in the last month?  
E:  Because a number of foxes moved into the region a 
month ago (and, again, because of the activities of the 
foxes).  





E:  Because of the presence of iron crystals, which served as 
a catalyst for this process.214  
Explanation by appeal to objects (and their properties, activities, and relations) seems to be an 
endemic and completely acceptable way of proceeding in these and a vast variety of other cases.  
 
An initial general point we might notice is that all such explanations seem to presuppose the 
fact that we have the capacity to successfully individuate objects – to single them out from the 
rest of reality and to track them through time. So our explanatory practices seem to depend on 
the availability of this further, perhaps more basic, capacity. To render this thought intelligible, 
we naturally appeal to the existence of objects; if there were, in fact, no objects, we would be at a 
loss to explain what we are actually doing when we track, for instance, an apple across time and 
space and judge that it is the same apple as one we experienced at an earlier time. Since I am 
officially neutral on whether objects are seen as substrata-involving or as bundles of tropes (or 
neither), it would be no answer to say that what we are doing is singling out and tracking some 
bunch of bundled properties, for even bundle theorists must distinguish between bundles and 
the individual properties that compose the bundles.215 In a Strawsonian-Kantian spirit we might 
say, more generally, that we need objects, conceived as enduring particulars, to unify our spatio-
temporal framework and enable us to locate ourselves within it. But my task in this section will 
not be so grand; rather than developing this general point, I will focus on the apparent 
conceptual demands for objects presented by some specific explanatory patterns. 
                                                   
214 I include this example to hint toward a case in which the presence of an entity alone, without its having to act, 
may be sufficient to bring about some effect that needs explaining. Of course, since there are intermediate reactions 
involving the iron itself, it might be denied that the example I have provided here is actually a case of the type I am 
trying to describe. Take a somewhat simpler case: the mere presence of a sheep dog on the hill, without the dog 
having to act at all (it is just sitting still – not even breathing) is sufficient to cause the sheep to run into the pen. 





The first sort of explanation I will consider is the sort that appeals to physical bodies to 
provide adequate causes of certain effects. Within Physics, there are, of course, very significant 
differences that have to be considered when dealing with the bodies of Classical, Newtonian 
Mechanics, or with the particles of Quantum Mechanics. Indeed, on some interpretations of 
Quantum Mechanics, the fundamental entities turn out to be strikingly non-object-like. I must 
put aside any ambitions to offer a serious discussion of quantum physics, or even classical 
physics, here. Instead, I will be considering the “folk” conception of compound physical objects, 
which is employed in ordinary causal talk, and which presumes some microphysical basis for the 
causal properties of such objects without requiring that the details be specified. 
 
To the objection that talk of physical bodies on other levels has been or eventually will be 
completely replaced by descriptions of quantum level events, I reply that some contemporary 
philosophers of physics have provided good reasons to doubt the force of this kind of claim. 
Nancy Cartwright, for instance, argues that it is far from true that quantum physics has replaced 
classical physics. Instead, she says,  
We use both; which of the two we choose from one occasion to 
another depends on the kinds of problems we are trying to solve and 
the kinds of techniques we are master of…. quantum physics works in 
only very specific kinds of situations that fit the very restricted set of 
models it can provide; and it has never performed at all well where 
classical physics works best.216  
Moreover, she thinks it is misguided to continue to hope that one day all this will change; 
“nature,” she argues, “is governed in different domains by different systems of laws not 
                                                   




necessarily related to each other in any systematic or uniform way; by a patchwork of laws.”217 A 
similar line of reasoning can be run for our folk conception of physical bodies – a conception 
roughly equivalent to the modified mereological compounds I suggested as a more palatable 
alternative to Hoffman and Rosenkrantz’s mereological compounds in 2.2. But since I am only 
here making use of the explanatory patterns we do in fact engage in without requiring that such 
patterns be ultimately correct, I will not delve any more deeply into these issues. Instead, I will 
simply assume that the concept of a physical body remains a useful target of investigation. But 
such bodies are compound objects, composed of other physical entities which are their parts, so 
it seems as though we are in need, in order to justify including them in our ontology alongside 
the physical particles (or other entities) that ultimately compose them, some way of saying how 
they can be something over and above those particles. 
 
Metaphysical Nihilism – which denies the existence of compound physical objects on the 
grounds that, strictly speaking, only the submicroscopic entities of theoretical physics exist218 – 
claims that ordinary objects are causally redundant. Take, for instance, the case of a depression 
that is formed in the earth as a result (as a believer in physical bodies would put it) of a heavy 
rock falling towards the earth and striking it.219 The Metaphysical Nihilist will argue that nothing 
over and above the composing particles is needed to account for the effect attributed to the 
purportedly existing rock.220  
                                                   
217 Ibid, 31. She continues, “most situations are brought under a law of physics only by distortion, whereas they can 
often be described fairly correctly by concepts from more phenomenological laws.” 
218 Lowe (2005) calls these ‘atoms’, using that term “as a place-holder for whatever kind or kinds of entities an ideal 
or completed physics would postulate as the ‘ultimate’ constituents” (p. 511). Since this view entails that we do not 
exist, Lowe notes, authors adopting a view like this have usually “tried to make an exception for our bodies, which 
they typically identify with ourselves” (512). 
219 The example is Lowe’s, from his (2005), 525. 





Lowe (2005), however, points out that it would be incorrect to say that the granite particles 
alone caused the depression in the earth, since if the same granite particles were collected in a 
bag (after the rock had been pulverized) and poured out toward the earth, surely they would not 
result in the same effect. So we have to say instead that the granite particles, being arranged and 
interacting with one another in a certain complex way, were ‘collectively’ responsible for 
generating the depression in the earth. However, when we spell out what this way of being 
arranged and interacting is, we inevitably have to say that it is the way granite particles would 
interact and be arranged if they composed a rock – in short, the granite particles must be 
‘arranged rock-wise’ to cause the kind of effect we are considering.  
 
To avoid making the full circle back to the claim that the depression was caused by the 
individual rock itself, the nihilist has to say that the referent of the noun-phrase ‘the granite 
particles arranged rock-wise’ is plural. If so, however, it seems that the referent would have to be 
just the granite particles themselves. For if we say instead that it is the granite particles united by 
coherence into a package of the sort they would form if they were to compose an individual 
rock, then we are back to a singular referent. But unless we say this, it seems, we will not have 
anything capable of causing the relevant effect. So, according to Lowe, the nihilist “has left us 
with the mere appearance of an alternative story about how the depression was caused.”221 For 
                                                   
221 Lowe (2005), 529. Furthermore, the nihilist’s appeal to collective causation seems problematic. Lowe explains,  
“Sometimes, granite particles ‘arranged rock-wise’ interact causally with… other things just as a pile of granite 
particles would – for instance, when we weigh them. And in these cases it is perfectly clear how causation by the 
particles as a group is nothing over and above causation by each of the particles. But in other cases, as when granite 
particles ‘arranged rock-wise’ cause a depression in the ground, it is very far from clear that causation by ‘the granite 
particles arranged rock-wise’ is nothing over and above causation by each of the granite particles. I conclude that 
the sceptic has simply been indulging in hand-waving… The phrase ‘acting in concert’ is just camouflage for the 




the kinds of causal explanations exemplified by the story of the rock and the depression, then, it 
seems that we cannot do without physical bodies, seen as objects in their own right. 
  
In the same article, Lowe discusses another point that offers additional reason for appealing to 
physical bodies within ontology. There are good reasons, he argues, for thinking there are 
spatially overlapping objects, such as a statue and the lump of clay composing it. Universalism, a 
position diametrically opposed to Metaphysical Nihilism, holds that whenever two or more 
things are found, there is, in addition to these, a third thing they compose – namely, their 
mereological sum.222 This view requires that the statue and the lump be identical, since each is 
identical with a sum of atoms. But the flaw of Universalism is that it makes use of only one 
principle of composition – the mereological summation of coexisting atoms. We do more justice 
to the way things are, Lowe argues, by deploying a variety of such principles, each of which 
relates to the distinct criteria of identity and persistence that apply to different kinds of 
objects.223 Just as there are different criteria of identity and of persistence for objects of different 
kinds, so there are different principles of composition for the different kinds.224 
                                                   
222 Lowe (2005), 513. Mereological sums are not to be confused with mereological compounds, whose parts have to be 
joined and connected in dynamic equilibrium along the lines spelled out in Hoffman and Rosenkrantz’s account 
discussed earlier. 
223 Four-dimensionalist Universalism is distinct from the related 3-D view described here in that it views “the 
ultimate parts of all composite objects… not [as] persisting entities of any kind but, rather, momentary temporal 
‘stages’ or ‘slices.’” But 4-D Universalism does seem capable of accommodating the distinction between a lump of 
bronze and the bronze statue spatially coinciding with it, because it sees the statue not as a simple sum of atoms, 
“but with a sum of atomic ‘slices’ selected from different atoms at different times.” The assumption that there are 
such things as ‘atomic slices’ to be summed is, however, according to Lowe, both yields an extremely 
unparsimonious ontology, and seems to be “entirely gratuitous” as it is so far unsupported by any empirical 
scientific results (518-19). 
224 Lowe (2005), 517. Tentative specific composition conditions offered by Lowe for lumps of bronze and statues, 
respectively, are as follows:  
Some bronze particles compose a lump of bronze at time t just in case (1) all of those particles 
cohere together [are held together by “intermolecular electrostatic forces that modern physics 
and chemistry have discovered to underlie the solid state of matter and whose presence is 





It becomes evident, Lowe thinks, that the lump and the statue are distinct, in spite of their 
being composed of precisely the same particles in precisely the same arrangement at any 
moment at which they overlap, when we see the two objects diachronically rather than 
synchronically. Tracing the particles involved over time allows us to notice, on the one hand, the 
changing constituency of the persisting configuration of particles (the statue) and, on the other 
hand, the cohering together of the same particles over a period time which persists in spite of 
alterations to their configuration (the lump).225  
 
The same point can be put in a slightly different way that is more conducive to the argument 
of this section. To make sense of our experience, in certain salient cases, we need to postulate 
various kinds of physical objects possessing distinct identity and persistence conditions which 
thus require distinct principles of composition, even though they are capable of spatially 
overlapping. Lowe’s defense of the objects of commonsense ontology is relevant for my 
purposes primarily because it shows that physical bodies are a type of object we need (over and 
above atoms or mereological sums of atoms) in order to account adequately for certain effects 
                                                                                                                                                              
during a period of time including t and (2) none of them coheres together with any other bronze 
particles during that period….  
[S]ome bronze particles compose a bronze statue at time t just in case (1) all of those particles 
cohere together at t in a certain overall configuration or shape, (2) those particles or replacements 
for them cohere together in that… same overall configuration or shape for a period of time 
including t, and (3) at no time during the period in question do the particles cohering together in 
that overall configuration or shape help to compose a larger lump of bronze (521). 
A similar point can be made about principles of unity. There is a divide between individuals that are unified 
intrinsically and those that are unified only extrinsically, but there are important distinctions to be made within the 
category of intrinsically unified individuals. What makes a natural inanimate compound object like a rock to be one 
thing is the coherence between the particles that make it up. What makes a living organism to be a single thing will 
be whatever it is that ensures that a functional system of a certain sort persists. For simple individuals, if there are 




we want explained. But the secondary point about the need to recognize a plurality of principles 
of identity, persistence and composition, ought to incline us all the more to the view that there is 
a significant conceptual need for physical objects.  
 
I wish to discuss one further type of explanatory pattern in this sub-section, one that applies 
to physical bodies, but is likely not limited to that case. The point was raised, in the discussion of 
the Non-Reductionist Theory of objects in Chapter Three, that there is a way of appealing to an 
object’s (or substance’s) kind to explain why it has certain properties.226 For instance, the 
extremely high melting point, density and refractive index possessed by diamonds can be 
accounted for by citing the kind of object a diamond is. This object, we say, has these properties, 
because it is an instance of the kind, diamond. The kind to which any individual belongs is 
determined by the essence of that individual. The essence which all individual diamonds share, 
and in virtue of which they belong to the kind, diamond, is constituted by the particular cubic 
crystal lattice structure which carbon atoms form when each joins with four other carbon atoms 
in regular triangular prisms.227 What it is to be a diamond, then, is (at least in part) to be an 
individual with such a structure. 
 
Once we determine to which kind an object belongs, we can make various useful predictions 
based on our knowledge of the characteristic properties of the kind in question. And, intuitively, 
                                                                                                                                                              
225 Lowe (2005), 522. This point about the statue applies even more strongly to the case of living organisms, since 
there may be stronger limitations on possible changes of constitution for items like statues than there is for 
organisms, which necessarily (given enough time) exchange all (or nearly all?) of their constitutive matter. 
226 There I gave the example of the possession of certain properties by a creature being explained by the fact that 
the creature in question is a black bear, that is, an instance of a certain kind of organism. Certainly there seems to be 
no obvious obstacle to there being kinds of a wide variety of individuals beyond the class of physical objects qua 




what makes such explanatory and predictive practices possible is that the essence denoted by the 
kind (in the case of diamonds, the carbon lattice-structure) plays some sort of causal role in 
bringing about the various properties we observe. Such explanatory and predictive practices, 
then, seem to pose the conceptual demand for the existence of entities that instantiate kinds. 
 
Of course the assumption made by this perspective, that (at least some) individuals do have 
essences that can serve as the referents of kind-terms, is not completely uncontroversial. 
Without getting involved in the numerous debates surrounding this topic,228 I attempt to employ 
a relatively harmless notion of the ‘essence’ of an individual as consisting in whatever fact about 
that individual provides the fundamental criterion of identity for the class of individuals of 
which the same fact is true. And I remind those who will want to resist even the idea that 
individuals have essences in this sense, that I am not here defending the view that any sense of the 
notion of an essence is in the final analysis coherent, but am merely trying to articulate what 
seems to be involved in certain explanatory practices we (at least many of us) do in fact engage 
in. If it turns out in the end that essences ultimately need to be rejected, so much the worse for 
any explanatory pattern invoking them. My purpose here, to reiterate, is only to spell out the 
conceptual demands of our practices, not to establish the ultimate legitimacy of those 
practices.229 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
227 See the overview of the topic by Anne Marie Helmenstine, which can be found on the following site: 
http://chemistry.about.com/cs/geochemistry/a/aa071601a.htm. 
228 For instance, debates concerning whether individuals have general or individual essences, or precisely how 
essences and kinds are related, or how we determine what the essence of a given individual is. It will be enough, for 
the purposes of the current project, if we have a rough working idea of essence.  
229 Having said this, however, I would not be considering the practices I consider if I did not view them as 




A further qualification that needs to be made is that not every putative kind-term is a term that 
can meet the demands of the causal-explanatory pattern under examination here. For instance, 
the kind-term ‘slime’ does not determine a criterion of identity precise enough to delimit an 
essence which some class of entities could possess in common. The reason for this is two-fold. 
First, ‘slime’ covers too broad a range of entities – things with a wide variety of distinct and not 
necessarily related underlying structures can be called ‘slimes’ (roughly, anything with a sufficient 
viscosity, or anything sufficiently mucus-like can be considered a slime). Relatedly, ‘slime’ serves 
only to capture a loose set of properties, without the assumption that such properties result in a 
regular way from any underlying molecular configuration. The genuine kinds – those that 
unambiguously delimit an essence capable of playing a role in the kind-property explanatory 
pattern – will be, roughly, the ones that play a role in our best scientific accounts of the subject 
matter involving the class of entities denoted by the relevant kind. 
 
But while it seems quite clear that the pattern of explanation under discussion requires that we 
appeal to individuals, it is not as clear that it requires appeal to objects (as opposed, say, to 
properties). To return to our earlier example, in saying that the kind to which instances of 
diamond belong is constituted by a particular carbon lattice structure (the essence denoted by 
diamond), we seem, in effect, to be saying that in virtue of the presence of certain properties (the 
properties of being composed of carbon atoms in a certain cubic crystal lattice formation), other 
properties are possessed. But if kinds are properties, and individuals are instances of those kinds, 
why aren’t the individuals (instances of) properties as well? An apparently easy way of answering 
this objection is to point out that if kinds (or the essences denoted by kinds) are properties, then 




for instance, possess the properties of being composed of carbon atoms in a crystal lattice 
structure. Intuitively, this seems to make sense, though as we shall see in the third section of this 
chapter, the notion of an individual required by kind-property explanations considered here may 
be only a very thin one.  
 
4.1.2 Biological Explanations 
The topic of this sub-section will be certain explanatory patterns that are more exclusive to 
biological science, and which require, prima facie, the existence of objects of a unique sort, namely 
organisms. Much effort was made in the 20th century to show that all teleological talk in biology 
(talk of “function” or “design”) could be translated into talk of temporally linear efficient 
causation, and that biology could in this way be “naturalized”. Key to effecting such translations 
is the force of natural selection. The resulting pattern of explanation takes the following general 
shape: “a trait’s function or functions causally explain[s] the existence or maintenance of that 
trait in a given population via the mechanism of natural selection.”230 The appearance of an 
adaptation in a population can best be accounted for by citing the fact(s) that random trans-
generational changes in traits (mutations) which are selected for over time cause the appearance 
(or disappearance) within a population of some feature, the result of which is that the organisms 
within that population become more fit for survival and reproduction in the environment they 
find themselves in. But explanations of this kind would be unable to proceed without a 
conception of an organism as a type of object. Even in order to handle the concept of a 
                                                   





biological ‘trait’ or ‘feature’ we presumably need some intrinsically unified individual capable of 
possessing properties. 
 
While the sort of efficient causal story outlined in the last paragraph is successful enough 
when the target of explanation is the presence (or maintenance) of traits in populations of 
organisms, there seems to be another way of asking about the functions of the various processes 
that take place within an individual organism, that requires another explanatory pattern. The 
processes in question are primarily the subjects of physiology, rather than evolutionary biology, 
and they include:  
(a) Self-Propagation: Organisms undergo continuous, internal and 
systematic self-regulation (maintenance) and self-reassembly 
(regeneration, as in healing processes).  
(b) Growth and Development: Organisms grow by systemic internal 
integration of nutrients (metabolism) rather than by 
aggregation. 
(c) Reproduction: Organisms come into being by means of sexual or 
asexual reproduction, a biological process resulting in the 
production of a new individual organism. 
 
Each of the processes mentioned so far seem to depend on a further feature, namely,  
(d) Interconnectedness: The parts of an organism are mutually 
interrelated and interdependent in the sense that they 
support, respond to, and even produce one another in such 
a way that the organization or structure of the whole 
system is preserved. 
 
We find, especially in the higher organisms, an uncountable number of sub-processes interacting 
harmoniously to make possible these higher processes, all of which operate in concert in such a 




inanimate physical bodies like rocks or heaps of sand.231 And attempting to avoid the claim that 
each such process exists for the sake of the others and ultimately for the sake of the whole 
within which it operates is difficult (though not uncommon). The view that the teleological 
notions we need to appeal to in accounting for such processes are unique and ineliminable (yet 
nevertheless consistent with a naturalistic account of their role) is one that appeals to many 
contemporary philosophers of biology.  
 
What seems to be needed, to account for such apparently goal-directed phenomena, is an 
appeal to some kind of holistic causality, according to which a whole may be temporally prior to its 
parts, and may thus causally govern or condition them.232 The whole organism, or more 
specifically the survival and reproduction of the organism, provides, in a sense, the reason for the 
parts being as they are and entering into the structural relations into which they enter with one 
another. What coordinates the various organs (and tissues, and cells) and their functions, what 
causes them to conspire together, is the purpose to which they all contribute – namely the 
                                                   
231 A similar, though more detailed account of organisms than that suggested by Wiggins (2001, 86) is given by 
Hoffman and Rosenkrantz:  
Where x is a persisting organism, (i) x has parts which are m-molecules, that is, organic 
macromolecules of repeated units which have a high capacity for selective reactions with other 
similar molecules, (ii) x has a layer or membrane made of m-molecules whose limit is x’s exterior 
surface, (iii) x absorbs and excretes through this layer or membrane, (iv) x metabolizes m-
molecules, (v) x grows through an increase in the number of m-molecules that compose it, (vi) x 
synthesizes m-molecular parts of x by means of m-molecular parts of x copying themselves, (vii) 
x reproduces, either by means of x’s m-molecular parts copying themselves, or by means of 
another, more basic process, (viii) x’s absorbing and excreting causally contribute to x’s 
metabolizing m-molecules; these jointly causally contribute to x’s biosynthesizing m-molecules; 
these together causally contribute to x’s growing and reproducing by means of the addition or 
copying of m-molecules; and x’s growing causally contributes to x’s absorbing, excreting, 
metabolizing, biosynthesizing, and reproducing” (Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1998, 111-112). 
232 One sense in which the whole is literally prior to the parts in the case of organisms is that, since the component 
parts of the system are constantly changing while the system itself remains the same, the whole system must pre-




“welfare” or “fitness” of the organism.233 In other words, without the complex interactions of all 
these parts, the organism would not be able to develop and reproduce, or even just survive, in its 
environment.234 Without appealing to a “purpose” of this sort, we would have no way of 
explaining the unity of the various regularities. So, “‘Function talk’ cannot get away from the 
question of ‘welfare’ or ‘benefit’, and the question of naturalizing such notions is central to the 
current conundrums” in contemporary philosophy of biology.235 But if we recognize holistic 
causation as a legitimate form of causation, then we need to make room for teleological 
explanations alongside the efficient or mechanistic causation so useful in dealing with physical 
bodies.236  
 
The upshot of all this is that the explanatory practices of (at least many) biological scientists – 
especially those practices that attempt to account for the processes undergone by living cells or 
multi-cellular organisms – seem to require us to appeal to objects. And these explanatory 
practices cohere well with our natural tendency to categorize systems of this sort, as we 
encounter them in experience, as objects. Furthermore, several distinguished ontologists, not 
least among whom are found Aristotle and Leibniz, take organisms as the prototypical objects or 
substances. For theorists of biology following Locke’s example (e.g. Buffon), “‘intrinsic 
                                                   
233 Purpose here is to be understood not as a psychological term (except by analogy), but simply as an ineliminably 
teleological feature of the way organisms are. 
234 Huneman, P. (2006) “Naturalising Purpose: From Comparative Anatomy to the ‘Adventure of Reason’,” Studies 
in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 37C:4, pp. 649-674. 
235 Zammito, J. (2006) “Teleology Then and Now: The Question of Kant’s Relevance for Contemporary 
Controversies Over Function in Biology,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 37C:4, pp. 
748-770. 
236 I recognize that the ‘if’ near the beginning of the conditional statement to which this note is affixed might be 




purposiveness’ was a fact of the matter about concrete biological phenomena; the features of 
internal self-regulation were hypotheses arising out of actual research practice.”237  
 
Even if we adopt a more Kantian perspective, and claim that “we resort to causality according 
to purpose, in order to organize our reception of this phenomenon. But we do this… without 
presuming to explain it,” we have to admit that teleology is at least an indispensible enabling 
condition for biology. As Quarfood, discussing Kant’s view of biological teleology, puts it:  
The teleological identification of objects as functional units (natural 
purposes) demarcates a separate ‘order of things’, and it thereby makes 
biology possible as a special science pertaining to these objects. In this 
science, everything is viewed in a teleological light…. [T]his seems to be 
the case also in contemporary biology. Even the most sophisticated 
research in molecular biology is conducted from the point of view of 
the functions which the various substances under study serve for the 
organism. There could be a purely chemical, non-teleological study of 
the same substances, but it would lose its point if it were not embedded 
in a functional context. Or at least it would be of interest only from a 
strictly chemical point of view, having a relation to biology only in so 
far as the substances under investigation happen to be found in 
organisms. But… the notion of organism itself is dependent on 
teleology, so that a non-teleological consideration of such objects could 
only identify them as complexly built aggregates of matter.238  
The story Quarfood is telling here is not a vitalistic one, since everything about organisms could 
be understood from the perspective of a chemist, or from that of a physicist, for that matter. But 
the teleological perspective is what makes organisms available to be cognized and explained by 
us; without it, “there would not even be any such unit as ‘the organism’ to consider. This is the 
sense in which teleology provides the objects of biological science.”239 
 
                                                   
237 Zammito, J. (2006), 765. 





My intention here has not been to defend a certain view of the somewhat controversial nature 
of teleology or of biological organisms. Instead, I have been trying to show that the possibility of 
certain common explanatory practices, both in evolutionary biology and in physiology, seems to 
carry with it conceptual demands for organisms conceived of as objects. In each case we are 
dealing with intrinsically unified systems capable of bearing properties of various kinds, and the 
teleological understanding seems, in the case of objects of this sort, to be what underpins our 
thinking of them as units as well as our description of many of their properties.  
 
4.1.3 Person-Involving Practices 
A person is a kind of individual which seems to carry a very central significance for us. You and 
I, and our immediate family members and relatives are persons. Personal relationships (and the 
persons with whom we enter into them) are central among the things that concern us. But what 
are persons? As a first approximation, persons are the subjects of consciousness, of self-
awareness, and of memories, desires, beliefs, feelings, and intentions. Persons are reasoners and 
reflectors, imaginers and knowers, rememberers, interpreters and rational agents. In general, the 
business of “making sense of others and of ourselves” and of interacting and co-operating with 
others seems to require the grasp and ability to make use of some conception of what it is to be 
a person that involves these various marks and others.240 But, arguably, these marks would not 
be applicable to any individual thing if that thing were not an individual object. 
 
                                                   




More specifically, the self-regarding and other-regarding practices which govern much of our 
daily lives would be unintelligible in the absence of the conception of a unified locus of 
properties of the sort that is a person. The specific person-involving practices I will take to be 
relevant for the discussion of this sub-section include rational deliberation in view of prudential 
self-concern, and attribution of moral responsibility (praise and blame). Persons, treated as 
enduring objects of a certain kind, are the targets of these practices. Within the literature on 
personal identity, the metaphysical units taken to be of ethical significance for the purposes of 
rationality and morality vary from living human beings to atomic momentary experiencers.241 I will 
not be pronouncing on which of the different criteria of personal identity is correct, but will 
simply note that each of them seems to require a conception of a person that builds in object-
like features. 
 
A moral agent, at least on one standard way of looking at things, is a rational agent – an 
intentional system capable of engaging in rational deliberation. But the possibility of such a unified 
source of beliefs, desires, goals, and plans, an end-directed system capable of practical rationality, 
whose behaviors are governed by organized patterns of belief and desire, seems to be intelligible 
only when taken together with the concept of an object as locus of these various capacities.242 In 
other words, without a conception of a unified and persisting self, we would be unable to 
successfully undertake deliberations which require arbitration and choice between various 
competing desires, as well as the ability to situate our immediate goals within the overall 
                                                   
241 Shoemaker, David (2005). “Personal Identity and Ethics” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
242 Even if they belong to a very special kind of object in virtue of their possession of capacities and dispositions 





framework of a single life-plan.243 Furthermore, we need the notion of a self to explain our 
concerns about our own future well-being that motivate our rational deliberative processes. So 
the concept of an object seems to be a necessary condition for conceiving of rational intentional 
systems such as persons.  
 
The justification of our practice of attributing moral responsibility has traditionally been taken 
to require, as a necessary condition, a certain view of diachronic personal identity. The idea is 
that a person can be morally responsible or accountable for some action only if the action was 
performed by the same (numerically identical) person or self whose accountability is now in 
question. On the Lockean view of personal identity, a person is responsible only for those 
actions he or she remembers performing. This view of identity takes experiential memory and 
continuity of consciousness as constitutive of personal identity. Various contemporary accounts of 
identity also employ something like the following psychological criterion of personal identity:  
X at t1 is the same person as Y at t2 if and only if X is uniquely 
psychologically continuous with Y, where psychological continuity 
consists in overlapping chains of strong psychological connectedness, 
itself consisting in significant numbers of direct psychological 
connections like memories, intentions, beliefs/goals/desires, and 
similarity of character.244 
Parfit’s well-known version of this kind of view denies that identity really matters in survival, so 
long as psychological continuity and connectedness are preserved.245 A person X is morally 
                                                   
243 Christine Korsgaard (1989) expresses a view along very similar lines. 
244 Shoemaker (2005), citing Parfit (1984, 207). 
245 An important point in favour of this view over any theory centred on numerical identity is that it accounts for 
the hypothetical case of fission (the dividing of a person’s consciousness into two distinct streams, by means of the 
transplanting of two functionally equivalent hemispheres of the brain into distinct bodies) in a way that none of 
those theories seems to be able. It is not entirely clear, however, whether psychological continuity can be either 




responsible for the actions of a person Y, on this criterion, only if X is uniquely psychologically 
continuous with Y. Similarly, by appealing to a criterion of this sort, we are also able to explain 
the rationality of our prudential self-concern and anticipation of continuing psychological life in 
deliberative practices, by showing how various psychological states belong to the same person in 
virtue of the intrinsic relations between them.  
 
Since, however, personhood (in the sense given by the psychological criterion) is something 
that might arguably not apply to me at all stages of my existence – when I am very young or very 
old for instance – some have appealed instead to a biological criterion of identity for human 
beings according to which continuity of a single biological organism is what constitutes our 
identity. This view may take “person” to be a sortal term that applies to an object only during a 
phase of that object’s existence (a phase sortal), rather than a substance sortal which applies to it 
during its entire existence, as “human being” would be. But it can also more straightforwardly 
identify persons with human organisms.246 The nonreductionist view, which takes persons to be 
entities (Cartesian ego-substances or souls) entirely distinct from their brains and bodies, and 
thus from any facts about physical and psychological continuity, is in a way very similar to the 
biological continuity view. The difference is that in the former, the substance unifying the 
individual life and rendering it distinct from other lives is an ego and not an organism. Like 
                                                                                                                                                              
intentions may tell against its sufficiency, and cases of “brain trauma causing psychological discontinuity” may tell 
against its necessity. 
246 This seems to be the view that Wiggins prefers. See his (2001), p. 195ff. For a related view, see Strawson’s 
Individuals, Ch 3. Persons, then, would be the subjects of both consciousness-involving and body-involving 
predicates. Whether or not in turns out that all of the former kind of predicate are (reducible to) predicates of the 
latter kind can be left as an open question (Wiggins, 195, note 3). 
   However, even if biological continuity does a better job of giving a metaphysical characterization of diachronic 
human identity, argues Shoemaker, it seems to be irrelevant to any attempt to account for the practical concerns of 
rational anticipation and moral responsibility, at least according to certain strong intuitions we tend to have - 




organisms, nonreductionism’s ego-substances are frequently dismissed on the grounds that they 
are irrelevant, for practical purposes, except insofar as they possess various psychological 
connections, and are thus entirely dispensable in favour of a view which concentrates solely on 
those connections.247  
 
Others (e.g. Schechtman 1996) deny that the source of numerical unity is what needs to be 
found out, and have tried instead to account for personal identity by appeal to a “Narrative 
Criterion.” On this view,   
what makes an action, experience, or psychological characteristic 
properly attributable to some person (and thus a proper part of his or 
her true identity) is its correct incorporation into the self-told story of 
his or her life….  Narrative identity is thus really about a kind of 
psychological unity, but not just an artless or random unity.248  
Accordingly, there can be no genuine moral agent or person unless the experiences of a subject 
are “actively unified… gathered together into the life of one narrative ego by virtue of a story the 
subject tells that weaves them together, giving them a kind of coherence and intelligibility they 
wouldn't otherwise have had.”249 Since the narrative account makes each person identical with an 
extended narrative ego which encompasses her past and future existence, it is rational for any 
person to be concerned about the entire self generated by the narrative and to anticipate (as 
belonging to her) future experiences that will fit in with her on-going story. Ownership of 
actions, and hence moral responsibility, is explained by the connection between the action and 
                                                                                                                                                              
references provided by Shoemaker), according to which “rational anticipation, self-concern, moral responsibility, 
and the like can be justified [by appeal to psychological relations] even in the absence of biological continuity.” 
247 Furthermore, since we can have, in principle, no indication of when a featureless ego-substance is present (again, 
besides the indication given by the physical and psychological properties), for all we know we could be being 
replaced moment by moment by qualitatively identical ego-substances, in which case we could never be sure that we 
had reidentified a person, nor would we be justified in claiming special concern for some future stage of our bodies.  




the agent’s “central values, beliefs, and experiences” to which it is united by the story being told. 
Thus a person is numerically identical over time in virtue of a kind of “unity of character” – the 
“unity” of an actor in a story – needed for narrative coherence.250  
 
It is beyond the scope of this sub-section to adjudicate between the various conceptions of 
what personhood consists in. The important thing to notice here is that whichever view one 
chooses, one will be in need of some notion of an object to make the view intelligible. If the 
presence of an enduring biological organism is found to be a necessary condition of personal 
identity, one will clearly be in need of the notion of an object, insofar as biological organisms are 
objects (as was shown in the previous sub-section). But even if one adopts a non-reductionist or 
a narrative view according to which no particular biological organism is essential to support 
psychological continuity or narrative unity, some object-like notion of a unified source of 
rational deliberation and moral responsibility will nevertheless be necessary. 
   
I have focused attention on three different types of practices that seem to require appeal to 
objects: causal explanations that involve physical bodies, biological explanations that involve 
organisms, and our person-involving practices of rational deliberation and attributing moral 
responsibility. In addition, an explanatory practice of citing kind-membership as explanatory of 
property possession was discussed as involving physical bodies, though as noted, it could apply 
to other sorts of objects as well. A comprehensive list of object-involving practices would be 
                                                                                                                                                              
249 Ibid. 
250 A question arises, however, about whether the narrative in fact creates the unity of the events and experience, or 




significantly longer than the one I have provided here. But the examples I have chosen should 
give some indication of the breadth of application of the idea.  
 
4.2 The Family-Resemblance Account 
The preceding section showed that there are compelling reasons that support the prima facie very 
plausible contention that the concept of an object is indispensible to us. Any attempt to 
enumerate the furniture of the world that proceeded without such a concept in place would 
appear, at the very least, to be in need of some fancy footwork to explain how the host of 
apparent conceptual demands for objects could otherwise be met. Nevertheless, this contention 
appears to be in conflict with the conclusion reached at the end of Chapter Three, namely that 
no unproblematic general assay of objects is available or likely to be forthcoming. This is 
troublesome because if objects are necessary inhabitants in any adequate descriptive ontological 
system, we should be capable of telling a coherent and satisfying story about what they are like, 
ontologically speaking. In this section I will attempt to explain, in general terms, the strategy I 
want to recommend for resolving this apparent conflict. 
 
4.2.1 The General Strategy 
The first step in my proposed resolution is to note that the ontological distinctions which were 
put to use in generating the concept of an object (an intrinsically unified independent concrete 
particular) in Chapter Two are not as rigidly organized as the hierarchical scheme (objects are a 
sub-type of particulars which are a sub-type of individuals) I employed there may have 




rather than proceeding as we did, taking intrinsic vs. extrinsic unity as the primary division, we 
could instead have begun with particularity vs. universality, dividing each of these into 
intrinsically and extrinsically unified entities, and moving on from there.  
 
The ontological distinctions we have been using are best viewed as conceptually fundamental 
pairs of correlative concepts which could be represented by ones and zeros. We might use an 
analogy here and call the result of the relation holding between any given pair an ontological 
dimension. But in using an analogy of this sort, we would have to make clear that at least some of 
the dimensions consist only of opposite poles, with nothing in between (there do not seem to be 
degrees of particularity or universality, or of concreteness or abstractness, even if there are degrees 
of unity). So it would be incorrect to see the various dimensions as giving rise to an ontological 
space within which, at any point, entities of a certain kind could be located. It will be useful for 
the ensuing discussion to consider each of the distinctions from Chapter Two as assigning a 1 or 
a 0 to an individual according to the following table:251 
Dimension 1 0 
Unity Intrinsic Extrinsic 
Instantiation Particular Universal 
(Ontological) Status Independent Dependent 
Locatedness Concrete Abstract 
Identity Determinate Indeterminate 
 Table 2. Ontological “Dimensions” 
Each sort of individual will then have assigned to it a sequence of ones and zeros depending on 
where it sits along each ontological dimension. For ease of discussion I will refer to the poles 
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time, I have not included a dimension on which this feature would represent a pole, mainly because the opposite of 




represented by the labels in the 1-column the “robust” poles of each dimension, and to the poles 
represented in the 0-column as the “ethereal” poles.   
 
What makes this useful is that we now have a way of discussing types of individuals in terms of 
ordered quintuples of ones and zeros. So far nothing implies that every combination of ones and 
zeros corresponds to a useful notion of an individual, but at this stage we have not ruled any out, 
either. In addition to asking whether a score of one on any particular dimension is required for 
some type of individual to qualify as a metaphysically significant type, we might also ask the 
question whether there are relations between the dimensions such that a score of one or zero on 
one dimension would necessitate a score of one or zero on another dimension. For instance, 
insofar as intrinsic unity involves distinct parts being made into a unit or individual that exists 
over and above the parts of which it is composed, it would seem that entities like properties, for 
instance, are not the kinds of thing that have parts in the relevant sense (even if they can be 
structured on the properties of and relations between the substantial parts of the entity whose 
properties they are – recall Robb’s account of the colour of a tennis ball being structured on the 
colour of the right and left halves of the tennis ball). But if properties do not have parts, they are 
not candidates for either intrinsic or extrinsic unity. To ask whether the colour of a tennis ball is 
one thing or many things seems to be, in some way, a misguided question. If this is true, 
however, it would suggest that some individuals might fall outside of one or more of the 
dimensions. 
  
The naïve perspective would be to require that every metaphysically significant individual 




‘individual’ – the sense I spelled out as being an intrinsically unified, independent concrete particular – 
with the commonsense notion of an ordinary object, the idea captured by the phrase ‘middle-sized 
dry goods’. I also argued there that most, if not all, of the individuals that we, as human beings, 
care about fall under this category, which is a reason for seeing this notion as an especially 
important one. In view of the reframing of the ontological perspective I am advocating, what is 
correct in the thoughts expressed by each of those claims can be clarified and better explicated. 
Firstly, the commonsense notion of an object is, as most commonsense concepts are, imprecise, 
so that we should not expect the commonsense notion of an object and the much more precise 
term of art (IICP) to be co-extensive. Secondly, to say that anything qualifying as ontologically 
significant must sit at the robust pole of every ontological dimension is untenable, as will be 
borne out by what follows. Insofar as the concept covering a type of individuals does sit at a 
robust pole, to that extent the type will be “object-like” or ontologically significant. But 
individuals generally, and even those that come closest to falling under the notion of an IICP, 
can be object-like in some respects but not in others, and this fact should not disqualify them 
from counting as ontologically significant. 
 
I have already suggested that the tendency to want to work with a single, univocal notion of 
objecthood leads to problems of different sorts in ontology. Furthermore, thinking of 
ontologically significant individuals as having to be at the robust pole of each dimension is one 
source of the difficulty that the project of attempting to give ontological assays of objects 
encounters. Each assay attempts to give a general account of objects – one that ranges over too 
wide a variety of distinct kinds of individuals to be able to say anything truly informative that 




ontologically significant individual - organisms, mereological sums, artifacts, natural inanimate 
formations, atoms, persons, etc. – that it seems unreasonable to expect there to be a univocal, 
governing concept or ontological account applying to them all. Instead, each of the various types 
of individual identifiable via the conceptual demands of different human practices may warrant 
categorization as belonging to a unique kind of ontologically significant individual, as falling 
under a unique (whether the difference is radical or only quite subtle) individual-concept.  
 
The “family-resemblance” account of individual-concepts I am describing, if true, may enable 
us to take an important step toward resolving the tension between the apparent conceptual 
demand for objects our practices impose and the failure of any comprehensive assay of objects. 
It may turn out, if the family-resemblance account is correct, that Bundle Theory is capable of 
accounting for individuals of certain types, even if it cannot deal with individuals of other types. 
In certain cases we will have to turn to some form of Substratum Theory, or perhaps the best we 
will be able to do in certain cases is to adopt something like a Non-Reductionist approach. But 
before being in a position to make any definite pronouncements on which assay is capable of 
handling which type of individual – if in fact it turns out that any of them are capable of 
adequately handling any type – I first need to show that the project of distinguishing different 
individual-concepts for the various types of individuals required by our practices is a feasible 
one.  
 
Is there anything we can say a priori, before looking at the concepts generated by the 
conceptual demands of specific practices, about conceptual relations that obtain between the 




entity – and thus a unit – whether their unity is derived intrinsically or only extrinsically. To see 
this, try to imagine an individual that is not singular but irreducibly plural in the sense that it 
could not appropriately be unified even extrinsically, by the mind’s activity. In such a case, we 
would lose the basis for calling whatever it is we were considering an individual at all. But 
‘individual’ is a count noun. Hence, no individual could be irreducibly plural in this sense. A 
mereological sum is perhaps the closest candidate for an exception to this rule. But, considered 
as an individual, even a mereological sum possesses some unity – namely the unity we impose on 
it when we treat it, conceptually, as an individual. For this reason I have not represented 
individuality and plurality as a separate dimension in the list.  
 
It is not nearly so clear that all individuals have to be particulars (non-instantiable entities).252 
For what principled reason could we appeal to in order to exclude universals from consideration 
as individuals? There seems indeed to be a way of thinking of universals as abstract (non-spatio-
temporally located) individuals, in spite of the fact that they are non-particular (they are multiply 
instantiable). On the other hand, it could be argued that the referents of abstract nouns 
(‘brotherhood’, ‘tallness’, ‘courage’, ‘intelligence’) cannot be seen as individuals except by means 
of a significant distortion of linguistic-conceptual convention. This is perhaps part of the reason 
we find Platonic transcendent universals so intuitively strange. The fact that we react against the 
reification of such entities seems to indicate that we naturally employ a concept of individuality 
which excludes universals. At the same time, it is possible that all this shows is that we acquire 
our concept of individuals from our experience of ordinary non-instantiable particulars. But 
                                                   
252 Saying this would not entail that all particulars must be individuals. Interestingly enough, it seems that even 
irreducibly plural entities (e.g. physical stuffs) could be particulars. This point indicates already the flexibility of the 




facts about how concepts are acquired need not (even should not) rigidly constrain further 
extensions of their application.253 And it sits well with the flexibility of the ontological 
perspective I am advocating here to leave it as an open question whether there could be non-
particular individuals, even though such individuals would be quite radically different from any 
we ordinarily experience. Though each of the three main types of individual I will be considering 
in the following section will be particulars, the motivating example I will raise before I get there 
might well not be. 
 
In spite of the fact that most of the individuals we encounter exist in space and in time, 
concreteness is not a necessary conceptual element of ontologically significant individuals either, 
as the next sub-section, which considers numbers, will bear out. Moreover, it is difficult to find 
instances of entities which lack determinate identity. Yet they can apparently be found, as some 
descriptions of quantum-level particles seem to indicate.254 And it is possible that the identity of 
entities that possess vague spatial boundaries may not be fully determinate. But what about 
independence? Independence seemed, in Chapter Two, to be the hallmark of our standard 
conception of ontological significance, and was given as the key distinguishing feature of IICPs. 
As we shall see, however, certain ways of looking at physical bodies and at persons may require 
us to re-examine even this apparent invariance.  
                                                   
253 And there certainly are other potentially dependent entities, like tropes or events, which seem to be capable of 
serving as the referents of concrete nouns without too much of a stretch of linguistic convention (I have in mind D. 
C. Williams’ ‘Hamis’ and ‘Borcas’ as names for the particular shapes of certain lollipops, as well as names for events 
such as ‘The Battle of Hastings’). Again, not wanting to be sidetracked by an attempt to resolve this kind of 
complex issue here, I will attempt to remain neutral on the issue. I refer the reader to a discussion of related issues 
in Fraser MacBride’s (2005). 
254 It might appear that I am equivocating on the word ‘identity’ here since determinate (synchronic) identity is not 
the same as the diachronic identity which seems to be lacking in the case of quantum particles. Yet granted that 
these two senses of ‘identity’ are distinct, it is nevertheless in virtue of the fact that an individual possesses a certain 





The general thesis I take these considerations (and those that will follow immediately) to 
support is that in order for something to count as a member of the family of ontologically 
significant individuals (whose concepts, taken together, should take the place of our problematic 
general notion of an IICP in an improved ontological framework), it must score a one on some 
ontological dimension or other (and possibly on more than one dimension), though it will not be 
necessary that it score a one on every dimension. If this is true, then conceiving of something as 
ontologically significant will not necessarily be hindered by the inclusion of some zeros, however 
counter-intuitive this might feel so long as we remain in the grip of the idea that object-like 
(ontologically robust) individuals are those that fall under the concept of an IICP. We can 
afford, to some extent at least, to be neutral about where individuals are situated within the 
schema. Some of the force of the original identification of all ontologically significant individuals 
with Chapter Two’s IICPs is retained by the claim to which I will continue to adhere, that no 
entity under consideration for ontological significance that came out on the ‘ethereal’ side of 
every one of the dimensions would make the cut. 
 
4.2.2 A Motivating Example: Numbers 
This sub-section presents an examination of a kind of individual that involves a particularly 
unusual assortment of ontological ingredients, in order to help bear out the idea that the 
ontological framework I have been describing is flexible in the way I have been claiming it is. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
individual, and so the two sorts of identity are intimately related. Thanks to Doreen Fraser for pointing out the need 




While this is a hotly disputed matter in philosophy of mathematics, at least at first blush, 
numbers (and, indeed, many sorts of “mathematical objects”) seem to be best described as 
abstract, independent individuals. They are obviously not something we come into contact with in the 
way we do with spatially located entities, and they do not seem to be the sort of thing that is 
bound to time. Nevertheless, they seem to be independent, since they are entities which have 
properties and enter into relations, but are not had by anything else. Numbers can be odd or 
even, prime or not-prime, etc.; we also say that 4 is twice 2, or that 3 is a factor of 6. They are loci 
of various properties (capacities, dispositions, etc.) in a sense that is at least relevantly analogous 
to that in which physical objects are. The score that a number must achieve on the unity or 
instantiation dimensions, however, seems to be open to debate, and to depend on whether one 
sees numbers as mental constructions of some kind, or as more akin to the Platonic Forms. But 
it is interesting to notice that, without explicitly taking sides on the issue, mathematicians are not 
hindered in carrying out extremely complicated operations requiring quantification over 
numbers. This seems to suggest that it may not matter to us whether the source of the unity of 
numbers is taken as intrinsic or extrinsic to them, or on whether they are, in the final analysis, 
particulars or universals.  
 
This last point raises an additional consideration in support of the flexibility of the ontological 
schema in which the various individual-concepts are located. In addition to the possibility of 
different individual-concepts lying at opposite poles of some ontological dimensions, it is also 
possible that our concepts of certain kinds of individuals can be unspecific concerning which 
pole of a given dimension they involve. What this shows is that even if ontology, when done for 




that differentiate one sort of entity from another, in its role as provider of a conceptual schema 
in which our more specific projects (everyday or scientific) proceed, ontology’s job will be 
accomplished so long as no distinctions that are of practical or scientific importance are left 
unrepresented in the framework. 
 
4.3 Three Examples of Individual-Concepts 
Having illustrated the flexibility of the ontological framework I am describing, I now want to 
proceed with showing where the three individual-concepts required by the practices discussed in 
4.1 fit in to this framework. By doing so, I hope to show that even though various practices of 
ours require that we appeal to individuals, nevertheless the individual-concepts we employ in 
each case are in fact distinct, though related, concepts. 
4.3.1 The Concept of a Physical Body 
I argued above that, prima facie, (at least very many of) the kinds of explanations we make use of 
in day-to-day life and in science require us to use a concept of a physical body. The specific 
example I used to illustrate the point was of a falling rock, upon striking the earth, causing a 
depression in it. Since we are dealing, for such practical purposes, with compound bodies as 
represented by our folk-physics conception of them, we are also clearly dealing with concrete and 
particular entities. That much seems relatively indisputable. What about unity and ontological 
status? 
 
If what we said above in agreement with Lowe is correct, the relevant kinds of explanatory 




were exhausted by mereological sums, we would need only extrinsically unified (albeit still 
concrete and particular) individuals. But we saw that appealing only to the granite particles 
without specifying the way in which they cohere together to form a whole of some kind was 
insufficient for explaining the kind of phenomena under consideration. And surely the relations 
of coherence that make the particles into a single object hold between them regardless of what 
we think about it. So even if we populate our ontological scheme with mereological sums, they 
will need ontologically more robust neighbors on the unity dimension. 
 
Can we get a more precise specification of the principle of intrinsic unity involved in the case 
of physical bodies? Here, the notion of a mereological compound developed by Hoffman and 
Rosenkrantz and discussed earlier can be of use. Unlike mereological sums, mereological 
compounds cannot survive having their components scattered to the four corners of the earth. 
For the purpose of explaining, by appeal to the presence of some physical body, the kind of 
macroscopic effects we are concerned with, there will need to be some significant set of particles 
connected via the joining relation, but what will not be required is that every one of the particles 
so connected remains connected throughout the period of time we are concerned with. The fact 
that some quantity of atoms originally adhering to the surface of the rock comes loose and 
separates from it upon collision with the earth does not bring about the generation of a new, 
numerically distinct rock, as it would in the case of a mereological compound.255  
 
                                                   
255 And the fact that some of these particles are left behind in the depression, while the bulk of the rock rolls a few 
meters away, though part of the causal story at a sufficiently precise level, need not be part of the macro-level causal 




For this reason, although physical bodies should be seen as intrinsically unified entities, and 
although the principle of their unity is given by something like the principle of unity for 
mereological compounds, we need to be sensitive to the difference between the conception of 
the latter type of object and the conception of physical bodies that our explanatory practices 
require. As we saw earlier (1.2), our conception of a physical body is, in regard to the 
specification of its parts, relatively imprecise (relative to the conception of a mereological sum or 
a mereological compound). Given the fact that mereological compounds typically are not the 
sorts of thing that endure through time, it seems to me that it would be more ontologically 
economical to dispense with them altogether and make do with physical bodies and mereological 
sums. But I will not argue the point here.  
 
As we have seen, physical bodies differ from mereological sums in regard to the source of 
their unity. Interestingly, however, the concepts relevant to these two types of object seem to 
adhere to the same pole of the ontological status dimension. In one sense of ontological 
independence – the sense that we appealed to in order to distinguish objects from properties (or 
events), even mereological compounds seem to fit the bill. Take a given mereological 
compound, a roughly spherical collection of cohering atoms. Call this mereological compound 
‘Lu’. Since it is true that Lu could have existed without being spherical (if, for instance, Lu was 
cube-shaped instead), Lu is not ontologically dependent in the sense that Lu’s sphericity is (Lu’s 
sphericity could not have existed without Lu). All three kinds of objects (sums, compounds, and 
bodies) are independent of at least some of their properties. At the same time, however, both 
sums and bodies depend, quite directly, both for their identity and their existence, on the atoms 




particles were put in their places, this would be a clear case of the generation of a numerically 
distinct rock. And although a similar point would hold for mereological compounds, these will 
again differ from physical bodies in the sense that if a single atom were removed from a 
mereological compound, we would have a different compound, while I have argued that the 
same thing is not true for physical bodies. In virtue of this apparent admissibility that physical 
bodies may endure through gain or loss of some microscopic parts, there seems to be some 
indeterminacy in regard to the identity of physical objects, since there seems to be no principled 
way of specifying their spatial boundaries. Even in the course of a single causal interaction, the 
particles composing the body acting as agent may not be the same at the end of that interaction 
as those composing it at the beginning. So in regard to the identity dimension, the object-
concept for physical bodies may belong on the ethereal pole. 
 
The kind of indeterminacy involved does not, however, seem to matter insofar as we are 
considering the concept of a physical body as a unified locus of causal powers, an actor in 
certain causal stories. It seems that our concept of a physical body like a rock actually contains 
two components. On the one hand we think of a rock in terms of the particles constituting it; on 
the other hand we think of it in terms of the causal powers it possesses. Arguably, if our concept 
only included the causal component, it would make sense to say that two rocks (call them Lo 
and Bo) could turn out be the same rock even though entirely constituted of different particles, 
so that Lu and Bu (the mereological compounds composed of Lo and Bo’s atoms) are 
different.256 But it does not seem to be the case that our concept of a rock includes only the 
                                                   
256 Consider the following hypothetical situation: Two large igneous rocks (Lo and Bo) are formed via crystallization 
of magma and are deposited on the slope of a volcanic mountain. For the sake of the thought experiment, imagine 




causal component. We cannot think about a rock without thinking of it as a unified group of 
particles. We cannot separate out the causal aspect from the concept even if what it is to be a 
rock is mainly constituted of being a locus of causal powers of a certain sort. Part of what it 
means to be a rock (or a unified mass of matter more generally) is – approximately – to be a 
certain mereological compound. The macro-level causal powers of the rock are very directly 
linked to the presence of the particles that compose it. In certain cases, it is explanatorily 
sufficient to appeal to the rock’s particles alone, for instance in explaining the effect on the 
needle of a scale on which the rock has been placed.257 No mention of the unification or 
arrangement of the particles is needed in such a case, though as we have seen it is needed for 
other explanations.  
 
But if the concept of a rock is indeed the concept of a mereological compound plus the 
macro-level causal powers resulting from the unification and arrangement of the particles and 
minus the necessity of every particle remaining part of the compound throughout the course of 
its existence (since our concept of things like rocks just is not so fine-grained as that), then it 
                                                                                                                                                              
and calcium, and that the configuration of their atoms is also identical, so that the resulting overall shape of Lo and 
Bo is exactly the same. Three boys find Lo at time t, and proceed to push Lo over the edge of a cliff on the 
mountainside, and Lo causes a depression in the soft ground at the foot of the cliff. This depression subsequently 
comes to be known as the ‘hole of good fortune’, being so named because it was formed by Lo within inches of the 
Queen who was riding horseback along the trail at the cliff’s foot at the time when Lo was launched over the cliff’s 
edge. Now consider a possible world which differed from the world in which Lo was discovered by the boys in the 
most minimal way needed for the locations where Lo and Bo were deposited (having already been formed before 
the processes leading to this difference began) to have been exchanged. In this second world, the boys find Bo 
instead of Lo, so that it is Bo instead of Lo that causes the depression. Would we say that a different rock caused 
the depression in each case? Concerning Lu and Bu we would undoubtedly say this, but what ought we to say about 
Lo and Bo? The description, “The Rock found by Peter, Thomas and Nathanael which caused the famous Hole of 
Good Fortune” would apply just as much to Bo in the second world as to Lo in the first. Thus, there is some 
temptation to say that Lo and Bo are in fact the same rock across worlds. However, as noted, this is not what we 
say, upon reflection. There is not even a temptation to say this about Lu and Bu, since (ex hypothesi) two 
mereological compounds formed from different atoms are different. And it seems that the only reason to deny that 
the description applies to Bo (in the first world) and Lo (in the second) is that part of what it is to be Lo is to be Lu, 
and in the same way being Bo includes being Bu.  




seems as though we do have to say that rocks are dependent on the particles composing them. 
In general, for an entity to be ontologically independent, it must not depend necessarily, for its 
existence or its identity, on any other entity (though it can still depend on some type of entity). So 
by this criterion, physical bodies (along with mereological sums and compounds) must be taken 
to score a 0 on the ontological status dimension. And this does seem to be in accord with 
intuitions like the one I mentioned above; if Peter, Thomas and Nathanael (in the first world 
mentioned in footnote 256) were told that all the particles in Lo were instantaneously replaced 
with particles from Bo, they would intuitively feel that they were now holding a different rock. 
 
Taking stock of all of these considerations, the individual-concept that applies to physical 
bodies is the concept of an intrinsically unified, dependent concrete particular whose identity is not fully 
determinate. The concept given here includes three ontologically robust or “object-like” features, 
combined with two features (ontological dependence and indeterminacy of identity) which make 
it fall short of the ontological full-bloodedness of the notion of an IICP. Clearly, then, things like 
rocks do not count as objects in the sense of that word given in Chapter Two. Even so we can 
see easily how they are ontologically significant individuals, and just where they fit in to the 
ontological scheme I am suggesting. It is important to remember that the individuals falling 
under the extension of this concept are the macroscopic compound bodies we experience via 
our senses (with or without minimal technological extensions to our sensory capacities) and 
hence would exclude fundamental physical particles.  
 
The concept applicable to the kind of individuals required by the kind-property pattern of 




simply as instances of their kinds. Princess the poodle is an instance of the kind ‘dog’ and so is 
an organism and a physical body. But here we are thinking of Princess only as an instance of her 
kind. The main requirement, imposed by the constraint of belonging to a (genuine) natural kind, 
is that the individual in question possess a determinate identity, that is, that there be a definite 
answer to the ‘What is it?’ question concerning the individual in question. Kind-instances, on 
this count, would seem to qualify immediately as particulars. But to be a particular it is not 
sufficient to be an instance – a particular individual must also be non-instantiable. To see this 
consider that Justice is an instance of Virtue, and yet is itself instantiable (even if rarely 
instantiated). So particularity cannot be simply equated with ‘being-an-instance’. For similar 
reasons, concreteness cannot be a necessary requirement for kind-instances. Again, kind-
instances need not be intrinsically unified. The kind ‘set’, for instance, has many instances and 
bestows on them perfectly determinate identity conditions, yet it is plausible that all sets are 
extrinsically unified. Indeed many of the kind-instances we encounter will be intrinsically unified, 
concrete and particular; but this is not a requirement of the sort of explanation currently in 
question.  
 
Kind-property causal explanations of the sort that require non-instantiable instances do seem 
to involve independence of a certain sort, since kinds will be taken as causally prior relative to 
the properties caused by them. The causal entailment flows from essence to property and not 
vice-versa.258 If x has an essence E, then x has property f (or will have one of some range of f-
properties, in the case of accidental properties), but the reverse (If x has property f, then x has 




qua kind-instances, seem to be independent. Of course, the possibility that an instance of a 
certain kind will be dependent on entities of some other sort will always be open, and the answer 
to it will be determined by the kind being dealt with. 
 
The concept of an individual kind-instance, then, is the concept of an individual with a 
determinate identity. The facts that (a) there aren’t any entities that are pure kind-instances without 
further qualifications and that (b) the kinds involved will make large differences in the ultimate 
pronouncement about where a given instance sits on various ontological dimensions makes the 
project of determining a unique concept for individuals relevant for the practice of the kind of 
explanation we’ve been considering a task of potentially dubious helpfulness. Indeed, whether 
the entity invoked need even be an individual at all might be an open question here, since there 
seem to be natural kinds for stuffs as well, even if any specific portion of stuff will be 
characterized as an (either intrinsically or extrinsically unified) individual. Still, developing such a 
thin and imprecise concept in response to the demands of a particular explanatory practice can 
provide a kind of limiting case of what is possible on the kind of ontological perspective I am 
attempting to develop. 
 
4.3.2 The Concept of a Living Organism 
Which of the conceptual elements will be involved in the individual-concept relevant to 
organisms, as determined by the conceptual requirements of the biological explanations we 
discussed above? As was the case for physical bodies, it seems entirely uncontentious to say that 
                                                                                                                                                              




organisms are concrete individuals; non-spatio-temporally located living organisms seem to be 
ruled out by the parameters of our biological theories.259 And the idea of a multiply instantiable 
organism also seems to transgress certain conceptual boundaries that it would be too costly to 
abandon. So organisms seem to be concrete particulars. 
 
Moreover, the idea of an organism seems to be the idea of something intrinsically unified. 
This point flows quite naturally from the consideration of organisms as functional units, whose 
various processes and parts are somehow ordered toward the maintenance and well-being of the 
whole as a living system of some biological kind. If functional unity is indeed indispensible to 
our ability to conceive of an organism as an organism (as opposed to conceiving of the 
mereological sum or the physical body present at the same spatio-temporal location as the 
organism), then it is clear that the source of an organism’s unity cannot be extrinsic. For there 
does not seem to be any obvious way in which the functioning of organs, which sustains the 
organism, depends on the beliefs or other conceptual features of a cognizer. There is, of course, 
a literature which holds that functions are always interest-relative and hence non-objective. But 
as I am not defending the teleological perspective I am discussing, but rather attempting to 
demonstrate what notion of an individual is required for this particular approach to biological 
explanation, I am simply assuming its legitimacy. So although the objections raised by the 
interest-relative perspective on functions are both interesting and important, it will not be part of 
my task to answer them here. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
environmental conditions and laws of nature also have to be a certain way for the properties to be expressed. 
259 One interestingly distinct aspect of the concreteness of organisms is that they cannot exist at a single point in 




Conceiving of organisms as ontologically independent items seems, initially, to be incorrect, 
for the same reasons we found for denying that status to physical bodies. For although 
organisms, as much as physical bodies, certainly are the bearers of properties and are 
(presumably) not themselves borne by anything else, it also seems true that just as physical 
bodies were seen to depend on the particles composing them, so organisms could not exist or be 
what they are without the particles making up their organs, tissues, and cells. But this latter point 
is not quite correct, since no organism depends on any given set of particles, as is witnessed by 
the fact that the matter of which organisms are composed is constantly being exchanged with 
the environment. There is, in the case of organisms, only a generic or type-dependence on 
material composing parts – their existence and identity presupposes some entities of a certain 
sort – but not any specific or rigid dependence on any particular entities.  
 
So as long as we limit our idea of what ontological dependence involves to the rigid case, it 
seems unproblematic to hold that living organisms are ontologically independent in a way that 
physical bodies are not. This leaves us with the following individual-concept relevant to living 
organisms. Living organisms are intrinsically unified, ontologically independent concrete particulars. They 
are, in a way that physical bodies are not, objects in the most robust sense, which explains why 
those who have attempted to say what the paradigmatic individual substances are have so often 
pointed to living organisms. Though, of course, if independence is taken to involve the stronger 
idea that an entity, if it is ontologically independent, is not even generically dependent on any 
entity besides itself, then the individual-concept applicable to organisms would swing to the 
ethereal pole of the ontological status dimension we are considering.  
                                                                                                                                                              





4.3.3 The Concept of a Person 
In 4.1.3’s discussion of our prima facie conceptual need to think of persons as objects of some 
kind, we noted that there are many distinct accounts of what a person is and of what it takes for 
a person X to be identical to a person Y over time. Shoemaker, whose overview guided us in 
that section, ends up suggesting a pluralistic approach to relating personal identity with various 
practical concerns. Adopting his view for the purposes of this section, and setting aside the 
problematic aspects of each account, I will assume that the psychological criterion of personal 
identity yields the appropriate conception of personhood for the context of rational deliberation, 
while the conception most suitable for moral responsibility and ownership of past actions is 
provided by the narrative criterion of personal identity.260  
 
What ingredients are required of an individual-concept answering to the needs of each 
conception? In either case, it is straightforward that particularity will have to be involved. 
Concreteness also seems to be a component of our individual-concept for persons. We regularly 
encounter and interact with persons in space-time. Of course some have argued that spatial 
locatedness might not be a condition for personal existence, as in the case of angels or 
disembodied spirits. And a still more extreme conception would argue for the possibility of 
extra-temporal personal existence in the case of a transcendent Creator. Since, however, these 
are controversial waters to swim in, and are sometimes considered philosophically dubious, and 
                                                                                                                                                              
enable the functioning and success of the organism in its environment can exist at a single instant. 
260 I thus leave aside the conceptions of personhood involved in the bodily and non-reductionist criteria of personal 
identity, as they do not seem relevant or necessary to the purposes we have been considering. Furthermore, even if 
the bodily criterion were relevant it would be uninteresting since it would require an individual-concept identical 




since all parties acknowledge the existence of embodied human persons, I will limit the scope of 
my considerations to them, apart from this note of room for debate. 
 
Another element that seems to be involved in either conception of personhood is 
independence, at least in the sense that persons, in order to serve as the subjects either of praise 
and blame or of rational deliberative processes, must be loci of a multiplicity of properties, 
capacities and dispositions. Persons are the subjects of conscious states, of memories, intentions, 
feelings, etc. They also must be agents of some kind. Nevertheless, as will soon become evident, 
independence in some other respects may not be available to persons on at least one of the two 
conceptions of persons. 
 
When the question of unity is raised, the two conceptions of personhood diverge more 
obviously, being attracted to opposite poles of that dimension. If the narrative account of 
personhood is taken seriously, then it seems that persons are in some way generated by the 
activity of story-telling (whether the story is told by one or by many persons). But if the unity of 
a person is the result of the mental activity of some thinkers, the independence of persons 
comes into question. For without these activities, there would exist no person, even if there 
existed a human organism engaging in various interactions with other entities.261 And the 
dependence we find here is fairly rigid.262 The identity and existence of a person depends on the 
telling of a specific story; if the story-telling were to take place in a different way, we would 
                                                   
261 If narrative unity required the continuity of a single organism linked to the narrative ego this would be a further 
source of dependence. But there seems to be no reason to think such a linking to be a necessary requirement, even 
if the persons we usually encounter all seem to be linked to single organisms.  
262 By ‘rigid’ dependence here, I mean dependence on some specific entity, as opposed to ‘generic’ dependence 




presumably have a different person. Ignoring the threat of circularity this account of personhood 
faces (since the unity of persons seems to presuppose the (personal) unity of those entities 
telling the story), we can conclude that the individual-concept applicable to a person, on the 
narrative view apparently needed to account for ownership of actions and hence moral 
responsibility, is the concept of an extrinsically unified, dependent concrete particular.  
 
Crucial to the practice of attributing moral responsibility to some individual is the requirement 
that the individual in question be the same individual that performed the action we are 
concerned about. So continuity through time is needed, and this implies diachronic possession 
of determinate identity. But this in itself does not tell us much, since what continues through 
time may only be a complicated set of relationships between psychological states. The concept 
of a person given by Parfit’s psychological continuity criterion takes diachronic numerical 
identity to be inessential to personhood, and so is explicit about not requiring a single enduring 
biological organism, since possibly indefinitely many organisms could serve – via fission – as 
hosts for the psychologically connected selves.263 And persons, united by relations of 
psychological continuity and connectedness, do not seem to be dependent on the mental 
activities of any cognizer, except in the trivial sense that there must be some cognizer having some 
psychological states in order for there to be a person. So persons on this account do seem 
relatively independent.  
 
                                                   
263 If, per impossibile, there could somehow be an unceasing flow of organisms such that the selves in question would 
never be in any given organism longer than an instant, a case might be made for the near-complete independence of 
persons from organisms, at least as far as rigid dependence is considered. But if fission always involves 
transplantation of (at least some significant portion of) a brain, it is not clear that the psychological continuity 




One remaining concern, however, is that if persons are indeed reducible to sets of 
relationships between psychological states over time, then it seems that the identity and existence 
of a person is rigidly dependent on those states and the relationships between them. Since, 
however, the states and relationships are in a sense constitutive of the person, this kind of 
dependence may be relatively harmless. To see why, recall the case of physical bodies, which 
turned out to be dependent entities in virtue of the necessity of conceiving of such bodies as 
mereological compounds (or at least in such a way that is not inconsistent with them being 
mereological compounds), and of the fact of the tight conceptual connection between the 
macro-level causal powers of such bodies and the particles that compose them. In the case of 
persons as identified by the psychological criterion, our intuitions about counter-factual 
situations are different from those driving us to say that two rocks, e.g. Lo and Bo from the 
hypothetical story discussed in footnote 256, could not be the same across worlds since Lo and 
Bo are necessarily identical264 to the mereological compounds Lu and Bu. We can imagine a 
myriad of counterfactual situations in which a person (say, William Lyon Mackenzie King) who 
has certain psychological states between which certain relations hold in one world turns out in 
another world to have quite different psychological states, with different relations holding 
between them. Mackenzie King’s life could have been different. Had there been available to him 
no crystal balls, Ouija boards or mediums capable of performing séances, a large number of 
Mackenzie King’s experiences would have been different, and consequently instead of the 
memories and intentions formed on the basis of those experiences, he would have had others. 
But we would not, for all that, want to say that he was a different person.  
                                                   
264 If, in some possible world, the same mereological compound could have different causal powers, and so be a 
different rock, then the relation between Lu and Lo would not best be described as one of necessary identity but 
rather of one-way dependence: Lo’s identity would depend on Lu’s but not vice versa. Thanks to Dave DeVidi for 





If this is right, it turns out that the sense in which a person (on the psychological continuity 
conception) is ontologically dependent on psychological states and the relations holding between 
them is not rigid, but only a variety of a generic dependence, in the sense that for a given person 
there must be some coherent and connected series of psychological states, but variance in the 
specific states making up the series is permissible, at least to some extent. Furthermore, the 
persons we are considering are all human beings as well. So it might be thought that a person 
must be ontologically dependent on some human organism. Yet it does not seem necessary to 
conceive of persons as human beings – or for that matter even to conceive of them in a way that 
is not inconsistent with being a human being – as it is necessary to conceive of rocks as 
mereological compounds. For this reason, the possibilities of thinking of animals, or perhaps 
even non-embodied beings as persons have been seen as live options to many. This goes to 
show an apparent conceptual freedom in regard to the notion of a person which we did not find 
in regard to the notion of a physical body. 
 
As mentioned earlier, it is in terms of unity that the psychological continuity account differs 
most clearly from the narrative. Persons are, on the former story, unified by virtue of the 
relations that obtain between psychological states of selves at different times. But such relations 
hold independently of what any cognizer thinks about them; intuitively, at least, it is an objective 
matter whether or not self B remembers A’s past experiences or is motivated by A’s past 
intentions. So the individual-concept applicable to a person on the psychological continuity view 





This conception of a person, however, gives rise to some counter-intuitive results. For both 
psychological continuity and psychological connectedness seem capable of holding, not only 
between earlier and later selves within the life of one person, but also between numerically 
distinct persons. Beliefs, intentions, and memories all seem to be shareable across persons, in the 
sense that it is possible that numerically distinct persons have identical beliefs and intentions265 
(if the identity of these attitudes are determined by their content) unless every belief or intention 
essentially carries a reference to the self of the one possessing the belief or forming the 
intention.266 Relatedly, some moral theorists seem content to view various entities besides 
individual human beings as morally responsible agents. Corporations, for example, as well as 
nations, are both groups that seem to be moral agents, and thus persons, in their own right.  If 
this is the case, however, our concept of a person will have a somewhat surprising extension. 
Still, since we are dealing with concepts designed to serve certain practical purposes, this might 
not be as problematic as it seems. Recalling that we have been considering the narrative 
conception of personhood as most relevant to the phenomenon of moral responsibility may 
serve to explain this odd result. And furthermore, the intuitive strangeness may turn out to result 
mainly from the fact that human persons are also (from another perspective) organisms, and are 
thus subject to other principles of unity and identity, while corporations and nations have quite 
different unity and identity conditions. 
 
                                                   
265 Shoemaker (2005). 
266 It might be argued that Harry’s intention to go to the store has to be spelled out not as “I intend to go to the 




4.4 The Relevance of These Results 
As noted at the end of the previous sub-section, the roles requiring appeal to an individual may 
require seeing the individual from different perspectives. For example, a dog could be taken as 
an organized living system for the purpose of certain biological explanations; while certain 
physical explanations (accounting for the depression made in the ground by the dog’s falling 
body) would require seeing the dog as simply a certain compound physical individual; the fact 
that it is the locus of various life-sustaining functions would be irrelevant. But the important 
thing to take away from the discussion of this section is that the three individual-concepts we 
were able to isolate (four if the two applicable to persons are counted separately, and five if we 
count kind-instances) – each applicable to one of the classes of entities that we (prima facie) took 
our practices to demand conceptualization as objects – is distinct in significant ways from the 
others. Their scores on the various ontological dimensions are not all the same. Nevertheless, we 
have good reasons for calling each of these classes of entities (physical bodies, organisms and 
persons) kinds of ontologically robust or significant individuals, since each of them scores a ‘1’ 
on at least some of the ontological dimensions. This result is significantly strengthened by 
recalling the motivating examples of numbers and mereological sums in 4.2, which also seemed 
to warrant membership in the family of ontologically significant individuals, in spite of the 
notable divergences between their ontological scores and the scores of the entities we would 
ordinarily think of as more object-like. 
 
There remains a problem. I introduced the family resemblance account of concepts for types 
of ontologically significant individuals as a way of showing that, although the concept of an IICP 




a single concept that is indispensible for all these purposes, but a number of distinct concepts, 
each of which involves its own combination of elements from the different ontological 
dimensions. But this account was also supposed to be a step toward resolving the tension that 
arose between the conclusion of Chapter Three, that we have no unproblematic general assay of 
objects, and the apparent indispensability of the concept of an object. How, we now have to ask, 
does the family resemblance account enable us to deal with the difficulty of the apparent failure 
of all the available ontological assays? I do not pretend to be able to completely resolve this issue 
here. However, I will offer a sketch of what I think is the right way to proceed.  
 
Consider the Bundle Theory, according to which an object is a bundle of tropes united by 
relations of dependence into a foundation system which may or may not possess a core of 
essential (rigidly interdependent) tropes along with a periphery of accidental tropes. A major 
difficulty for Nuclear BT was its reliance on in-principle unspecifiable substantial parts for its 
account of the unity of macro-level tropes. Taking the family resemblance account of 
(ontologically robust or significant) individuals into consideration, we can notice that although 
the objection just mentioned holds in regard to physical bodies, since they are ontologically 
dependent on the atoms composing them, it cannot hold in regard to, say, mathematical 
individuals, which are obviously independent of any substantial (physical) parts. Organisms 
conceived of as functional units would be another candidate for an assay in the style of Nuclear 
BT. One of the key ideas of functionalism is that functionally defined states are multiply 
realizable. We can take this to entail that no appeal to any particular substantial parts would be 
required in giving a complete functional account of an organic system. When all the functional 




inventory for that individual would be complete, and so an assay in the style of Nuclear BT 
would not run into the objections it faced. In these cases, then, there would seem to be no 
obvious problem in giving a (sufficiently sophisticated) bundle theoretical assay. So although 
Nuclear BT cannot be construed as an overarching pattern for ontological assays of individuals 
of every kind, it can be a useful approach for entities falling under certain local individual-
concepts.  
 
At the level of the basic tropes, however, we saw that there was some difficulty in avoiding 
conceiving of these as bare particulars, due to the problem that any basic nature would have other 
features predicable of it (at the very least, simplicity, independence, additivity, unity) and would 
thus be complex and not in fact simple. The only way out seemed to be to say that at this level, 
something like the bare particularist account is correct, so that there are truly featureless entities 
to which the lowest-level tropes (including unity, simplicity, etc.) are tied (while not being rooted 
in them), and these are what give the basic natures their unity and numerical diversity, as a 
matter of primitive ontological fact. Of course we found conceptual difficulties in characterizing 
bare particulars as entities of this sort. But it may be the case that we have to acquiesce in the 
point Moreland made about the need to respond to dialectical pressures by postulating such 
entities, even if explaining how they can be the way they need to be in order to do what we want 
them to do for us is not fully graspable by us. Insofar as the phenomenon of numerical diversity 
seems to be an inescapable component of our experience of things, appealing to an ST-style 
assay as an instrument enabling us at least to show what is needed if we take the phenomenon 





Another example of the approach I am suggesting would be a Non-Reductionist assay of the 
kind of individual needed to serve as instances of natural kinds. The main problem facing NRT 
was that its way of accounting for various phenomena by appeal to the primitive and 
unanalysable (if not wholly mysterious) instantiation of substance-kinds seems unsatisfactory, 
and at any rate no better than the ways of accounting for the same phenomena as the 
reductionist positions. As was shown in Chapter Four, however, the kind-property explanatory 
pattern does seem to indicate a kind of common practice we engage in, involving appeal to 
kinds, or to the essences of things by virtue of which they belong to their kinds (whatever kinds 
ultimately turn out to be), as explanatorily or even causally prior to the features of the individuals 
that are instances of those kinds.  
 
Essences (if indeed we admit such things) give us a way of describing the core of what a given 
individual is that respects the macro-level unity of that individual, and thus seems resistant to a 
reductionistic assay into lower-level ontological constituents. In the case of a diamond, for 
instance, it is the crystal lattice-structure that binds the carbon atoms into a distinctive sort of 
unity that determines the diamond’s refractive index, density, ability to cut glass, etc. But the 
possibility of essence-to-property causality of the sort demonstrated here seems to entail that, at 
least insofar as this practice is concerned, reductionist assays that make particular properties 
and/or substrata prior to the objects themselves have things backwards. And this seems to 
capture something of the charge leveled by non-reductionists that to see tropes and/or substrata 
as parts is a category mistake. So even if an NRT-style assay cannot explain how individuals are 




might serve as a useful tool for accounting for the sort of explanatory practice we have been 
considering here, if not others as well. 
 
What remains to do is to investigate whether we can tell a similar story about how the key 
problems of one or another attempt to give a general theory of objects no longer apply to the 
restricted accounts of individuals we require for the various purposes I have enumerated, and 
others as well. It is beyond the scope of the current project to carry out this task in the detail it 
would require to be done well. What I have attempted to do here is to show that each of the 
ontological assays, though problematic from certain points of view, may also be useful given 
certain particular purposes. Just as we use different mathematical tools when approaching 
different kinds of scientific problems, perhaps we also need to take our collection of ontological 
assays as a sort of conceptual toolbox for dealing with local ontological issues. No good 
handyman would think that a hammer, of great use in carpentry, could serve as the fix-all tool in 
plumbing as well, and then criticize it when it does not function as well in that capacity and 
replace it with a wrench as the sole tool in his possession. Having gone pluralistic about objects 
(now construed as a multiplicity of individuals), we might also have to go pluralistic about the 
assays we employ for accounting for their various ontological aspects and for the various 





4.5 Conclusion of Chapter Four 
The following table summarizes the results of my attempt to show how distinct individual-
concepts are required by different practices (along with the results for other kinds of individual 
mentioned in the course of the discussion): 
  
 Unity Identity Locatedness Status Repeatability 
Physical Bodies Intrinsic Indeterminate Concrete Dependent Particular 
Organisms Intrinsic Determinate Concrete Independent Particular 
Persons (narrative egos) Extrinsic Determinate Concrete Dependent Particular 
      
Mereological sums Extrinsic Determinate Concrete Dependent Particular 
Mereological compounds Intrinsic Determinate Concrete Independent Particular 
Numbers ? Determinate Abstract Independent ? 
Quantum Particles Intrinsic Indeterminate Concrete Independent Particular 
Kind-Instances ? Determinate ? ? ? 
 Table 3: Some Individual-Concepts 
Not only is the conceptual schema I have been presenting flexible in such a way as to admit of 
interesting variations within the class of entities falling under one or another of the family-
resembling individual-concepts, but the conceptual demands of the practices which made 








Suggestions for Further Research 
So far, the “resolution” I offered to the tension between the prima facie importance of the 
concept of an object and the plausible view that no ontological account of objects is successful is 
little more than a suggestion. One way of carrying forward the project I have been outlining is to 
work out the details of, for example, a Bundle Theory assay for some sorts of individual, a 
Substratum Theory account for others, and a Non-Reductionist Theory approach for still others, 
along with a principled criterion and explanation of which account applies when.  
 
Furthermore, I’ve only illustrated the approach in any serious way with three sorts of 
individuals (physical bodies, organisms and persons), though I have sketched how the approach 
might deal with some others. In addition to filling in these sketches, two important further 
questions are what other sorts of individuals could this method apply to, and what assays would 
be available for them? Artifacts are a particularly salient case, given all the ink that has been and 
still is being spilled over them in metaphysics. Again, I presented only a handful of “object-
requiring” practices. What other practices or kinds of practices are relevant to the concepts of 
the various kinds of individuals we will end up with on a complete examination? Obviously, 
there is much work remaining to get this project off the ground.  
 
If this story I have been telling is right, we should also expect to be able to draw important 
implications for debates like the one canvassed at the end of Chapter Two. I noted that it is my 




Wiggins, and Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (and those sharing the views they represent) is not the 
existence of various disputed sorts of individuals (from one perfectly good point of view it would 
be insane to call their existence into question), but whether such individuals are in fact objects, 
in the sense given by (something like) the concept of an intrinsically unified, independent 
concrete particular. Once this is seen, the way is opened up for a philosophical middle ground 
which preserves the kernel of truth in each of the opposing positions.  
 
The main point at issue in the debate just mentioned concerned artifacts. But there are similar 
disputes all over metaphysics – people debate the reality of moral facts and properties, of the 
posits of theoretical physics, of beliefs and intentions, etc. I think the approach I have been 
advocating here has connections with the kind of position Crispin Wright has developed, in 
Truth and Objectivity and elsewhere, according to which realism or antirealism concerning the 
individuals of a given domain of discourse depends, among other things perhaps, on the width 
of cosmological role accorded to those entities. I have mentioned one area with connections to 
the kind of work I have been engaged in here; there are others as well. Debates about 
reductionism and supervenience could also be informed by an ontological perspective like the 
one I have been describing. Following through on such connections is another project I hope to 
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